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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 The start of the new millennium has seen a staggering outpouring of literature, 
film and art depicting dystopian and post-apocalyptic societies. Previously relegated to 
less prominent and critically-acclaimed genres like science fiction and fantasy, 
contemporary dystopian stories have come in the form of massively popular films like the 
Matrix, Hunger Games and Divergent trilogies; Emmy-winning comic-to-television 
adaptations such as The Walking Dead; and Pulitzer Prize-winning novels like Cormac 
McCarthy’s The Road, or Kasho Ishiguro’s Booker Prize-nominated Never Let Me Go. In 
2010, Paolo Baccigalupi’s post-apocalyptic novel Ship Breaker was among the first 
finalists nominated for the National Book Award in young people’s literature. In the last 
five years, a wave of critically-lauded video games—The Last of Us (2013), Bioshock 
Infinite (2013) and Dishonored (2012) come immediately to mind—have depicted 
dystopian worlds while reaching mass audiences. Combined, The Last of Us and 
Bioshock Infinite sold over 12 million copies in 2013 alone (Ledford). These titles alone 
represent the variety of mediums and genres that dystopian stories can inhabit, and their 
combination of award recognition and popularity speaks to their burgeoning cultural 
significance. In Wastelands: Stories of the Apocalypse, John Joseph Adams notes that 
dystopian stories went through an early cycle of cultural prominence in the Western 
reading world after WWII; popularity forged in the shadow of the twin horrors of the 
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Hydrogen Bomb and the Nazi Holocaust. That national popularity and fascination waned 
as the Cold War drew to a close, but reemerged again in the mid-to-late nineties, first in 
film and young adult fiction, and then later in popular adult literature. Adams wonders if 
the current resurgence is connected to widespread global conflict: “Is it because the 
political climate now is reminiscent of the climate during the Cold War? During times of 
war and global unease, is it that much easier to imagine a depopulated world, a world 
destroyed by humanity’s own hand?” (2). 
 While I agree that a kind of “global unease” is central to the re-emergence of 
fiction that depicts widespread violence, destruction, disease and political strife, the truth 
is that the international political climate resembles very little of the Cold War.
1
 Rather 
than a long-simmering conflict between established nations with legacies of military and 
economic might, the contemporary global community is more frequently defined by 
amorphous entities. International corporations, global community organizations and 
groups of non-state actors both engage and defy nation-state governments, while 
individuals, corporations and states all participate in an expansive and complex global 
economy. In this project, I argue that the antagonisms that arise from these transnational 
exchanges are both the subject and the modus operandi for dystopian stories which 
analyze, and are influenced by, terrorism and events of mass destruction.  This 
dissertation looks to the myriad ways that contemporary dystopian fear is woven into a 
global culture in which terrorism, biological warfare and scarcity of natural resources 
coalesce to create cultures of anxiety and paranoia that exist alongside more 
                                                 
1
Our newly-emerged standoff with Russia over the Crimea and the economic identity of the 
Ukraine notwithstanding.  
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cosmopolitan conceptions of globalization. 
 To understand the contemporary proliferation of dystopian stories, the genre itself 
needs to be contextualized within the synchronal rise of globalization. As I have noted, 
John Joseph Adams argues that the mid-Twentieth Century popularity of dystopian 
fiction reflects a post-World War II culture of paranoia that flourished during the Cold 
War. The impact of World War II—its endless, ruthlessly mechanized and streamlined 
butchery—and the Superpower nuclear standoff its ending engendered on the popularity 
of dystopian and apocalyptic fiction cannot be overstated. The best way to understand the 
contemporary popularity and significance of dystopian fiction is to first contextualize it 
within the history of early Twentieth Century transatlantic travel and communication, and 
then the transnationalism and technology that drives Twenty-First Century globalization. 
In doing so, the following chapters use these epochs of recent history as markers in the 
expansion of the long historical process of globalization, and contend that the major 
cultural traumas and anxieties described in modern dystopian works align with shifts and 
growths in globalization. In short, this project will show that dystopian anxieties are 
interwoven with the rise of globalization. In what follows, I begin with an overview of 
the historical antecedents of contemporary dystopian literature and theory. The 
simultaneous rise of transatlantic Modernism and the modern city sewed a cynicism and 
wariness among a segment of Modernist writers and artists. Walter Benjamin, James 
Joyce and other Modernist writers gave rise to many major Twentieth Century cultural 
critics – from Theodor Adorno and Max Horkiemer to Frederic Jameson – who 
developed a variety of theories which, I argue, navigate the basic premise of dystopian 
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theory: disillusionment and the loss of hope in a technologically advanced, mechanized 
society.  
Transnational Cities and Modern Dystopias 
 The force of modern globalization and the presence of dystopian energies in 
contemporary fiction need to be understood within the framework of Modernity and the 
manner in which it coincides with the rise of the modern city. Charles Baudelaire is 
thought to be the first poet to use the term “Modern” to describe the experience of 
industrialized, urban living, but using his works as a starting point can date the field all 
the way back to near 1840, which makes it so large as to be nearly meaningless as a 
descriptor.
2
 I take Modernism to demarcate the 35-plus year period between 1900 and the 
start of WWII in 1938. This locates the field as a successor to the Victorian Era, and 
situates it at a time in which many metropolises across the Atlantic were encountering 
new technologies of travel, mass communication and industrialization. Carl Sandburg’s 
1920 poem “Manual System” speaks directly to this confluence of communication and 
technology: 
 Mary has a thingamajig clamped on her ears  
 And sits all day taking plugs out and sticking plugs in.  
 Flashes and flashes—voices and voices calling for ears to put words in  
 Faces at the ends of wires asking for other faces at the ends of other wires:  
 All day taking plugs out and sticking plugs in,  
 Mary has a thingamajig clamped on her ears. 
 
Mary, who works as a telephone operator, has a “thingamajig clamped on her ears” (1) as 
she connects people to one another, people who are conceived as “Faces at the ends of 
wires asking for other faces / at the ends of other wires” (5-6). The poem is significant 
                                                 
2See Baudelaire’s “Painter of Modern Life” essay in The Painter of Modern Life and Other 
Essays, edited and translated by Jonathan Mayne. London: Phaidon Press, 13. 
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because in but a few brief lines Sandburg highlights the way a variety of forces worked in 
concursion to cross borders—literal and cultural – during the transatlantic Modern period. 
As her name implies, the main character of the poem is a woman, and a working woman 
at that. Like many women in the Modern period, Mary has moved into the working 
world, a precursor to the great influx of women into the U.S. workforce during World 
War II. And yet Mary isn’t just working, she’s working with new technology. “All day” 
long she is able to connect people to one another through the relatively new technology 
of the phone. So vital and important was this kind of new technology within the period 
that it literally becomes blended into the fabric of humanity: the wires connecting people 
are plugged directly into human faces, so that technology and humanity becomes a nearly 
homogenous unit. And the image we are left with is one of Mary as a type of motor or 
bridge, the person who keeps the mechanized human beings in contact with one another. 
In this sense, Sandburg positions newness (in technology, constructions of gender, and a 
variety of other domains) as the engine of the Modern period, the thing that binds 
together and animates a world that is often understood to have been defined by its 
traversing of new borders and new identities through the use of advancing technology.  
 Though unspoken, it is almost certainly true that the scene conceived by Sandburg 
would have taken place in a call center in an urban setting, as large cities were hubs for 
the transnational processes of communication and travel that developed during the 
Modern period. The end of the Civil War impelled a massive relocation of the United 
States’ population from rural to urban locations. In 1860, only 16 American cities had a 
population greater than 50,000; by 1900, the population in 38 U.S. cities totaled more 
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than 100,000 inhabitants. By 1920, the 20 largest cities in the U.S. each had a population 
over 300,000, with Chicago at over two million and New York at over five million 
residents (U.S. Census). As nearly 24 million people migrated into urban spaces in the 
forty years after the Civil War, cities grew both upward and outward (“The Rise of the 
Modern City”). At the turn of the Twentieth Century, urban spaces were becoming 
preeminent centers of commerce and congregation, and were coupled with a series of 
technological innovations, from radio-wave technology, to the telephone system 
described in Sandburg’s poem, to film (Cuddy-Keane). Maxwell Garnnett, then Secretary 
of the League of Nations, wrote in 1924 that: “The United States are, in effect, nearer to 
London than Scotland was one hundred years ago. The developments of science are 
welding the world into a whole, whether its people wish it or not” (Cuddy-Keane). 
Pamela Caughie argues that the Modern Period should be considered the start of 
contemporary globalization:  
Modernism, with its emphasis on new technology, can now be seen as at least the 
inception of what we have come to call globalization. Globalization here refers to 
the swift dissemination of cultural products (e.g., music, literature, fashion) 
worldwide through the forces of mass culture such that the borders separating 
nations and geographic regions have become permeable and insecure. (372)
3
  
 
And indeed, the era features a shrinking of geographical restrictions in a time of 
advanced travel technology, and an emerging global culture based around movement and 
communication originating in urban locations. 
                                                 
3
Roland Robertson (Globalization) and Paul Jay (Global Matters) both argue that globalization 
has a long historical genesis that stretches well back to instances of European colonialism in the 17
th
 and 
18
th
 Centuries. But Caughie’s assertion is more a suggestion that the Modern period is the root of 
contemporary globalization, and that its technological and industrial roots are still evident today. 
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 The migration of vast numbers of people to cities is an essential feature of 
globalization, and the aesthetics of urbanization were central to Modernism. A number of 
Modern writers celebrated the city and the culture of urbane cosmopolitanism they 
perceived to be growing out of it. In Writing the City, Desmond Harding argues that for 
many writers, from antiquity to the Modern era, the city was defined by a binary 
relationship of “identity and structure” (21), with urban spaces providing sociological 
structure while housing and nurturing a diverse array of identities and cultures. The city 
is, at once, culturally knowable to its inhabitants (who assume its name—Chicagoan, 
New Yorker, Parisian—as both a marker of regionality and a badge of membership) and 
yet inscrutably sprawling and morphing, lending it a sense of amorphousness:  
In linguistic terms, it can be argued that the city defies any attempt to designate a 
“meaning,” “signified,” or “center,” eliding its own signification at every turn. In 
Derridean terms, if the traditional functions of the city are now displaced to other 
parts of a more homogeneously urbanized environment (as has become the case, 
say with American “edge cities”), then the effect will resemble the loss of 
semantic apprehensibility. (22)  
 
For many artists, the city’s eliding of signification translated to endless possibility; a text 
to be continually interpreted and reinterpreted in the eye of an observer. Central to 
Baudelaire’s construction of the term “Modernity” was the concept of the flâneur, the 
strolling urban observer. As he wrote in one of the more often-cited portions of The 
Painter of Modern Life:  
For the perfect flâneur, for the passionate spectator, it is an immense joy to set up 
house in the heart of the multitude, amid the ebb and flow of movement, in the 
midst of the fugitive and the infinite. To be away from home and yet to feel 
oneself everywhere at home; to see the world, to be at the centre of the world, and 
yet to remain hidden from the world—impartial natures which the tongue can but 
clumsily define. […] Or we might liken him to a mirror as vast as the crowd 
itself; or to a kaleidoscope gifted with consciousness, responding to each one of 
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its movements and reproducing the multiplicity of life and the flickering grace of 
all the elements of life. 
 
Baudelaire composed The Painter of Modern Life in 1859, and by the high Modern 
period some 60 years later, technologies of communication afforded, to different degrees, 
the opportunity for society at large to function as a flâneur in a transcultural exchange. 
 In Reading 1922, Michael North discusses the world voyages of major artists like 
Claude McKay and Charlie Chaplin (who detailed his travels in My Trip Abroad), 
arguing that the position of the flâneur was alive and well in the Modern period. But just 
as significantly, North suggests that the advent of national media forces like the BBC 
offered a transcultural veneer to society, connecting even peoples whose lives did not 
involve direct access to travel and offering the masses access to the media’s roving, 
observing eye (16). This line of thinking is later echoed in Arjun Appadurai’s concepts of 
a mediascapes and ethnoscapes.
4
 Appadurai argues that globalization constitutes 
landscapes of people who comprise the shifting world in which we live; tourists, 
immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers and other moving groups of persons. The 
mediascape is a kind of portal into and out of which visual cultural information travels. 
For Appadurai, who is a critic of globalization and not Modernist scholar, these scapes 
are a way to conceptualize fluidity in media and migration. North suggests that these 
media portals blossomed in the Modernist period, forcing audiences to be more aware of 
the diversity of the human experience; asking Modern audiences to view themselves and 
their culture as contextual, not universal, with the media as an interlocutor (110). By 
“contextual,” North means the antithesis of the Arnoldian ideal; rather than understanding 
                                                 
4See Appadurai’s Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (1996). I discuss 
Appadurai’s work in much greater detail in the next chapter of this project.  
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their culture as omnipresent and their belief systems as universal, Modern audiences were 
forced by the mass media to understand their lifestyles as situated and mediated by a 
number of factors, including location, politics, class and race.  
Edward Cutler suggests the self-awareness of Modern audiences was mirrored by 
a reflexivity in Modernist mass media. He argues that the daily newspaper of the time 
was a deviation from previous incarnations of “newspapers,” which previously were 
printed political and religious pamphlets or tracts: purposefully biased and intended to 
persuade. Cutler notes that the daily newspaper, however, was intended to be “an ongoing 
and near synchronous representation of current events” (64) a fact which foregrounded 
the “present” moment and a reflexive acknowledgement of it as an important kind of 
“social knowing” (65). Cutler’s views seem a natural companion to North’s scholarship, 
together suggesting that transatlantic mass media forced Modernist audiences into a 
recognition of both their social contextualization and personal temporality. Not 
surprisingly, movement, migration and the media become significant themes for many 
Modernist writers during this period (John Dos Passos’s 1919 and 42nd Parallel, and 
D.H. Lawrence’s The Lost Girl spring immediately to mind). Again, the city is a vital 
construct here, as its elided signification served as a perfect embodiment of transnational 
and transcultural relativity: the city was always shifting and forever changing. 
 But this largely celebratory view of the city, and its relationship to global cultural 
exchanges, was not without dissent. The great migration to urban hubs of travel and 
culture occurred against an aggressive backdrop of industrialization and congestion. 
Where many Modernists viewed the city as a cosmopolitan ideal, others came to see 
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urban life as thronged, emotionally isolating, and perhaps most importantly, infected. 
Between 1850 and 1915, many large U.S. cities were plagued by outbreaks of 
communicable diseases. In 1866, a cholera outbreak killed 990 people in Chicago (“Early 
Cholera Outbreaks”) and the disease was a major source of mortality in New York’s Irish 
and Italian immigrant communities (“Cholera in 1866”). Between 1890 and 1893 a 
typhoid epidemic in Chicago accounted for 7% of the city’s total mortality rate. 
Localized typhoid epidemics in New York in 1906 and 1915 were preludes to the global 
Spanish Influenza pandemic of 1918-1919, which killed upwards of 40 million people 
and reduced the global life expectancy rate by nearly a decade (Billings). The virus, now 
recognized as a type of Avian flu, likely originated in China and spread from military 
trenches in Europe as World War I wound to a close to port cities along trade and travel 
routes like New York, Boston, Paris, London and Sierra Leone (Billings). The movement 
of the Spanish Influenza is eerily similar to Jack London’s remarkably prescient The 
Scarlet Plague, published in 1912 and set in 2073. In London’s novella, an elderly man 
tells the story of a global epidemic in the year 2013, which manifests like a kind of a flu – 
including a scarlet rash – and kills within an hour of infection. It is almost stunning to 
read London’s story, both because of how well it would fit in with contemporary popular 
fiction, and because even in 1912 it is already adopting a globalized identity. The disease 
is first reported in New York, but spreads rapidly through each major American city 
along a port or a train line:  
we talked through the air in those days, thousands and thousands of miles. And 
the word came of a strange disease that had broken out in New York. There were 
seventeen millions of people living then in that noblest city of America. Nobody 
thought anything about the news. It was only a small thing. There had been only a 
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few deaths. It seemed, though, that they had died very quickly, and that one of the 
first signs of the disease was the turning red of the face and all the body. Within 
twenty-four hours came the report of the first case in Chicago. And on the same 
day, it was made public that London, the greatest city in the world, next to 
Chicago, had been secretly fighting the plague for two weeks and censoring the 
news despatches [sic]. (Section I) 
 
Notice the connection London makes between New York’s status as “that noblest city of 
America” and its imagined population of “seventeen millions of people.”5 The 
implication being that New York’s standing as a world city – the equal of London in the 
New World – is intimately affixed to its growth and density. And indeed that density is 
identified as the Scarlet Plague’s primary mode of transmission:  
In spite of all these diseases, and of all the new ones that continued to arise, there 
were more and more men in the world. This was because it was easy to get food. 
The easier it was to get food, the more men there were; the more men there were, 
the more thickly were they packed together on the earth; and the more thickly 
they were packed, the more new kinds of germs became diseases. (Section I) 
 
Meanwhile, the mass exodus of millions from infected areas becomes a major 
consequence of the epidemic, and the primary mechanism by which looting, riots and 
class violence (London was a committed Socialist whose work frequently reflected the 
gilding of the Reconstruction Era) overtake the United States. 
                                                 
5The actual population of New York City is roughly half London’s estimate. The Census Bureau 
report from July 2013 estimates 8,405, 837 inhabitants in the city proper. If the metropolitan area is 
included, then the estimated polulation for New York City in 2013 balloons to 19.3 million, making 
London’s prediction surprisingly accurate.  
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Figure 1. Gordan Grant’s original illustrations for the 1915 edition of The Scarlet Plague 
The Scarlet Plague sets a structure that will be replicated in dystopian and 
apocalyptic fiction produced in the early and mid-2000s: A major catastrophe strikes a 
metropolitan area; mass casualties ensue as urban life descends into chaos, and small 
bands of survivors flee the city in favor of sparsely populated rural and wooded area. This 
pattern, imagined by London in 1912, is reproduced in Danny Boyle’s 28 Days Later 
(2002), Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2006), and Alfonso Cauron’s Children of Men 
(2006), all of which are discussed in Chapter Two. 
 That industrializing hub cities could be seen as diseased and dangerous is hardly 
unchartered territory, and The Scarlet Plague is perhaps the most extreme example of 
dystopian Modernist literature. But it provides an important backdrop for a dimmer 
perception of urban living, one that views the city as a fetid place – where the sprawling 
slippage of signification which facilitates transcultural exchanges can also be re-imagined 
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as a diseased and dangerous impersonal force. Modernist writers explored urban 
dystopias in less drastic terms than Jack London, though still within the context of the 
intersection of global technologies and the growth of urban communities. While these 
authors do not portray societies in the obvious physical or political disrepair of The 
Scarlet Plague, they still illustrate communities faltering under dystopian impulses which 
eliminate small communities, and replace them with large, potentially dangerous 
collections of un-connected peoples and energies. During this period, critics viewed the 
city as simultaneously advanced, progressive and global, and a chaotic, dangerous space 
that unmoors its inhabitants from previous identities.  
 Walter Benjamin’s writings after World War I lay the foundation for a dystopian6 
view of Modernity that he later expands upon in his Theses on the Philosophy of History. 
Jessica Berman notes that Benjamin’s essay The Storyteller laments the loss of knowable 
communities to the fragmentation of the modernizing transcontinental world: 
In the twentieth century […] social experience becomes fragmentary; the only 
community available seems to be the “community of speech […] Both Benjamin 
and Williams imagine community as the crucial link between speaker and listener 
and thus as the underlying condition of storytelling. Both Benjamin and Williams 
also imagine community as the realm in which narrative and history coincide, the 
realm in which past experiences in common make possible a shared linguistic 
meaning. And both see, in twentieth-century Europe, the problem of the loss of 
this realm of the knowable, a loss which becomes for them a key experience of 
the narratives of modernism. (2) 
 
By “the loss of this realm of the knowable,” Berman attributes the Modernist sense of 
displacement and discontinuity not to a general experience of disillusionment, but to an 
experience rooted in the loss of small, local communities. That isn’t to say that Benjamin 
                                                 
6A full definition and description of the term “dystopian,” and my use of it in this project, follows 
shortly in this introduction.  
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was opposed to cosmopolitanism (he himself was quite cosmopolitan); rather, that in an 
age of rapid industrialization and urbanization, he worried that the idea of community 
was becoming abstracted. In the absence of shared experience, Benjamin argues that 
there is no shared understanding – leaving only ignorance building toward disaster. 
Benjamin’s personal experience of terror and exile from the Third Reich only deepened 
his suspicions, and concretized his belief that the combination of rapid globalization and 
industrialization obscured individual identities and streamlined the processes of 
oppression. In Theses on the Philosophy of History, he writes: “The tradition of the 
oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in which we live is not the exception 
but the rule. We attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight” 
(257). Benjamin’s description of a perpetual “state of emergency” is an expression of 
dystopian thought: that in a fragmented and abstracted world, the past – and any wisdom 
and foresight it might imbue through shared experience – rears its head only at the 
moment it is too late to realize we’re standing on the precipice of catastrophe:  
The true picture of the past flies by. The past can be seized only as an image 
which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized and is never seen again 
[…] (The good tidings which the historian of the past brings with throbbing heart 
may be lost in a void the very moment he opens his mouth. (255)  
 
For Benjamin, history is not a chain of events leading to a more advanced, progressive 
state of being, but a sustained calamity, where society is always approaching the edge of 
some new ruin.  
 James Joyce’s Dubliners illustrates the state of calamity that Benjamin describes, 
as Dublin is portrayed as a city aspiring to the models of London and Paris, but plagued 
by industrial and moral decay, and a waning sense of national identity and history. Garry 
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Leonard has argued that Modernist writing renders the city as both a location and an 
experience, one which encapsulates the irony of isolation in ever more crowded spaces: 
The experience of modernity is fostered by the rise of the modern city, and works 
of modernism do not so much convey this experience as they betray the strain of 
surviving it and detail various strategies for doing so. Thus modernism might be 
regarded less as a representation of modernity and more as a symptom of it. 
“What are the dangers of the forest and the prairie compared with the daily shocks 
and conflicts of civilization?,” Charles Baudelaire asks (qtd. In Benjamin 39). 
Indeed, the city is a forest, one rendered all the more dangerous because it appears 
to be the final triumph over nature. (80) 
 
The Dublin of Dubliners is an illustration of those “daily shocks and conflicts of 
civilization.” As Terence Brown writes, “Symptoms of stagnation and concomitant 
misery were not hard to find” (xviii) as Dublin’s port – its main economic engine – 
flagged under competition from Cork and Belfast to serve as the primary Irish trading 
post with mainland Europe.” Most of the city’s working class, some 200,000 people, 
were left to live in dilapidated tenements, and even the historic districts of Dublin, Brown 
notes, were criticized for failing to live up to the standard of modern continental 
European beauty and architecture.  
The characters in Dubliners reflect the city’s anxieties about its flagging economy 
and perceived cosmopolitan deficiencies. While leaving the Morkan sisters’ party in The 
Dead, Gabriel is stricken to hear Bartell D’Arcey singing The Lass of Aughrim, an Irish 
folk ballad: “Now that the hall-door was closed the voice and the piano could be heard 
more clearly. Gabriel held up his hand for them to be silent. The song seemed to be in the 
old Irish tonality and the singer seemed uncertain both of his words and of his voice” 
(211). Julie Henigan believes that the use of a specific “tonality” makes the ballad 
distinctly Irish: “In this phrase [“old Irish tonality”], [Joyce] almost certainly meant to 
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suggest what is commonly called the "modality" of many traditional Irish melodies, 
“modality” here referring to the European diatonic modes, especially those not 
corresponding to the modern major and minor keys” (141). Henigan then convincingly 
contends that the Irish method of singing is a symbol for traditional Irish culture and 
identity put in opposition to a modernizing European continent – an overarching theme in 
the story and in the entire collection. The Bartell D’Arcy scene should be understood in 
tandem with an earlier dinner scene, in which the guests discuss opera. They can all 
easily recall the acclaim that follows the performance of the Italian tenor Enrico Caruso, 
but Aunt Kate has difficulty identifying a local singer who “had then the purest tenor 
voice that was ever put into a man’s throat” (200). Bartell D’Arcy’s impromptu 
performance is marked not only by his Irish tonality, but also the morose quality of his 
singing: “The voice, made plaintive by distance and by the singer’s hoarseness, faintly 
illuminated the cadence of the air with words expressing grief” (211). Bartell D’arcy is 
never able to finish his performance of the song that so moves everyone; in fact, he is 
only willing to perform it when he thinks the others are too distracted to listen. He sings 
just a few brief lines, and briskly claims to be too hoarse when pestered to continue. 
When Gretta asks about the name of the song, the response is short: “It’s called The Lass 
of Aughrim, said Mr. D’Arcy, but I couldn’t remember it properly” (213). If the song and 
its performance deal in loss, then Mr. D’Arcy’s expression of this emotion is truncated, 
with his hoarse voice and inability to remember the words serving as a failure of both 
communication and memory. So too for the characters at the table: Aunt Kate’s inability 
to recall the name of the greatest Irish singer she has ever heard, even as she so vividly 
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remembers Enrico Caruso, suggests a fear that Irish culture had become muted and 
incommunicable as Dublin sought, perhaps unsuccessfully, to greet a modernizing world 
at the turn of the 20
th
 century. As he lies down next to his sleeping wife at the end of the 
story, Gabriel thinks that “[o]ne by one they were all becoming shades” (224). The “they” 
indicates not just the members of the party, but the whole of Irish culture they are meant 
to represent. The stunted, muted nature of music in the The Dead signifies an 
omnipresent dystopian energy, evoking both the personal failures of individual 
characters, and the slow evaporation of Irish identity and culture. Because of lapses in 
memory and voice, the text’s last scene of Dublin is that of a graveyard, one populated by 
the living and the dead, who have merged into a indistinguishable grey in the face of 
Modernity. 
 Leonard tells us that Joyce reimagines the role of the flâneur in the guise of the 
artists; rather than a strolling observer of city life, says Leonard, Joyce positions the artist 
as a kind of categorizing force, one who attempt to bring discipline to the chaos and 
danger of the modern city under a rubric of aesthetic theory. That is, categorizing this as 
beautiful, or that as grotesque is a bid to bring some kind of order to the “nearly 
unmanageable assault of noise, illogical juxtaposition, relentless unpredictability and 
enigmatic epiphanies, all made publically available to anyone of all classes” (84) of the 
city. But, I suggest, Joyce’s city observers, from Dubliners to Stephen Dedalus to Bloom, 
are never able to wrangle the city’s endless spiral of significations and fragmentations. 
Just as Bloom observes his marriage spin out from under him, the Joycean observer 
always watches the city spin away from a centralizing force. In its place are a series of 
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encounters which offer the promise of revelation or romance, but almost invariably lead 
to some misfortune, small or large. In “An Encounter,” a young narrator and his friend, 
Mahony, conspire to ditch school for a day so that they may travel around Dublin, 
marveling at its magnitude. Instead, they are greeted by a young boy who launches 
epithets at them when he takes them for Protestants, a decaying ferry system by the river, 
and then, most disturbingly, an older, menacing man who wanders to them as they rest on 
a hill near the water. After interrogating the boys about how many girlfriends they have, 
and expressing his own wish to be a young boy once again, he abruptly stands to leave:  
He stood up slowly, saying that he had to leave us for a minute or so, a few 
minutes, and, without changing the direction of my gaze, I saw him walk slowly 
away from us towards the near end of the field. We remained silent when he had 
gone. After a few minutes I heard Mahony exclaim, “I say! Look what he’s 
doing!” (18). 
 
The man most likely masturbates in front of the boys (or, at the least, exposes himself to 
them from a distance), before returning. That the boys decide to use fake names with the 
man indicates their sense that he is dangerous, and that the entire exchange is a perverse 
one. The story ends as the narrator works up the courage to drag Mahony away from the 
man. The meeting with a probable pedophile ends their day as young observers of 
Dublin, but stands in for what Joyce’s larger experience of Modernizing Dublin: a 
historic but decaying city, struggling to compete with cosmopolitan Europe, rife with 
strangers who all too quickly reveal themselves as predators.  
Utopian and Dystopian States 
 Modern dystopian theory has its roots in the much of the major cultural criticism 
of the Twentieth Century, as dystopian impulses are found in the works of Theodor 
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Adorno, Jean-Franocis Lyotard and Frederic Jameson. It is first important to note the 
intrinsic connection between dystopian and utopian fictions; utopian and dystopian 
theories and stories are not just elements along a spectrum, they are direct antipathies, 
linked by their constant analysis and appraisal of the other. In terms of current theory, 
one does not exist without the other. Keith M. Booker defines utopian thinking, and the 
literature that it produces, as a critical belief in humanity’s imaginative power to enact the 
future: art and philosophy imagine an ideal state of human society and social behavior, to 
be achieved through the implementation of some new or improved system of belief (The 
Dystopian Impulse in Modern Literature). In Postmodernism, Fredric Jameson describes 
utopian thinking in reference to Hegel’s concept of “reconciliation” between states of 
being: “[...] which is to say, the illusion of the possibility of some ultimate reunion 
between a subject and an object radically sundered or estranged from each other, or even 
[...] to some new “synthesis” between them” (334-335). 
Jameson implies that belief is a fundamental element of utopian thinking; that a 
synthesis between subject and object - and in the case of utopian philosophy, the subject 
is understood as society, and the object as its ideal or most perfect state of being or 
function – can be enacted through a belief structure. Many religions, at their core, rely on 
utopian ideology, promising providence or enlightenment as a reward for behavior that 
adheres to the belief system. Jameson’s concerns, however, are closely tied to art, politics 
and secular philosophies, arguing that the primary engine of all political energy is a faith 
in the systematized improvement of society through the implementation of a social 
construct. As a Marxist, Jameson is ultimately suspicious of ideologies, but he notes in 
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The Political Unconscious that “all class consciousness – or  in other words, all ideology 
in the strongest sense, including the most exclusive forms of ruling-class consciousness 
just as much as that of oppositional or oppressed classes – is in its very nature Utopian” 
(289). Jameson admits here the utopian nature of political movements. Moreover, he 
extends that analysis to art and philosophy, arguing that the very practices operate on a 
notion that intellectual and artistic endeavors can serve to better the communities in 
which they are introduced. Regardless of the specific field (art, philosophy, politics), the 
defining characteristic of Jameson’s understanding of utopianism is belief. The content of 
the belief systems vary given the situation, but the presence of a belief structure is key: A 
utopian world is one achieved through the implementation of an ideal belief.  
 As Booker notes, utopian belief structures have existed since ancient times, 
stretching from Plato’s Republic to the Western world’s faith in reason and rationality 
during the time of the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment. Even in the mid 
Nineteenth Century, Booker suggests a prevailing belief in the liberating power of 
science and Enlightenment thinking; advances in scientific ability seemed to mean that 
nothing was out of the power of man to imagine and then create. But by the late 
Nineteenth Century, scientific advancements were also revealing the limitations of man’s 
ability to create:  
Meanwhile, nineteenth-century scientific discoveries like the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics and Darwin's theory of evolution were suggesting strict limits 
on the Enlightenment notion of unlimited progress and of the boundless power of 
the human mind to overcome all obstacles set before it. By the end of the century 
science and technology had become symbols not only of human capability, but of 
human weakness and limitation. (6) 
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By the Twentieth Century, cultural theorists from the Frankfurt School were establishing 
critiques of the unwavering belief in the progress of rationality, arguing for the notion of 
enlightenment as a deceptive system. In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Theodor Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer note:  
On the road to modern science, men renounce any claim to meaning. They 
substitute formula for concept, rule and probability for cause and motive [...] for 
the enlightenment, whatever does not conform to the rule of computation and 
utility is suspect. So long as it can develop undisturbed by any outward 
repression, there is no holding it. In the process it treats its own idea of human 
rights exactly as it does the older universals [...] which means that enlightenment 
still recognizes itself even in myths. (5-6) 
 
Adorno and Horkheimer argue that rather than being a system which frees the human 
mind from myth, magic, spirituality and the “older universals,” unblemished faith in 
science and industrial progress have merely replaced those universals even as they 
functions in the same manner.
7
 Writing as exiles from the Third Reich, Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s work views Nazi fascism as an abomination, but not necessarily an 
aberration; ancient beliefs in the unknown have been replaced by the Enlightenment’s 
complete fear of it, and thus any system that is mechanized and total becomes a 
sanctuary, even one that forces its participants to willingly engage in genocide. The point 
here is not that Nazi Germany was dystopic, but that its existence compels critics like 
Adorno and Horkheimer to some of the earliest Modernist dystopian thinking: the fear 
that, if older universal systems and modern scientific systems have come to behave as 
one another, then all systems of belief are flawed, and progress is an illusion. 
                                                 
7
I think it is important to note that many readers incorrectly assume that Adorno and Horkheimer 
argue that Enlightenment is necessarily a myth, or, by nature mythical. I do not read the text this way. 
Instead, I think they are performing a reading of a historical variance; that is, that as it has developed over 
the century and-a-half they observe, faith in Enlightenment values has come to function much the same as 
faith in mythology, religion or the supernatural. 
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 The disillusion with even the possibility of utopian progress becomes a major 
feature of literature and cultural criticism in the mid-to-late Twentieth Century. Jean-
Francois Lyotard suggests that science and “metanarratives” have always been in conflict 
with one another (The Postmodern Condition).
8
 Moreover, he argues that the 
Enlightenment is a grand narrative, wherein knowledge works toward the ethical and 
social goal of peace. He questions the validity of that narrative, however, terming his 
suspicions “postmodern” and describing the postmodern condition as “an incredulity 
toward metanarratives [...] the narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its 
great dangers, its great voyages [...] it is being dispersed in clouds of narrative language 
elements – narrative, but also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive and so on” (509). 
Perhaps the most fitting description comes from the seminal work Shape of Utopia, 
where Robert C. Elliot comments: 
To believe in utopia one must believe that through the exercise of their reason 
men can control and in major ways alter for the better their social environment 
[...] To believe in utopia one must have faith of a kind that our history has made 
nearly inaccessible. This is one major form of the crisis of faith under which 
Western culture reels. (86) 
 
The criticism detailed here goes by many names, from high modernism, to 
deconstructionism, to postmodernism, but I contend that a guiding feature of these 
theories is an examination of the loss of belief; or rather, the thinking that all systems of 
belief promising utopia progress are suspicious. This skepticism forms the basis of my 
                                                 
8
Lyotard uses the term “metanarratives,” which in the context of his argument, seems similar in 
definition to Adorno and Horkheimer’s “older universals”; both terms denote systems of belief or 
understanding that are not necessarily scientific or rational by their nature. Lyotard describes “the 
hermeneutics of meaning” (509), while Adorno and Horkheimer write of magic and mythology, but they 
seem to describe systems which, to borrow from Adorno and Horkheimer, “[do] not conform to the rule of 
computation and utility.” 
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definition of the relationship between utopian and dystopian thinking: in short, utopia 
describes a presence, and dystopia describes an absence. Utopian hope is founded on the 
presence of widespread belief in a system of behavior or ethics as a path to its own ideal 
state, and a utopian community is one that successfully enacts those prescriptions. 
Dystopian fear, on the other hand, examines the partial or complete loss of such faiths, 
and a dystopian community is one suffering under both the consequences of failed 
utopian policies, and an evaporating sense of belief in any ability to progress or improve.  
 Practically speaking, dystopian narratives are valuable for their ability to 
illuminate and analyze the flaws inherent to a given strand of utopian thinking. Booker 
helpfully comments that: 
[D]ystopian literature is specifically that literature which situates itself in direct 
opposition to utopian thought, warning against the potential negative 
consequences of arrant utopianism. At the same time, dystopian literature 
generally also constitutes a critique of existing social conditions or political 
systems, either through the critical examination of the utopian premises upon 
which those conditions and systems are based or through the imaginative 
extension of those conditions and systems into different contexts that more clearly 
reveal their flaws and contradictions. (3) 
 
The “imaginative extension” comes through a process which I will refer to as 
defamiliarization. Dystopian stories frequently feature societies or communities familiar 
to our own in their social, political, or economic composition, but differentiated by time, 
location or, often, technological capability; the effect distances the reader or viewer 
enough to critically analyze what might otherwise be dismissed as commonplace or 
familiar. Some stories, like Joyce’s Dubliners, subtly exaggerate the moral deterioration 
of a city. Others—William Golding’s Lord of the Flies and Alan Moore’s Watchmen, for 
example—more explicitly illustrate the large scale collapse or disintegration of political 
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and economic systems, as well as common forms of social interaction. In chapter two, for 
example, I argue that three contemporary tales—Alfonso Cauron’s film Children of Men, 
Danny Boyle’s film 28 Days Later and Cormac McCarthy’s apocalyptic novel The 
Road—perform the project of dystopian critical analysis, while responding to the social 
and political critiques from globalization theorists and critics.  
 The following chapters are unique in historicizing the rise of dystopian and 
apocalyptic literature in relationship to the rise of Modernity. The theoretical frameworks 
outlined above often describe momentary disillusionments with industrial or 
technological progress, a context which has long informed the popular definition of 
“dystopian.” This project recognizes this framework, but pushes the field toward an 
understanding of the role that globalization has played in cultivating the current field of 
dystopian literature and film, and shows how the growth of the transnational community, 
and the intersections and antagonisms it brings, impacts a significant contemporary 
genre. 
Chapter Outlines 
 
Chapter Two: After the Towers: Terrorism, Global Media and the Dystopian 
Zeitgeist 
 If the rise of Modernism was distinctly tied to the rise of the modern city, the 
dominant narrative at the other end of the Twentieth Century is rooted in paranoia and 
fear about its susceptibility to attack and collapse. The September 11
th
, 2001, terrorist 
attacks and the images they produced—smoldering skyscrapers, collapsing towers, rubble 
and debris mixed with body parts and photographs—were burned into the collective 
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consciousness of a digital public and inform this pervasive cultural fear. So too do train 
bombings in London and Madrid,
9
 hotel explosions and shootings in Mumbai,
10
 and 
sustained popular fear of biological warfare. These events, among many others, coalesce 
to create widespread feelings of insecurity and vulnerability, which take root in images of 
urban destruction.  
 Chapter One looks specifically to issues of memory, trauma and representation in 
what, for many in the United States, is the most dystopian occurrence of the new century: 
the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks. Specifically, I explore the attacks on the North and 
South Towers of the World Trade Center, and the popular imagery of burning 
skyscrapers, crumbling industrialization and human rubble they engender. I first argue 
that contemporary terrorism and terrorists need to be understood as emerging from the 
processes of globalization as amorphous, subaltern groups which design their attacks to 
maximize exposure in the symbolic exchange of the global media. From there, I propose 
that the symbols which emerge from the dust and death in Manhattan on September 11
th
 
fit Edward Burke’s classic definition of the Sublime: a massive, horrifying and 
hypnotizing spectacle of destruction, pain and mass casualty.  
 I insist that terrorism is both a physical and cultural phenomenon, and that 
cultures of terror exist and effect contemporary global culture. Terry Eagleton’s Holy 
Terror, which claims that terrorism forces death and destruction into the consciousness of 
                                                 
9
On Thursday, April 11, 2004, 191 people were killed in coordinated train bombings in Madrid, 
and on Thursday, July 7, 2005, 56 people were killed in coordinated bombings in London’s underground 
train system and aboard one bus. 
 
10
Between November 26-29, 2008, 164 people were killed in coordinated bombings and shootings 
at a series of hotels and cafes in Mumbai, India. 
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a culture, shows that dystopian stories which mimic those events allow cultures to 
process the sublime danger and fear that result from a safer proximity. Finally, I end with 
a discussion of the Falling Man, a specific image of a man falling from the North Tower 
on September 11
th
, and perhaps the most significant cultural image produced by the 
attacks as a whole. The Falling Man is central element in both Don DeLillo’s Falling 
Man and Jonathan Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, which use the 
image and the taboos that surround the image to suggest that art and literature can create 
agency for wounded and stunned observers of real-world dystopian imagery. 
Chapter Three: Dystopian Global Conflict and Mass Destruction 
 In the decade after September 11
th
, often referred to as the War on Terror decade, 
contemporary dystopian fiction is set against the backdrop of the attacks and suffused 
with the vocabulary and imagery of urban terrorism. Chapter Two moves to fiction in the 
War on Terror decade. The destruction wrought on family units in these texts speaks to a 
dialogue with the global. As critics of globalization raise important concerns about 
population growth, migration, and scarce resources, the disassembling and rebuilding of 
families in dystopian stories stands in for the interaction that individuals and small groups 
have with the global community. This dystopian engagement with globalization 
underpins Alfonso Cauron’s 2006 film Children of Men, Danny Boyle’s 2002 zombie 
redux film 28 Days Later, and Cormac McCarthy's 2006 apocalyptic novel The Road. In 
Children of Men war, immigration and infertility are the backdrop for a story of a society 
with no systematized structure belief and, literally, no hope for its own future. 28 Days 
Later utilizes the zombie horror genre as a metaphor for mass infection and biological 
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warfare in the post-September 11
th
 world community. The Road, meanwhile, depicts 
characters who struggle with the complete loss of organizing systems—governments, 
religious institutions and nuclear families—in the face of an unknown worldwide 
disaster. In focusing their stories on small groups of survivors who form improvised 
domestic units, Cauron, Boyle and McCarthy position the family (and the authors / 
directors define family in many ways, as we will see) as a counterbalance to a myriad of 
dystopian global crises.    
Chapter Four: The Global Posthuman: Dystopian Evolution and Corporate 
Hegemony 
 The final chapter of this project turns to extremely recent dystopian fiction. As 
public attention shifted drastically away from the War on Terror after the global financial 
recession of 2008-2009, dystopian stories moved away from the drastic imagery of 
catastrophic urban destruction, and instead moved toward a discussion of the anxieties 
which animate post-recession culture: class conflict, the gulf between corporations and 
individuals, and the further depletion of world resources. Even more interestingly, recent 
dystopian fiction often takes up questions of the basic nature of humanity and its 
relationship to technology by imagining future worlds in which there is no clear 
demarcation between what is natural and what is constructed, between the human and the 
cyborg. In this chapter, I examine Paolo Bacigalupi’s 2009 posthuman novel The Windup 
Girl and Ken Levine’s Bioshock game series (2008-2014). These texts foreground 
concerns about wealth inequality and power, and the role of corporations in biological 
and environmental development. In this chapter, I look to fiction infused with the 
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apprehension and fear of the early and mid-2000s, but which looks forward to concerns 
about humanity’s ability to sustain and inhabit the planet in the shadow of global 
corporate power.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
AFTER THE TOWERS: TERRORISM, GLOBAL MEDIA AND 
THE DYSTOPIAN ZEITGEIST 
Before turning to popular dystopian texts, it is vital to understand the role that 
terrorism and the War on Terror played in creating a pervasive global psychology of 
paranoia, xenophobia and fear in the new millennium.
1
 The September 11
th
 attacks, and 
the massive cultural zeitgeist they engendered—one replete with images of urban 
destruction, suffused with the vernacular of subaltern threats, and anchored by more than 
a decade of war—are directly responsible for the enormous outpouring of dystopian 
stories in the new millennium. On Monday, September 17
th
 2001, less than one full week 
after four hijacked planes were flown into the World Trade Center Towers, the Pentagon 
and a field in Pennsylvania, novelist Martin Amis wrote: 
It is already trite - but stringently necessary - to emphasise that such a mise en 
scène would have embarrassed a studio executive's storyboard or a thriller-writer's 
                                                 
1
There have been many instances in which a leader or national representative has vowed to wage 
battle against terrorism (or specific terrorists). The term “War on Terror” was popularized by George W. 
Bush in the weeks after the September 11
th
 attacks, but defining its scope and reach is a section of political 
theory unto itself. For my purposes here, the “War on Terror” refers to the international military operation 
led by a loose coalition of NATO and Non-NATO states against fundamentalist terrorism after the 
September 11
th
 attacks.  
 
 Barack Obama has at several points implied or outright declared the War on Terror and its 
doctrine of preemptive aggression to be over—at least as an official tactical pursuit of the US government. 
In a 2010 speech at the National Defense University, Obama said, “Beyond Afghanistan, we must define 
our effort not as a boundless ‘global war on terror’ – but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to 
dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America” (quoted in The Washington Post, 
May 23
rd
, 2013).  That said, the basic elements of the campaign—a draconian domestic and international 
spying apparatus, a program of extraordinary rendition, the ever-expanding use of drone warfare against 
militant extremists—are still fully operational and functional, and most political writers argued that the War 
on Terror has never actually end, even if the term has been retired.      
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notebook ("What happened today was not credible," were the wooden words of 
Tom Clancy, the author of The Sum of All Fears). And yet in broad daylight and 
full consciousness that outline became established reality: a score or so of Stanley 
knives produced two million tons of rubble. (The Guardian) 
 
That Amis finds the comparison of the attacks to a movie storyboard trite just six days 
after the attacks speaks both to how frequently that particular comparison was invoked in 
the immediate spectre of September 11
th
, and to the pervasive and lasting difficulty of 
contextualizing the scale and horror of the destruction.  
 Across the country, front pages of national and regional newspapers responded to 
the attacks with startling similarity: an image of the burning North and South World 
Trade Towers, and a short, bolded exclamation of fear (“Terrifying”;2 “Terror!”3), 
anguish (“Day Of Death”;4 “America Savaged, Changed Forever”5) or anger 
(“Bastards!;”6 “OUTRAGE”7). The confusion and anger—the uncertainty that underlines 
the Akron Beacon Journal’s “Who Did This?” headline —of the days immediately 
following the attacks portented the months and years to follow, as the struggle to 
comprehend their occurrence morphed into a deep cultral struggle to comprehend their 
meaning. And trite though Amis may have found them, the analogies to big budget 
disasters films hinted at a cultural phenomenom that would soon emerge, in which the 
attacks were aestheticized in literary and cinematic representation to assert control over 
                                                 
2
The Oakland Tribune. 
 
3
The Arizona Republic. 
 
4
The Indianapolis Star. 
 
5
The Detroit Press. 
 
6
The San Francisco Examiner. 
 
7
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. 
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their impact and affect. I argue here that the aura of terrorism draped itself, in subtle and 
unsubtle ways, over popular fiction and imagination because the structural intent of 
terrorism works toward that result. Mass-scale acts of terrorism utilize devices typical to 
fiction, metaphor and symbolism, to embed themselves in cultural memory.  
In the decade since, many authors aestheticize the attacks, hoping that the metaphors and 
symbols bound up in terrorism can be repurposed to different cultural or personal affect. 
In this chapter, I argue that contemporary terrorist events—the September 11th attacks are 
my primary focus, but the public transit bombings in London and Madrid and the 
shootings in Mumbai also come immediately to mind—are intimately connected to the 
experience of globalization, both for those that experience the attacks and for those that 
perpatrate them. They are true global spectacles, imbued with meaning that is intended to 
reveerbarate through transnational channels of media and migration. Scenes attendant to 
terrorism—smoldering skyscrapers, collapsing towers, rubble and debris mixed with 
body parts and photographs—burn themselves into the collective consciousness of a 
digital global public and coalesce to create the dystopian psychology which blooms in the 
new millennium. 
Theory and Context: Fact and Representation on 9/11 
 As with all cultural forces, definitions impact meaning, and the relationship 
between terrorism and globalization is impacted by how we define and historicize these 
forces. In my introduction, I outlined the debate between critics who view globalization 
as a contemporary phenomenon predicated on a distinct break from previous modes of 
communication and travel (what Appadurai refers to as a “rupture” (2) in Modernity at 
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Large), and critics who view contemporary globalization as an acceleration of long-
existing forces. I agree with Roland Robertson, who famously defined globalization as 
“the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a 
whole,” (8) and Paul Jay, who writes that “globalization actually has a long history and 
[the] whole arch of European imperial expansion, colonization, decolonization, and the 
establishment of postcolonial states figures prominently in that history” (41). What we 
today call globalization has a long historical and cultural genesis. In this chapter, I bridge 
these critics, using Appadurai’s concept of “scapes” (fluid global portals through which 
culture, money and images move) and Robertson’s theory of “glocalization,” arguing that 
terrorist events are localized dystopian tragedies whose symbology echo through global 
portals. 
 In Modernity at Large, Appadurai identifies a number of dimensions through 
which global goods, culture and money are exchanged; portals which he refers to as 
“scapes.” These include technoscapes, which encompasses global technology of travel 
and communication; financescapes, which account for the expansive and often subaltern 
flow of global capital; and ethnoscapes, which are the most difficult to describe, but seem 
to generally conceptualize a landscape of individuals who populate the movement of 
globalization, including travelers, businesspeople, guest workers, immigrants, refugees, 
exiles and other moving groups. Appadurai’s concept of mediascapes and ideoscapes are 
most useful. He writes that “mediascapes refer both to the distribution of the electronic 
capabilities to produce and disseminate information (newspapers, magazines, television 
stations, and film-production studios)
8
 which are now available to a growing number of 
                                                 
8
An updated account of mediascapes would no doubt include any number of web-media. 
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public and private interests throughout the world, and to the images of the world created 
by the media” (35). Put differently: the entirety of the image-producing media, and the 
narrative—of an event, a culture, globalization itself—that the images create and 
reinforce for an eager public in a constant cycle of production and reification. Closely 
related, ideoscapes refer to images and narratives that contain an explicit political or 
nationalist ideology, and which similarly travel through media channels. Taken together, 
these scapes are “scripts” that: 
[C]an and do get disaggregated into complex metaphors by which people live 
(LaKoff and Johnson 1980) as they help to constitute narratives of the Other and 
protonarratives of possible lives, fantasies that could become prolegomena to the 
desire for acquisition and movement. (35-36) 
 
Mediascapes and ideoscapes in many ways form the basis for Appadurai’s concept of 
Globalization as a whole. Rooted heavily in Benedict Anderson’s work on “imagined 
communities,”9 Appadurai argues that the individuals who populate the global 
community, who participate in the movement and exchanges of the scapes, have an 
agency to construct highly unique identities based on the cultural elements they access in 
these portals. He doesn’t fetishize his concept, but it is a largely positive view of a global 
cosmopolitanism in which individuals have significant ability to assemble diverse 
identities in ways that were inaccessible to past generations. Kwame Anthony Appiah 
expands on Appadurai in The Case for Contamination, arguing for a transnational 
community of travelers and terming global culture “Cosmopolitanism.” Appiah suggests 
                                                 
9Anderson defined an “imagined community” as one not predicated on a daily physical or social 
interaction – like, say, a small town of people – but rather on constructed beliefs or ideologies to which 
individuals belong, whether willingly, unwillingly or unknowingly. Anderson’s work relates most direct to 
discussion of nationalism, and the manner in which individuals from diverse backgrounds imagine 
themselves to belong to the same national identity.  
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that the cosmopolitan is “citizen of the world,” who seems to carry an inherited, regional 
culturalism to new locations, creating meaning through pluralistic, polyglot difference.  
 Roland Robertson’s concept of “glocalization” is a productive corollary to 
Appadurai and Appiah. Like Appadurai, Robertson recognizes the “complex metaphors” 
used by global citizens to construct their conceptions of others and themselves, but argues 
that thinking of globalization in purely or predominantly macro social terms—for 
example, as transcultural portals in which cosmopolitan identities are sculpted—elides 
the reality of the local, or lived experience of a particular place or culture. Robertson 
writes that:  
The reason for my emphasizing the local as adding a spatial dimension to the 
study of globalization, contra Appadurai, is mainly because sociology has—again 
until recently—been centered upon diachronicity, or  temporality. In fact 
from Marx onward, the so-called classical sociologist through Max Weber were, 
above all, preoccupied with the shift from pre-modern to modern societies. Thus 
to speak of glocalization is meant to ensure that the general discussion of 
globalization encompasses the cross-cutting dimension of locality along spatial 
lines. (“The Conceptual Promise of Glocalization”) 
 
Put differently, Robertson developed the concept of glocalization, a portmanteau of 
global and local, as a way to foreground the simultaneity of the micro and the macro in 
the globalized world; events have a local impact and reality, but exist in a global context, 
and produce meaning in the fluid constellation of metaphors, symbols and stories at the 
heart of Appaduri’s definition of globalization.  
 Though they are infrequently cited in discussions of terrorism,
10
 I argue that 
Appadurai and Robertson’s conceptualizations are essential to understanding both 
contemporary terrorist acts and, crucially, the cultural response that the authors discussed 
                                                 
10I’m struggling to find any scholarly citation of either critic in a major paper about terrorism in 
any of the standard databases – Academic Search Premier, Ebsco, JSTOR.  
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later in this chapter engage in. C.A.J. Coady suggests that while “terrorism” is a loaded 
word carrying a variety of meanings, the term denotes two generally agreed upon 
features. First: in order to be considered an act of terror, an event must include violence 
(or a significant threat of violence) against a group of people widely considered to be 
innocent: “More exactly, I would define [terrorism] as the organized use of violence to 
attack non-combatants (‘innocents’ in a special sense) or their property for political 
purposes” (“Defining Terrorism,” 5). The immediate destruction and death of terrorist 
event is only a portion of the act itself, which brings us to the second feature: terrorism is 
primarily intended to affect or alter the behavior of people not directly subjected to the 
violence and pain of the event. Igor Primoratz notes that: 
In terrorism proper, causing fear and coercion through fear are the objective […] 
for terrorism very often aims at setting off long and complex social processes, 
involving much irrational behavior, that are meant to disorient the public and 
destabilize various social arrangements and institutions, if not social life in 
general. (“What is Terrorism?” 24) 
 
That is to say that I think the most rigorous definitions of contemporary terrorism 
recognize that symbology is its primary objective, not death. For as tragic, horrific and 
massive as the loss of life on September 11
th
 was, the men who hijacked the planes that 
were flown never really intended to punish the particular individuals in the World Trade 
Center Towers and the Pentagon.
11
 Certainly, it was central to the heinousness of the 
attacks, but the larger objective is the injection of fear, the disruption of life, and the 
alteration of public policy injected into society in the months and years beyond the 
attacks themselves. 
                                                 
11
Or the Capitol Building, which most investigators speculate was the intended target of the 
hijacked Flight 93 United plane. 
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 Alex Houen, much like Primoratz, argues that beyond the immediate material 
reality of death and destruction, terrorism is, at its very core, a symbolic act (Terrorism 
and Modern Literature). It is a collision of symbols and metaphors competing for the 
attention of a large audience, sometimes specific and sometimes nonspecific. Terrorist 
acts have an intended political and social reception, and also a cultural life beyond the 
duration of the destruction – the public and private reception of the act is part of an 
ongoing negotiation of the event. And in a globalized world, that constant public and 
personal negotiation of the meaning and significance of the events occurs in the very 
portals and scapes that Appadurai describes. The technologies of communication that 
define Appadurai’s mediascapes were also primed for an event like the September 11th 
attacks. Perhaps never before in history has a single event been so well-documented:  in 
stories, cell phone videos, photographs, audio recordings and a twenty-four hour news 
media which first broadcast and re-broadcast the attacks. Intended as spectacle, the 
mediums and modalities of the mediascape became central to the lasting experience of 
the terrorism, and underscore the truly glocal nature of the attacks. In a 2009 interview 
with Mark Athitakis, Kristiaan Versluys, author of the 9/11 study Out of the Blue, 
suggests: 
9/11 is arguably the first instance of what one could call global trauma. It was 
witnessed not only by the people in the direct vicinity of the WTC-towers on that 
bright Tuesday morning. It was also witnessed by millions and presumably 
hundreds of millions on TV, either live or in the many repetitions of the iconic 
images that everybody remembers […] all notions that are current in trauma 
theory – may have to be adapted or revised to fit the new category of global 
trauma. Televised indirect experience raises new questions as to what is genuine 
and what is hype and it establishes new conditions for making memorializing into 
an act of approximation and not an act of appropriation. (Athitakis)  
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Reading the attacks as glocal, Robertson would insist that we cannot elide the immediacy 
of the event; the devastation, death, urban destruction and environmental poisoning 
encapsulate the real, lived experience of the attacks – its diachronicity—as do the days of 
search and rescue, weeks and months of poisonous clean-up, and the years of rebuilding 
and memorializing. But the array of metaphors, stories and debates that spiral through the 
mediascapes and into public consciousnesses constitute the symbolic life of a global 
terrorist event. When, in the quote introducing this chapter, Martin Amis comments that 
the attacks would “embarrass a studio executive’s storyboard,” he’s speaking to the 
public negotiation of the attack: the symbolic (in)comprehension of the mass violence. As 
Richard Schechner wrote: 
The world was given free tickets to a real-life made-for-media movie. The  images 
from New York uncannily resembled The Towering Inferno, the Godzilla movies, 
and other catastrophe films where terrified, panicked crowds flee down the 
canyons of Manhattan ahead of fire, smoke, and debris. Although the pentagon 
was also hit, and a hijacked plane crashed in Pennsylvania […] New York took 
center stage (265). 
 
For the significant majority of the nation that experienced the carnage not firsthand, but 
through the gaze of a news camera and the glow of a television, the comparisons between 
Hollywood disaster films and the lived destruction of the attacks were a natural, if trite, 
effort to put unfamiliar fear and death into a familiar context. 
 The aesthetic shock and the visceral reality of the attack leave the observing 
public at a difficult juxtaposition. On the one hand, the analogies to disaster films and big 
budget actions make sense as an organizing reference: the scale of the attacks is so 
unbelievable (a point I’ll revisit in greater detail shortly) that the unreal or the fictional is 
the only context that seems proportionate. On the other hand, an event like September 
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11
th 
hardly seems a natural subject for fiction; the sheer amount of destruction and death, 
and the extreme degree to which the events of the attacks were documented via 
television, photographs, newspapers, cellphone video and amateur photography, mark it 
as an event which few people associate with fictionalization. Houen notes, “It was a day 
in which terrorism exploded into a sheer viscerality of fact
12” (1). But the magnitude of 
that viscerality renders its experience almost numbing, and nearly impossible to 
categorize. The comparison to films, the stunned, angry headlines in newspapers, and the 
endless replays of the Tower falling and debris-caked people running in abject fear are a 
part of the glocal mediation of the event. 
 In his essay “The Ruins of the Future,” Falling Man author Don DeLillo gives 
voice to that juxtaposition of so many observers, writing about the necessity of locating, 
documenting and reproducing the myriad individual stories and experiences that were 
born out of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Towers, the Pentagon, and in 
Pennsylvania:  
The cellphones, the lost shoes, the handkerchiefs mashed in the faces of running 
men and women. The box cutters and the credit cards. The paper that came 
streaming out of the towers and drifted across the river to Brooklyn backyards 
[…] These are among the smaller objects and more marginal stories in the shifted 
ruins of the day. We need them, even the common tools of the terrorists, to set 
against the massive spectacle that continues to seem unmanageable, too powerful 
a thing to set into our frame of practiced response. (34)  
 
Indeed, the “unmanageable” nature of the attacks captures attention throughout much of 
DeLillo’s essay and novel, as he grapples with what critic Marco Abel describes as 
competing desires to aestheticize and experiment with representations of September 11th, 
or to act as a kind of journalist, struggling to accurately transcribe and represent an event 
                                                 
12
Emphasis mine. 
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which seems, literally, “incomprehensible,” (“DeLillo’s Ruins of the Future,” 1239). 
DeLillo’s difficulty in finding the appropriate manner of representation for September 
11
th
 speaks to the larger issue of aesthetics in literature which describes actual—that is, 
lived and historical—events of widespread terror, violence and destruction.  
 I mention Houen here because he helpfully articulates the manner in which many 
works of fiction dealing with terrorism or destruction attempt to negotiate the gap 
between journalism and fiction. Doubtless, categories like “literature” and “film” carry 
the connotation of fiction: an artistic rendering even of events based in reality. But novels 
and films depicting acts of terrorism challenge these notions on a variety of fronts. 
Contemporary films have, with increasing frequency, attempted to walk a line between 
fiction and a documentary-like approach to representation. The New York Times noted the 
intense length that director Paul Greengrass took to achieve “a believable truth” in 
writing and filming his 2006 film United 93, a docu-drama styled retelling of the United 
flight 93’s hijacking and eventual crash into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania: 
[Greengrass] incorporates information about the disaster, including the plane's 
exact movements in the air, the times and content of phone calls to family 
members, recordings from inside the cockpit and reaction on the ground from air 
traffic controllers and the military, as well as details about the passengers' 
personalities and mannerisms provided by the families. (“Four Years On, a 
Cabin’s-Eye View of 9/11”) 
 
The practical effect of all this research is a film that feels clinical and sparse, like a 
documentary, even as the audience knows that vital lines of dialogue and key events 
within the cabin of the plane were improvised. The aesthetic affect, many critics argued, 
was that the intensely realistic style of the film removed it from the tainted, complex 
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cultural debate about the attacks that emerged in the five years between September 11
th
 
and the film. Roger Ebert opened his positive review of United 93 by saying,  
It is not too soon for "United 93," because it is not a film that knows any time has 
passed since 9/11. The entire story, every detail, is told in the present tense. We 
know what they know when they know it, and nothing else. Nothing about Al 
Qaeda, nothing about Osama bin Laden, nothing about Afghanistan or Iraq, only 
events as they unfold. This is a masterful and heartbreaking film, and it does 
honor to the memory of the victims. 
 
Ebert’s commentary is instructive in many ways. The most pressing point here is that 
Ebert thinks a realistic depiction of the events of September 11
th
, one that remains 
“present tense,” can remove itself from the glocal mediascapes and ideascapes to which 
the event now belongs. Ebert, a very smart critic, thinks that this particular depiction of a 
terrorist attack can be separated from the symbolic negotiation of the event that follows 
it, and in doing so, can serve to honor the memory of victims by distancing them from the 
political and social realms that September 11
th
 has become associated with. Ebert 
overlooks or ignores the fact that the viewer brings these frames of reference to bear even 
if the film actively elides them. This speaks to what DeLillo calls “unmanageable”; not 
just the massive scale of destruction, but the struggle to reconcile the symbolic life of the 
act with the memory of its visceral reality. Ebert and other critics praised Greengrass’s 
film for attempting to distance the two, and while I disagree that that is even possible, the 
mere fact that Ebert opens his review of the film in this way speaks to the prevalence of 
the debate over fictional representations of actual tragedies. Even as we know that the 
symbology of an event carries equal weight to the lived destruction, the public struggles 
with obvious questions: “When has enough time passed to fictionalize this event?” 
“When is it ‘too soon’”? “What kind of fictionalization is appropriate?” 
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 The persistence of these questions regarding the nature and appropriateness of 
September 11
th
 fiction coexists with an ever-expanding pool of such literature and film. 
That same 2006 New York Times article describing Greengrass’s extensive research into 
United flight 93 opens by noting that:  
After almost universally shying away from the topic for the past four years, 
Hollywood is turning in full force to the events of Sept. 11, 2001. Painful 
memories, all-too-familiar news clips and personal stories are now being 
transformed into big-screen dramas, as studios look for commercial value in the 
still-fresh trauma, while prompting the mass audience to revisit its thoughts and 
feelings. 
 
And in the decade-and-a-half since the attacks, hundreds of novels, films, and television 
episodes have directly or indirectly described the events of September 11
th
, underscoring 
a larger question: if its appropriateness or value is still widely debated, why is fiction 
about September 11
th
 so popular? Why are we preoccupied with the unmanageable and 
the unspeakable? 
The Aesthetics of Terrorism 
The answer to that question touches on many of the forces I have described in this 
chapter thus far: the symbology of mass terrorism, the transmission of dystopian imagery 
through global media portals, and the etymological origins of terror in aesthetics. It is 
generally accepted that Edmund Burke is the first English writer to use the word 
terrorism in regard to an event of mass violence. In his Letters on a Regicide Peace 
(1795-96), Burke records his reflections on the most violent phase of the Jacobian Reign 
of Terror and the subsequent Thermidorian Reaction, and describes his horror from afar 
at the mass public executions committed both by the French Revolutionaries and those 
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that revolted against revolutionary rule.
13
 Writing of the brutal purge of Jacobeans, Burke 
commented: 
At length, after a terrible struggle, the Troops prevailed over the Citizens. The 
Citizen Soldiers, the ever famed National Guards, who had deposed and murdered 
their Sovereign, were disarmed by the inferior trumpeters of that Rebellion […] 
Thousands of those Hell-hounds called Terrorists, whom they had shut up in 
Prison on their last Revolution, as the Satellites of Tyranny, are let loose on the 
people. The whole of their Government, in its origination, in its continuance, in 
all its actions, and in all its resources, is force; and nothing but force. (3.4.72) 
 
In this instance, Burke’s use of “Terrorists” is, in practical effect, the opposite of our 
contemporary understanding of the word. Burke attaches it to Government agents 
exerting mass violence and intimidation against the French Revolutionaries, and thereby 
establishing a government based on coercion, not consent.
14
 Meanwhile, the 
contemporary conception of a terrorist is typically that of a subaltern agent or group who 
frequently employ violence to protest a government, not enforce its will. The amorphous, 
non-state character of terrorism is perhaps its most defining Twenty First Century 
characteristic; a shift – as I’ve noted in my introduction to this project– away from Cold 
War conflict (and the dystopian stories which emerge from it) defined by established 
Super Powers with economic and military might. Though his embodiment of a terrorist 
was substantially different from our own, Burke’s use of the term and larger witness of 
the French Revolution is extraordinarily significant in the development of his aesthetic 
theory on terror, fear and the Sublime. 
                                                 
13
On the Thermidorian Reaction: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/591497/ 
Thermidorian-Reaction, and Burke’s reaction to the Reign of Terror. 
 
14Heather Welland notes of this section that “Terrorism here is associated with government 
coercion, with wielding illegitimate power – illegitimate because it had no consent from the people.” 
http://www.18thcenturycommon.org/who-is-a-terrorist-terrorism-in-the-long-18th-century/. 
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 Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and 
Beautiful presupposes his reaction to the French Revolution, and provides a helpful 
vantage point for his experiences in witnessing and responding to terror and chaos. In his 
Enquiry, Burke describes The Sublime—an aesthetic quality of greatness, often 
connected to size and scale, in which the magnitude of an affect overwhelms the 
observer, leaving him or her stunned into muteness or incomprehension
15
 – as the most 
powerful force that can attach to the human mind. More importantly, he argues for a 
separation between the Sublime and beauty (however defined), and instead links the 
Sublime with the experience of terror:  
No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning 
as fear. For fear being an apprehension of pain or death, it operates in a manner 
that resembles actual pain. Whatever therefore is terrible, with regard to sight, is 
sublime too, whether this cause of terror, be endured with greatness of dimensions 
or not. (Part II, Section II) 
 
That is to say that Burke believes that the experience of being in pain, and the experience 
of anticipating pain or death produce similar affects. The process of envisioning terror is, 
in effect, the process of experience it in some degree. And the central emotion produced 
by this experience of Sublime terror is astonishment:
16
 “Astonishment is that state of the 
soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror. In this case the 
mind is so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other […]” (Part II, 
Section I). Sublime terror leaves the observer in muted awe, consumed entirely with the 
scale of his or her fear. Burke lists a number of qualities that he associates with the 
                                                 
15“British Art and the Sublime” at the Tate Museum, http://www.tate.org.uk/art/research-
publications/the-sublime/christine-riding-and-nigel-llewellyn-british-art-and-the-sublime-r1109418. 
 
16
Again, emphasis mine. 
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Sublime (Infinity, Obscurity, Power, Vastness, Succession, Uniformity, Darkness, 
Loudness, Magnificence, Suddenness and so on) but the point here is how clearly 
Burke’s theorizing of the Sublime is born out later in his life as he witnesses the 
Revolution agape with horror. In his short tract, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 
Burke describes France as “furiously boiling” in “a drunken delirium from the hot spirit 
drawn out of the alembic of hell,” and worries that the Revolution will remove the veneer 
of Christian society to reveal an “uncouth, pernicious, and degrading superstition” which 
might take its place (Para. 152). That Burke authored this triangle of thoughts—
popularizing the term “terrorist,” theorizing about Sublime terror, and observing the 
butchery of the French Revolution—is no accident; they exist on a continuum: Burke 
understood the aesthetic hold with which fear and terror can seize mind, and then 
witnessed, with equal parts revulsion and fascination, terrorism played out on a mass 
scale. The same binary between fear and allure underscores contemporary reactions to 
terrorism. 
 While Burke certainly never envisioned damage and death on the scale of modern 
terrorism, the September 11
th
 attacks fit remarkably well to his theory of the Sublime. 
The planes flying through a clear sky, the burning towers set against the Manhattan 
skyline and the massive spectacle of their collapse feature elements of infinity, obscurity, 
power, vastness, uniformity, succession, darkness, loudness, magnificence and 
succession, while producing a massive wave of astonishment. In Holy Terror, Terry 
Eagleton sets out to explore what he calls the “metaphysical context” (vii) of terrorism—
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the philosophical, emotional and aesthetic impact of terror events—and utilizes Greek 
and Burkian models of the sublime. He argues that: 
As we enter the epoch of modernity, the sublime is one name for the annihilating, 
regenerating power we have been investigating […] the sublime is a glimpse of 
infinity which dissolves our identity and shakes us to our roots […] it warps the 
very inner structure of the mind, tugging us loose from the slackening grasp of 
reason. (44) 
 
The metaphysical effect of witnessing terrorism is unmooring, because mass scale 
destruction so overwhelms the mind as to separate us from rationally processing what is 
being seen. In A Philosophical Enquiry, Burke argues that a major element of the 
Sublime is recapitulation, whereby a pleasure or desire is amplified in two ways: because 
the experience or its value is socially sanctioned, or because experiencing the Sublime 
allows a witness to approximate the experiences of another: “The nature of this passion is 
to put is in the place of another in whatever circumstance he is in, and to affect us in a 
like manner, so that this passion may, as the occasion requires, turn either on pain or 
pleasure” (Part II, Section XVIII). In its contemporary iteration, recapitulation operates 
through the inescapability of the glocal media. The sheer omnipresence of images, videos 
and stories swirling across televisions, the internet and newspapers worldwide reifies 
these static symbols, concretizing their weight and power through repetition. Our sublime 
fascination with terror is underscored by how often we relive the experience via the 
media. These portals are impossible to escape, and thus the symbolic negotiation of the 
September 11
th
 events is impossible to evade. The globalized media forces the static 
symbols into an expansive reality of images, vocabularies and coded terms that are 
attenuated in our lives. 
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 Eagleton suggests we seek out representations of the attacks to make sense of 
these omnipresent symbols. If there is sublime beauty in that which terrifies us, then the 
prospect of death is its apex, and witnessing mass death and destruction amplifies our 
most personal fears across a public canvas. He writes, 
If the sublime confers on us a pleasurable sense of imperishability, it also allows 
us to perform our deaths vicariously, thus mastering our dread of them in that 
dummy run known as art. By making our destiny our decision, converting our fate 
into our choice, we are able to pluck life from death and freedom from necessity. 
(46) 
 
Literature, in this context, serves as a moral and emotional practice realm; a space to 
approximate that which, in this case, terrifies us, and to rehearse our reactions. Central to 
my argument, I would add that art is a space not only to experience mimetic death, but to 
create and assert agency in situations which produce feelings of powerlessness, anxiety 
and hopeless. Put simply, art and literature offer power, or at the least a measure of 
control, amidst dystopian trauma and sublime terror.  
We find Sublime beauty in mass death and mass violence, moreso than in 
singular, isolated moments of pain and mortality, because the scale of mass death is both 
shockingly real, and yet disturbingly impersonal. The sprawling, chaotic nature of these 
events allow for channels of ingress, where we can imagine ourselves as one among the 
crowd, or a face in a wave of panic and fear. Nothing underscores this reality better than 
The Falling Man—a complicated touchstone in the symbology of September 11th. Even 
the “Falling Man” signifier is muddled. For most critics, “The Falling Man” refers to a 
specific photograph taken at 9:41:15 am, September 11
th
, by Associated Press 
photographer Richard Drew. The photo shows a man falling from the North Tower of the 
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World Trade Center 29 minutes after the tower was first struck by American Airlines 
Flight 11, almost certainly forced out by smoke and heat from the crash. 
 
Figure 2. Richard Drew’s Associated Press photo 
The identity of the man in the picture is disputed. As Tom Junod notes in an 
excellent Esquire essay about the photo, as many as five different families have 
expressed a belief that the man in the photo may be a lost member of their family. The 
most widely proposed theory—the one seemingly endorsed by Junod’s piece—is that the 
Falling Man is Jonathan Briley, an employee at the 100
th
-floor restaurant Windows on the 
World. Beyond Briley, “The Falling Man” is a catch-all term for the estimated 200-plus 
individuals who fell or jumped to their deaths from the Towers, a great deal of them 
trapped in the upper floors of the North Tower after Flight 11 severed the building in two 
in a wave of smoke and jet fuel.  
 Though this possible identification took many years, Drew’s photograph was 
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published by a number of national and regional newspapers on September 12, 2001, 
including the New York Times. The reaction to the photo’s publication was swift, and 
overwhelmingly negative, with thousands of complaints in nearly every instance of 
publication. Splaying the last, terrifying moments of a man’s life across a newspaper, 
magazine or webpage, critics argued, robbed him of any dignity or privacy he might have 
had as he approached his demise, even amid this most public of spectacles. The photo, 
not unlike images of the World Trade Towers, was quietly scrubbed from public 
consciousness. Newspapers refused to publish it, 24-hour news stations that had pulled 
cameras back to prevent showing falling bodies on September 11
th
 declined to publicize 
the photo. As Junod writes:  
The resistance to the image -- to the images -- started early, started immediately, 
started on the ground. A mother whispering to her distraught child a consoling lie: 
“Maybe they're just birds, honey.” Bill Feehan, second in command at the fire 
department, chasing a bystander who was panning the jumpers with his video 
camera, demanding that he turn it off, bellowing, "Don't you have any human 
decency?" before dying himself when the building came down. In the most 
photographed and videotaped day in the history of the world, the images of people 
jumping were the only images that became, by consensus, taboo -- the only 
images from which Americans were proud to avert their eyes. All over the world, 
people saw the human stream debouch from the top of the North Tower, but here 
in the United States, we saw these images only until the networks decided not to 
allow such a harrowing view […]. (“The Falling Man”) 
 
So while the image bounded across televisions and newspapers in glocal portals 
throughout the world, it became the signifying taboo of the day in the United States, 
censured from view and willed into a cultural blind spot.    
 In so many ways, the Falling Man is both the most over-determined and under-
defined image of the Twenty-First Century. It is perfectly centered in a venn diagram of 
the known and the unknown. It is imminently recognizable, even as its publication was, 
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and still is, often met with protest or censorship. The identity of the man is tentatively 
confirmed, but disputed to this day. Even the nature and context of “falling” is a 
traumatic experience because it is an in between: we are fully committed to the act, but 
the anticipation of the moment of impact is still there. We are approaching death, but not 
yet dead, making it a perfect metaphor for mortality. That’s why the photo fascinates. 
The image also contrasts with that of the quickly-established narrative of the day. 
September 11
th
, as an event, was quickly organized into a narrative of heroism—of 
firefighters and first responders running headlong into collapsing buildings and ashen 
citizens carrying one another away from the smoldering towers. But the Falling Man 
denies both narratives; he was forced out a window before help could arrive, his escape 
through the streets impossible from the moment the planes slammed into the towers and 
cut the top floors off from the world below. The photo both fascinates and repulses 
because it cuts through the sublime horror of the day. Martin Amis, and dozens of other 
critics, can compare the attacks to a lewd Hollywood plot because the sheer weight of 
death and destruction depersonalizes the loss in a way we are only accustomed to seeing 
in two-hour disaster film. CNN can play and replay footage of Flight 175 slamming into 
the South Tower because what happened within the cabin of the plane and the windows 
of the floors it struck are only left to the horror of our imagination. But the Falling Man is 
solitary and individual; a single person tumbling untouched toward their death, and a 
microcosm for every unseen loss and every individual moment of panic and terror. 
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Don DeLillo and the Falling Man 
 In this way, the Falling Man is the most important image to emerge from the ruins 
of the attacks, and to enter the fray of the symbolic life of the attacks after the fact. And 
for writers like Don DeLillo and Jonathan Safran Foer, the need to acknowledge the 
image coincides with the pressing need to do as Terry Eagleton encourages, and 
aesthetically intervene in the cultural and political ideascape that emerges from the 
attack. The writer’s voice intercedes in the space between the reality of the event and its 
symbolic negotiation. To quote at length from DeLillo’s “In the Ruins of the Future” 
essay: 
The event dominated the medium. It was bright and totalising and some of us said 
it was unreal. When we say a thing is unreal, we mean it is too real, a 
phenomenon so unaccountable and yet so bound to the power of objective fact 
that we can't tilt it to the slant of our perceptions. […] The event itself has no 
purchase on the mercies of analogy or simile. We have to take the shock and 
horror as it is. But living language is not diminished. The writer wants to 
understand what this day has done to us. Is it too soon? We seem pressed for time, 
all of us. Time is scarcer now. There is a sense of compression, plans made 
hurriedly, time forced and distorted. But language is inseparable from the world 
that provokes it.  
 
Questions of language and representation are at the heart of DeLillo’s novel Falling Man. 
The novel is not his most celebrated work. Reviews at the time range from reservedly 
positive
17
 to lukewarm,
18
 but nothing approaching the praise lavished on other entries in 
his canon. And rightfully so; the novel – about a man who attempts to reconcile with his 
estranged family after surviving the fall of the towers – is sometimes moving, but more 
often tepid in recounting the horror of the attacks. But as a document exploring the 
                                                 
17
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/27/books/review/Rich-t.html?pagewanted=all. 
 
18
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2007/may/26/fiction.donDeLillo. 
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artist’s reaction to the attacks in general (and using the Falling Man image as a backdrop 
in particular) the novel is a significant measure of our cultural and aesthetic catharsis. In 
it, Keith Neudecker, a lawyer in the North Tower, walks out of the World Trade Center 
with minor injuries before the towers collapse, and almost immediately begins attempting 
to reconnect with his ex-wife, Lianne, and his son, Justin. I find Liane to be the most 
interesting and compelling character in the novel, because unlike Keith’s direct 
experience of the attacks (told in breathless, moving detail in the stellar final chapter), 
Lianne experiences the attacks like much of the country and the world did: from a near 
distance, mediated by a screen or a radio. Lianne is the staggered, awe-struck observer of 
the Sublime that Burke and Eagleton describe. For months and years after the attack, 
Lianne experiences a process of attenuated grief. She travels around New York like a 
wounded flâneur, looking to appropriate a model of healing from the crowds and 
communities of the city. 
 The process never works for her; the healing doesn’t come from the crowds and 
masses of people in Manhattan so much as the mood of these crowds increasingly 
subsumes her individual experiences:  
The crowd was dense and streaming, sundown, taking them along past booths and 
food stalls, and the friends were separated within half a minute. What she began 
to feel, aside from helplessness, was a heightened sense of who she was in 
relation to the others, thousands of them, orderly but all-enclosing. Those nearby 
saw her, smiled, some of them, and spoke to her, one or two, and she was forced 
to see herself in the reflecting surface of the crowd. She became whatever they 
sent back to her. She became her face and her features, her skin color, a white 
person, white her fundamental meaning, her state of being. (184) 
 
DeLillo’s constant use of crowds as a reference point for Lianne’s travels throughout 
New York is meant to approximate and juxtapose Keith’s specific experience in the 
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crowds fleeing the debris and ash billowing through downtown Manhattan when the 
Towers collapsed. After checking on a coworker (dead from the impact of the plane), 
Keith stumbles down 80-something floors and out into the streets with the mass of fleeing 
people, where he becomes part of a fabric of movement and debris after the collapse:  
He took one step and then the next, smoke blowing over him. He felt rubble 
underfoot and there was motion everywhere, people running things flying past 
[…] he could not find himself in the things he saw and heard. Two men ran by 
with a stretcher, someone facedown, smoke seeping out of his hair and clothes. 
He watched them move into the stunned distance.  That’s where everything was, 
all around him, falling away, street signs, people, things he could not name. (246)        
 
Keith recedes into the chaos of the falling towers, losing a sense of himself—his feelings 
don’t register, his sense of spatial reality thrown off—among the larger wave of people 
and ash. Mirroring this, Lianne later loses her sense of self amidst the crowds of New 
York, but her experience is decidedly different.  
 Lianne’s frequently-voiced concern that her identity is being lost among the 
crowds of New York—or that her identity is reduced to the outward appraisals the crowd 
makes of, and reflects back, to her—speaks directly to her position as a mass-mediated 
observer of the catastrophe. Her sense of loss among the crowd is underscored by a 
recognition that she is inextricably part of it; a reflection on the very real way in which 
(in a hyper-quick, endlessly repetitive global media portal) the real tragedies we observe 
on a screen are swiftly bounded into mass-constructed narratives that fit to the rhythms of 
fictional tragedy we are accustomed to consuming on our televisions and in movie 
theaters. In observing the difference between the mass-mediated mourning of the 
Kennedy Assassination and the September 11
th
 attacks, both of which are often framed 
within a similar national-fall-from-innocence lens, Richard Gray writes: 
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The Kennedy assassination left a huge hole in the life of America […] but the 
period of national (and international mourning) that followed his death provided, 
at least, some measure of release, an appropriate catharsis. With 9/11, however, 
the period of commemoration has been hijacked by a series of events tied to it in 
rhetoric if not necessarily in reality: the “war on terror,” the Patriot Act, 
extraordinary rendition, the invasion of Afghanistan and then Iraq. (8) 
 
 Let me put that another way: the rhetorical sweep of the symbolic life of September 11
th
 
makes objects of its observers, carrying them away in a tidal wave of wide-reaching but 
compact narratives. The more time passes, the more difficult it becomes to separate the 
moment of the attacks from the political decisions they engendered—sweeping 
intelligence-gathering legislation and more than a decade of war. More importantly I 
would argue, we cannot easily separate the attacks from the publicly-sanctioned stories 
that come to define the event: first-responders rushing into collapsing buildings, fire-
fighters raising a flag atop the rubble, first world progress versus third world 
fundamentalism. Lianne feels lost to the teeming crowds of the city because, as stunned 
viewer, she has always already lost control of the narrative waves breaking upon her. The 
endless repetition and reification of the glocal media portals only amplify and solidify the 
process. We lose ourselves among the practiced responses, tired metaphors and well-
defined taboos that emerge from the dust and rubble alongside the survivors.  
 But the Falling Man image cuts through this loss of self, because as I have said 
before, it has been earmarked as the ultimate taboo of the September 11
th
 attacks. The 
interdict weighed against it also means that it resists the mainstream narrative structures 
attached to mass tragedy. As Junod put so well: 
From the beginning, the spectacle of doomed people jumping from the upper 
floors of the World Trade Center resisted redemption. They were called "jumpers" 
or "the jumpers," as though they represented a new lemming like class. The trial 
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that hundreds endured in the building and then in the air became its own kind of 
trial for the thousands watching them from the ground. No one ever got used to it; 
no one who saw it wished to see it again, although, of course, many saw it again. 
Each jumper, no matter how many there were, brought fresh horror, elicited 
shock, tested the spirit, struck a lasting blow. 
 
Rather than the often-stultifying affect that the major narratives of any mass-media event 
endow, the Falling Man regenerates its horror and impact on each new viewing, reducing 
the observer in a crowd back to an individual, and replicates as closely as possible the 
mute trauma of the day in a single image. If the massive spectacle of September 11
th
 is 
hypnotically sublime, the Falling Man cuts through the fascination with something so 
horrific it can’t be bounded away in larger metaphors and stories. For Lianne, the 
symbolic spectre of this image haunts her in the form of a performance artist who 
recreates the Falling Man. Wearing a suit, the artist scales a variety of buildings in the 
city, suspends himself using a belt, and then jumps, free-falling through the air, until a 
harness and bungee stop him from hitting the ground and he holds an upside falling pose 
as he hangs in the air. In their most descriptive encounter, the Falling Man artist produces 
an intense feeling of anxiety and tension for Lianne:  
She felt her body go limp. But the fall was not the worst of it. The jolting end of 
the fall left him upside-down, secured to the harness, twenty feet above the 
pavement […] there was something awful about the stylized pose, body and 
limbs, his signature stroke. But the worst of it was the stillness itself and her 
nearness to the man, her position here, with no one closer to him than she was. 
She could have spoken to him but that was another plane of being, beyond reach. 
(168) 
 
Aaron Mauro smartly observes that, “The capacity for world history to enter the private 
realm is one of the most consistent concerns of post-9/11 writing” (593), and it is 
especially true of DeLillo’s work in this novel. The performance artist, clearly so struck 
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by the image of the Falling Man that he feels compelled to simulate, strikes Lianne to her 
core. Where other images, stories and mythologies from September 11
th
 leaving her 
feeling faceless among a crowd of observers, the Falling Man isolates Lianne, 
highlighting and reigniting her sense of “nearness” to the trauma of the day.  
 I would argue that Lianne’s alternating sense of fascination and repulsion with the 
Falling Man image – she wants to reach out and touch the other-worldly Falling Man 
artist even as his performance produces in her a near anxiety attack—stems from its 
function as a simplification of stories. In “Don DeLillo’s Falling Man and the Age of 
Terror,” Joseph M. Conte contends that terrorism is an act of narration. Much as I have 
argued at the start of this chapter, Conte points to the symbolic life of an act of terrorism: 
the deluge of symbols, metaphors and plotlines that coalesce to broadly define the public 
understanding of the event and its cultural significance. Conte also points out that 
DeLillo, in “In The Ruins of the Future,” suggests that “the world narrative belongs to 
terrorists” (33). Conceptualizing the attacks in narrative terms—as a competition for 
voice, plot and metaphor—isn’t just a gimmick to shift the context of the attacks into the 
writer’s wheelhouse; it is a deep recognition of one of the primary objectives of terrorism 
itself: to alter or sabotage prevailing metaphors and dialogues.  
 The plot of Falling Man stretches from September 11, 2001 through the fall of 
2004, the year in which Lianne reads in the newspaper that the Falling Man street artist 
has died. While reading the article, Lianne, for seemingly only the second time, 
encounters Richard Drew’s actual Falling Man photograph: 
It hit her hard when she first saw it […] the man headlong, the towers behind him. 
The mass of the towers filled the frame of the picture. The man falling, the towers 
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contiguous, she thought, behind him. The enormous soaring lines, the vertical 
column stripes. The man with blood on his shirt, she thought, or burn marks, and 
the effect of the columns behind him […] headlong freefall, she thought, and this 
picture burned a hole in her mind and heart, dear God, he was a falling angel and 
his beauty was horrific […]. It was the ideal falling motion of a body. (221-222) 
 
For DeLillo, then, the Falling Man’s cultural significance is tied directly to the binary of 
its historical context and the affect felt by an observer. “The mass of the towers filled the 
frame of the picture” (221), forever removing the possibility that this man’s plummet can 
ever be detached from September 11
th
. Except for the man himself, the North Towers 
consumes the entirety of the frame, defining, completely, from edge to edge the mis-en-
scene. While the horror of other images, like the collapse of the towers, can be married to 
other, more redemptive narratives, like the first responders who courageously ran toward 
the falling buildings, the Falling Man offers nothing beyond itself: it is always singularly 
a man tumbling between the smoke that forced him out of a 100
th
-floor window and the 
awful death awaiting seconds later. And yet—and yet—this passage explicitly ties 
together the reality of the Falling Man and the burning towers (the historical context of 
the photo), with Lianne’s subjective response over the course of several years (the 
evolving affective response). To my mind, it is important to clarify what Lianne means. I 
don’t think her description of the man’s fall as beautiful and heroic should be interpreted 
as a recognition of the Sublime; quite the opposite, actually. The beauty of his fall, if 
there is any, is that it realigns narrative control in a direct line between the subject and an 
individual observer. The act of terrorism intends to create a ripple of narratives, and the 
massive, media-satured glocal mediation of those narratives–and the counter-narratives 
built in reaction to them–subtly push observers into silent, non-critical rhetorical poses. 
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The Falling Man undoes this, resisting any attempt to graft it onto larger metaphors. This 
is DeLillo’s point: that the image is significant, beautiful even, because it foregrounds 
control of the narrative to a one-to-one ratio.  
 If we need simple evidence of the importance of Drew’s photograph, the fact that 
two prominent authors who have dealt almost solely in text-based narratives devote major 
portions of their novel to a photograph, to the experience of the visual, seems significant. 
Like DeLillo’s Falling Man, Jonathan Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud and Incredibly 
Close is at times preoccupied with the Falling Man image. Mauro argues that the 
foregrounding of the image by DeLillo and Safran Foer is an acknowledgement of the 
importance of visuality in the contemporary media world, and in contemporary 
terrorism’s push to enter and re-define that media landscape:  
At the limit between the image and the imagination – between the image and the 
experience of the image – is a desire to disavow that which is terrible. Due to the 
burden of this so-called “documentary testimony” that is made so readily 
available on the internet, contemporary authors are forced to incorporate the 
visual into the textual and grapple with terrible flashes of events. (585)  
 
And yet it should be noted that DeLillo’s novel doesn’t truly ask its reader to confront the 
visuality of the day. It describes Richard Drew’s photo, and uses its characters’ reaction 
to the photo as a space to mediate on the role of observation in trauma. But Drew’s photo 
itself is not present in the novel, and the closest that Falling Man comes is its paperback 
cover, which depicts a blue sky above a band of clouds with a single pair of vertical black 
lines down the right third of the page: an obvious visual reference to the vertical lines of 
the North Tower, if not the fall of the man himself. Indeed, the words “A Novel” are 
printed vertically at the top of this column of lines, reading from the top of the page 
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downward, creating downward movement in the reader’s eye which becomes attached to 
the vertical lines themselves. Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, on the other hand, 
asks its reader to directly “grapple with the terrible flashes of events” in a visual way.  
 Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close portrays a precocious, smart nine-year old 
named Oskar who travels around New York investigating a kind of treasure map of clues 
left by his father , a victim of the towers. The Falling Man is unacknowledged for almost 
the entirety of the novel, until it plays a key part in the final section. Oskar finds a series 
of photographs of a person falling from the towers, and rearranges them in reverse like a 
flipbook:  
Finally, I found the pictures of the falling body. Was it Dad? Maybe. Whoever it 
was, it was somebody. I ripped the pages out of the book. I reversed the order, so 
the last one was first, and the first was last. When I flipped through them, it 
looked like the man was floating up through the sky. And if I had more pictures, 
he would’ve flown through a window, back into the building, and the smoke 
would’ve poured into the hole that the plane was about the come out of. (325) 
 
 The final 15 pages of the novel replicate this flipbook, so that the reader turns through 
them and witnesses a body float up from the depths of nowhere, alongside a building, and 
ascend out of the frame of view. It should be understood that the photographs used in San 
Foer’s novel are not those of Richard Drew, and are not really photographs, in the exact 
sense of the word. The copyright page claims that the image used at the end of the story 
is “a photo illustration based on a photograph by Lyle Owerko.” Owerko, like Richard 
Drew, is a photographer who was on-scene and documented September 11
th
. So, the 
image used by Safran Foer is not technically The Falling Man, which is usually meant to 
indicate Drew’s photograph of Jonathan Briley, and the conceit that it is “a photo 
illustration” seems designed to ward off, as much as possible, the potential for criticism 
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of using an actual photo of an human tumbling to their death to end a work of fiction. 
And yet, as I’ve described before, The Falling Man is both a specific photo and a 
synecdoche for all the individuals who lost their lives by jumping or falling from the 
burning towers on September 11
th
. Using an illustrated version of a series of photographs 
is an intellectual distinction, but also an aesthetic telltale. In practical effect, Safran Foer 
ends his novel with a series of images of the Falling Man floating in reverse.  
 Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close draws a few brief comparisons between the 
Falling Man and the Tomb of the Unkown Soldier, a line of thinking evidenced even at 
the end when Oskar thinks, “Was it Dad? Maybe. Whoever it was, it was somebody.” 
Like the Tomb, the perceived anonymity of the photograph means that it can serve as a 
memorial of anyone who was lost falling or jumping out of the towers, while at the same 
time noting the real experience of the individual – it is somebody; there is someone in the 
tomb, and there is someone who was really photographed falling to their death. I think 
the significance of Safran Foer’s use of the image is how it signals an aesthetic agency 
within the author, and perhaps, the reader. In Falling Man, Lianne never feels in control 
of her response to the grief and horror of the attacks. The closest she comes is to feel that 
she can separate her feelings of grief from the choreographed mass narratives of sorrow 
when she encounters the Falling Man. And yet, Conte intelligently notes that the novel as 
whole does assert a sense of control over the dystopian images of burning buildings and 
tumbling humans. The story starts with Keith walking away from the collapsed tower, 
and doesn’t return to the scene until the very end, when it picks up just before the crash 
and then follows an injured Keith as he makes his way out of the smoldering tower. 
60 
 
Conte writes: “Temporally, the novel ends slightly before it begins, with Keith fleeing the 
north tower, so that by violating in his fictional narrative the inexorable forward thrust of 
events that comprises history, DeLillo can reexamine the motives of the terrorists and the 
experience of the survivors” (568). In other words, by rearranging the chronology of the 
book, DeLillo finds a pathway to investigate and examine that which seems inexorable. 
Safran Foer’s novel ends in the same manner. He is never able to remove the Falling Man 
from the context of September 11
th; as I’ve said before, the image is irreducibly linked to 
its historical context. That remains unchanged here; it is not a flipbook of a man floating 
through the sky, it is a flipbook of a man floating back up into the sky and – if more 
photos existed – back into the window from which he exited. But in reversing the 
chronology of the photos, and thereby reversing the chronology of events, Safran Foer is 
visually laying claim to the role of aesthetics in this kind of mass trauma: to create space 
for agency when there is none.  
 A primary feature of the Sublime is the sense of awe it instills, leaving the viewer 
dumbstruck. And indeed, “powerless” is perhaps the most apt descriptor for those who 
witnessed the September 11
th
 attacks from a distance, whether that distance is a few 
blocks in midtown Manhattan or the screen of a television. In either case, there was little 
more for most people to do than watch in mute horror as something unmanageably big 
occurred. But for authors concerned with the symbology and narratives that emerge from 
September 11
th
, re-arranging the symbols associated with the attacks, or using them to 
craft a different impact, signifies the cultural space allotted to art and literature in 
responding to instances of lived terror, destruction and mass death. The symbols cannot 
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be removed from their historical context, but they can be rearranged to create spaces for 
reflection, insight or healing where all that previously existed was terror. In this manner, I 
think narratives born of terrorism hold a special place in the genre of contemporary 
dystopian literature.  
 In the following chapter, I argue that stories of future dystopian societies which 
resemble, but are not exactly the same as our own, create a sense of defamiliarization that 
allows for critical analysis. The dystopian imagery related to terrorism cannot be 
unbound from its lived, historical reality. But those images can be repurposed within the 
context of the history to offer agency for authors and observers, and to create new spaces 
for healing and reflection. The writers in this chapter work to repurpose the symbology of 
terrorism in ways that allow those who bear witness to reclaim some agency amidst 
feelings of powerlessness. The next chapter features writers influenced by the symbols 
and imagery from September 11
th
, but who use these symbols to analyze the cultures of 
pain, paranoia and fatalism that grew out of the attacks.     
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CHAPTER THREE 
DYSTOPIAN GLOBAL CONFLICT AND MASS DESTRUCTION  
 
 For much of the decade after September 11
th
, contemporary dystopian fiction is 
set against the backdrop of the attacks and suffused with the vocabulary and imagery of 
urban terrorism. More than that, dystopian texts reflect the paranoid Western culture that 
grew out of the attacks: Color-coded terror warnings, talks of biological warfare, shoe 
bombs, airport profiling, two foreign wars, and The Patriot Act. Acts of terrorism have a 
symbolic life long after the actual violence, and the September 11
th
 attacks imbued our 
culture with a deeper anxiety of our own annihilation. Dystopian fiction manifests that 
fear in stories and landscapes of ruin. Abandoned cities, decimated buildings and 
cataclysmic decline feature prominently in a host of critically and popularly revered 
contemporary texts—from film (The Matrix, Snowpiercer), to television (The Walking 
Dead), to video games (The Last of Us). These cauterized terrains embody the social and 
political decline so many dystopian texts describe, and foreground a unique engagement 
with the global culture of anxiety and paranoia created during the War on Terror decade. 
The destruction wrought on family units in these texts also speaks to a dialogue with the 
global. As critics of globalization raise important concerns about population growth, 
migration, and scarce resources, the disassembling and rebuilding of families in 
dystopian environments stands in for the interaction that individuals and small groups 
have with the global community in a paranoid time. This engagement underpins Alfonso 
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Cuarón’s 2006 film Children of Men, Danny Boyle’s 2002 zombie redux film 28 Days 
Later, and Cormac McCarthy's 2006 apocalyptic novel The Road. In Children of Men, 
worldwide infertility and war form the backdrop for a story of an under-resourced society 
facing its own mortality. 28 Days Later utilizes the zombie horror genre as a metaphor 
for mass infection and biological warfare in the post-September 11
th
 global community. 
The Road, meanwhile, depicts characters who struggle with the complete loss of 
organizing systems—governments, religious institutions and nuclear families—in the 
face of an unknown worldwide disaster. In focusing their stories on small groups of 
survivors who form improvised domestic units, Cuarón, Boyle and McCarthy position the 
family as a counterbalance to a myriad of dystopian global crises. 
28 Days Later: Viral Capitalism and Terror Psychology 
 Danny Boyle’s 2002 film 28 Days Later utilizes a direct metaphor of infection 
and plague in contemporary London and its outlying communities to develop a critical 
exploration of millennial consumer identity, global media and the social experience of 
terrorism. In Boyle’s vision, Jim, a twenty-something bicycle courier, awakens from a 
coma to find himself locked inside a hospital room. He escapes to the deserted, dystopian 
landscape of an uninhabited London populated solely by a few survivors and “the 
infected”: humans plagued by a virus synthesized from the emotional and physical 
experience of rage. The infected shake in painful spasms, vomit blood, and violently 
attack the remaining uninfected. The infected don’t fit the technical definition of “living-
dead” zombification, but zombie narratives are the clear reference point for the film; the 
infected—wracked by a man-made, biological compound—are contemporary zombies: 
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infected against their will and consumed entirely by the virus. 
 Narratives of plagues and mass infections have a long literary history, stretching 
from contemporary zombie stories and HIV narratives, to the Black Death in Medieval 
Europe, and back to the “Plague of Athens” that Thucydides describes in The History of 
the Peloponnesian War. In these narratives, plagues and widespread disease often serve 
literal and abstract purposes: the texts document the lived experience of mass infection—
the fear, sweeping confusion and voluminous death. At the same time, literature 
frequently uses plague stories as metaphors for wholesale social upheaval, where the 
tumultuous experience of mass disease marks the before and after of a society in the 
process of social and political changes that are antagonized by the experience of a plague. 
Tony Kushner’s fantasia Angels in America, for example, both depicts the fear and loss 
endemic to the AIDS epidemic among a group of New Yorkers, while also using the 
pandemic to mark the transition between Reaganism’s grip on the American psyche in 
the 1980s to an anticipated political and social restoration in the 1990s.
1
 
 Contemporary literature and film about zombies, especially stories centered in 
major urban areas and cities with global profiles, emerge from this history of plague 
narratives. In From Early Modern Plagues to Postmodern Zombies, Stephanie Boluk and 
Wylie Lenz note the special significance of London as the setting for a story of mass 
infection. Beginning in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century, popular plague narratives 
frequently took their inspiration from the rapid and mass destruction of the Black Death: 
a series of outbreaks of bubonic plague in Europe and Western Asia that killed between 
                                                 
1
Indeed, the second book of the play, Perestroika, is named for the reformation of the Soviet 
Union after the fall of the U.S.S.R., and literally means “restructuring.”   
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75 and 200 million people, decimating a third of Europe’s population and deeply 
affecting the social psyche of its people.
2
 Boluk and Lenz argue that plague narratives set 
in London in the 17
th
 Century use the Black Death as a metaphor for the emergence of 
capitalist markets that crossed many communities, upending mercantile trade and 
instituting a system of accumulated wealth.
3
 Using Ben Jonson’s The Alchemist and 
Daniel Defoe’s A Journal of the Plague Year, they contend that infection signals not just 
disease, but also a society engulfed by a new sense of consumption, prosperity and 
wealth. They then suggest that the link between metaphors of infection and capitalism 
endure, to varying degrees, through Modernity, with contemporary zombie films, such as 
28 Days Later, Edgar Wright’s Shaun of the Dead and George Romero’s entire zombie 
cannon of the 1970s specifically connecting zombie plagues to global capitalism: 
In the same way these plague works describe a relationship between the spread of 
plague and the spread of capitalism, so too does the viral zombie serve as an 
allegorized figure of capital. In one respect, the zombie-as-critique-of-capital 
motif is an argument that has been well rehearsed by scholars,
 
and the critique of 
consumption and contemporary life is made explicit in Romero's Dawn of the 
Dead (1978). Zombies are pure desiring machines—they are creatures composed 
entirely of excess desire. They hunger for flesh, but their undead status means 
they do not require food. This excess, first exemplified in Romero's films, is 
didactically harnessed as a metaphor for consumption since the sole purpose of 
the zombie is to satisfy an urge unmotivated by any physical need. (135-136) 
 
Similarly, Sarah Lauro and Karen Embry argue that the enduring popularity and 
fascination with zombies as monsters is rooted in the particular threat the infected living-
                                                 
2
The most devastating outbreak of the Black Death occurred in the Fourteenth Century, between 
1348 and 1350. But distinct outbreaks reoccurred throughout Europe for the next several centuries, with 
different degrees of mortality. The Great Plague of London – which Defoe’s A Journal of the Plague Year 
documents – killed upwards of 100,000 people in the city, reducing its population by about 15%. See: “The 
Great Plague of London” – Wikipedia entry. 
 
3See also: “Black Death,” by Katherine Park, The Cambridge World History of Human Disease.  
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dead pose: to both end our lives, but also to end our consciousness, and transform us into 
another member of the shuffling, non-living, non-thinking horde. Zombies have no 
personal identity; they are folded into groups—The zombies, or The infected—and 
therefore serve as an obvious metaphor for Marxist critiques of consumer culture: “What 
Horkiemer and Adorno and others illustrate is that the illusory separation of subject and 
object, the fata morgana of individualism, keeps happy the camp of zombies – the slaves 
to capitalism who are merely deluded into thinking they are free” (92). That is, as an 
inherently dichotmomous creature (living but not conscious, dead but not at rest) the 
zombie mirrors the slippage between subject and object in millennial capitalism, where 
Marxists argue that production (labor) and consumption (buyer) have blurred irreparably 
into one.  
 Boyle’s 28 Days Later picks up this motif and connects it directly to the forces 
and effects of globalization, while arguably advancing the critique of capitalism to its 
furthest point. Romero’s films present a clear commentary on commodity culture – 
particularly 1978’s Dawn of the Dead, in which a group of survivors lock themselves in a 
shopping mall to escape hordes of reanimated zombies, and the mindless consumption of 
flesh reflects the mindless consumption of goods available to the survivors in the mall. 
The infected in 28 Days Later, meanwhile, spread the plague of rage, and are clearly 
positioned within the broader literary and cinematic context of zombies as all-consuming, 
“pure desiring machines”; indeed, in Boyle’s film, the infected are not defeated in a 
psychical or militarized confrontation, but only when they die out from starvation. That 
is, once there is nothing left to consume, the infected lose the ability to replicate and 
67 
 
eventually die. As both a metaphor and a species, the zombies in 28 Days Later are 
predicated on a cycle of perpetual ingestion and reproduction. 
 But where Lauro and Embry position the zombie as metaphor for the overlapping 
of subject and object, 28 Days Later presents what I consider a contemporary critique of 
the very distance between production and consumption in the globalized economy. From 
the start, the film makes obvious the uselessness of money in a dystopian landscape. 
When Jim initially escapes the hospital, he’s narrowly saved from a pack of the infected 
by two other survivors, Selena and Mark, who provide the back story of the mass 
infection and terror for Jim and the audience at large. Mark describes going to the airport 
with his family to try to buy their way onto a plane and out of England: 
Mark: I remember my dad had all this cash, even though cash was completely 
useless […] I remember the ground was soft. I looked down and I was standing on 
all these people, like a carpet. No one could run, all you could do was climb, 
climb over more people. 
 
In the chaos of the infection, money loses the power invested in it, a point underscored 
even more directly when Jim and Selena partner with Frank and Hannah, a father-
daughter living in a London flat, after Mark is killed. Hearing a radio broadcast from 
British soldiers claiming to have “the answer to infection,” they travel to a blockade 
outside of Manchester in the hopes of finding safety or even salvation. On the journey, 
they stop at an abandoned grocery store, where they gleefully fill their carts with food, 
candy and liquor, and exit as Frank leaves his credit card near the cash register in ironic 
tones of laughter. As with cash, Frank’s credit—the account of his debt and borrowing 
power from the economic system—is rendered irrelevant in a dystopian world filled with 
infected hordes of zombie-like people. Even as the infected themselves symbolize 
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mindless consumption, the frenzy and violence of their desire renders the system 
obsolete.  
 It is vital, however, to note that Jim, Selena, Frank and Hannah are forced to flee 
London not only because of the immediate danger of the infected, but also because they 
can no longer care for themselves amidst the collapsed social and civic services. When 
clean water and indoor plumbing are no longer available, Frank hordes the water 
collected in his toilet, and unsuccessfully attempts to trap clean water from dew under 
plastic sheets on his roof—a trick he witnessed on television at some point, but is unable 
to replicate. When they storm the grocery store they can only take eradiated, canned or 
non-perishable food that doesn’t require cooking. Much later, once they have arrived at 
the blockade, a British soldier attempts to prepare them a meal, but they find that the eggs 
have gone bad, despite the salt used to mask their flavor. Taken together, these scenes 
paint a larger critique: these first-world survivors are almost solely consumers, and they 
only survive because of their ability to scrounge for things they once were able to 
purchase. Due both to the circumstances of the infection and their lack of skills, they are 
unable to produce fresh food or clean water for themselves. It is only at the very end of 
the film, when Jim, Selena and Hannah live in a small farm cottage, that the viewer is 
given hope for rescue, and that hope only comes once it is implied that the trio are living 
and caring entirely for themselves—that they have become self-sustaining. Rather than 
explore an evaporating distinction between subject and object, the film focuses on a 
widening distance between production and consumption in the global economy.  When 
the social systems designed to ensure public safety, food delivery and other basic needs 
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collapse, the space between consumption and cultivation reveal how much the global 
production economy separates its subjects from any agency in their own survival.    
 As I noted earlier, Boluk and Lenz persuasively argue that “to situate a cinematic 
narrative of zombie infection in London is to locate it within the city's history of plague.” 
But I want to suggest that the contemporary zombie/plague narrative is underwritten by 
intersecting global forces separate (or at least irreducible solely to) economics and 
capital. In fact, 28 Days Later seems primarily concerned with the speed of travel and 
contact (and thus, communicability), and the growing fear of biological terrorism during 
the War on Terror. Even if we see the zombies as global citizens riven by the inexorable 
and unstoppable march of global capital, we shouldn’t miss the marks of other 
contemporary fears that are foregrounded the film. More importantly, it is essential to 
recognize that over the course of the film, 28 Days Later becomes less focused on the 
infected—in their experience or the threat they pose to the survivors—and increasingly 
interested in the social system from which they emerged, and within which the remaining 
survivors exist. As with Romero’s films, and in keeping with the social criticism 
embedded in dystopian stories, the zombies in Boyle’s movie are ancillary to the larger 
commentary their presence facilitates.  Boluk and Lenz write:  
28 Days Later opens with a […] self-referential gesture: upon entering the 
laboratory, the activists discover chimpanzees being subjected to a Clockwork 
Orange-style barrage of violent news footage, the implication being that the 
violent imagery infects the animals with humanity’s desire to destroy itself. (133) 
 
The barrage of images displayed before the chimpanzees are not only violent, but also 
representative of the present, encompassing any number of scenes a viewer could expect 
to encounter on a world news broadcast: visions of impoverished and dirty mobs clashing 
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with police clad in riot gear; mothers wailing over sickly children, violent explosions in 
unnamed, far-away countries. The inequalities between first and third world, class 
violence, and religious and xenophobic are beamed directly into the minds of the infected 
chimpanzees via television broadcasts in 28 Days Later: 
 
 
Figure 3. A laboratory chimpanzee is forced to watch images of global rioting and 
violence in the opening sequence of 28 Days Later 
 
The point here is that this scene evokes the cyclical nature of global media. 
Images of humanity’s own crises are reciprocated back to us in 24-hour cycles, thus 
furthering the crises they are reporting. The technology and narratives endemic to 
globalization are the infecting agents for a plague that consumes the modern world, 
offering a bleak conclusion: The contemporary world is self-consuming and self-
infecting. 
 But perhaps the most salient feature of 28 Days Later is the way the film is 
infused by the psychology of terrorism and fear I described at the start of this chapter. 
Aesthetically, the differences between the zombies of Romero’s films and Boyle’s work 
are speed and violence. Romero’s zombies eat their victims, but they also lurch about 
without coordination, and shuffle after potential victims, allowing the infected to survive 
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if they can move quickly. Boyle’s infected hordes, however, are shockingly fast, chasing 
down fit survivors in their mid-to-late twenties. In one scene, as Frank, Hannah, Jim and 
Selena change a flat tire while stuck in a tunnel, the infected race through the tunnel, 
nearly chasing down the car the survivors speed away in. When a victim is caught by the 
infected, they are met with bites, savage blows to the head, and infected blood that is 
vomited onto their faces. Within 20-30 seconds, a victim becomes engorged with rage, 
and begins chasing down new victims with the same malice as the other infected. The 
relative speed—of the infected themselves, of the spread of the virus—underscores the 
virulence of contact and movement in the globalized world. And on a literal level, the 
rapid spread of a constructed virus speaks directly to the pervasive fear of a bio-chemical 
agent spreading rapidly through an urban community. 
 The manufactured virus in 28 Days Later combines twin anxieties—of an 
epidemic of disease, and of a dangerous bio-chemical weapon—and pairs them with 
scenery and imagery associated with the War on Terror. The tagline in the original ad 
campaign for the film was: “Day 1: Exposure -- Day 3: Infection – Day 8: Epidemic – 
Day 15: Evacuation – Day 20: Devastation.” Similarly, 28 Weeks Later, the extremely 
underrated 2007 sequel which Boyle produced, was advertised with the following 
posters:  
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Figure 4. Posters for 28 Weeks Later  
 
The red and black background in the first image is offset by a white biohazard 
sign, which makes a re-appearance in the mouth guard worn by the woman in the second 
image. After several years of news broadcasts, anthrax-laced letters, and color-coded 
threat indices, the biohazard symbol is immediately familiar to anyone aware of 
international concerns tied to bioterrorism, a frame of mind reinforced by the tagline “It’s 
Back. Everywhere May 11,” which conveys the release date with terminology that 
underscores the fear specific to bio-warfare: that a disease or chemical agent can instantly 
be “Everywhere,” and that “There is no escape.” 
 The original 28 Days Later is best known among casual viewers for its opening 
sequence, in which a bewildered Jim wanders through an abandoned London after 
waking up from his coma: 
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Figure 5. Opening sequence in 28 Days Later 
 
It is a stark scene, certainly, but also one immediately recognizable as a reference 
to Manhattan on September 11
th
, or London on July 7
th
, 2005 after the bus and train 
bombings. The evacuated streets, the abandoned cars, the paper and debris littering the 
street are all evocative of the immediate aftermath of actual terrorist attacks. As Jim 
reaches the center of town, he finds a statue with hundreds of letters and photos pleading 
for help in locating loved ones, an image which mirrors the countless impromptu 
monuments filled with similar images in New York in the days after September 11
th
. 
 Both films, but 28 Days Later in particular, make heavy use of this kind of 
imagery, invoking the ingrained cultural memory of an audience literate in the lived 
experience of terrorism. In one sense, this gives the disaster scenarios in the films more 
emotional weight, as the plague of the infected is backlit by the trope of terrorism. More 
subtly, though, the films invoke the memory of actual events to sharpen the social 
commentary being constructed. In The Aesthetics of Risk in Dawn of the Dead and 28 
Days Later, John Carroll writes: 
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However, 28 Days Later is firmly ensconced within a risk society in which public 
institutions are unable and, increasingly, unwilling to predict or insure against the 
disasters the film alludes to, including the rapid spread of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy and the AIDS pandemic. (46)  
 
Carroll’s point is that the film utilizes the outbreak of a dystopian plague to better 
articulate a critique of culture well-versed in its own real disasters. More specifically, he 
is trying to describe the psychological damage that repeated widespread traumas cause to 
a community. The global world, versed in the anxieties of terrorism, bio-chemical danger 
and recurring disaster is figured as a society in perpetual anticipation of the next 
disaster—one that may as yet be undefined, but is certain to emerge nonetheless. In 
naming the culture in 28 Days Later a “risk society,” Carroll underscores a theme 
repeated endlessly in the film: that danger is ever-present, and that social institutions and 
authority figures are either unable to protect citizens from the threats they represent, or 
that some institutions may be just as dangerous as the as the looming outside threat.  
 In the moments after meeting Selena and Mark while he wanders through the 
abandoned and dystopian London, Jim begins to ask what the government is doing to 
combat the outbreak of plague. 
Jim: What about the government? What are they doing? 
 Selena: There is no government. 
 Jim: Of course there’s a government! There’s always a government! They’re in  
a… a bunker, or a plane. 
 Mark: No. There’s no government. No army. No police. No TV, no radio, no  
electricity. You’re the first uninfected person we’ve seen in six days. 
 Jim: What about your family? 
 Mark: They’re dead. So is Selena’s. 
 Selena: And yours will be dead too.  
 
The flat declarations about the government’s demise is both realistic for a set of 
characters living through a widespread disaster that has killed every other person they 
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know, but also indicative of a pervasive disregard for systems of authority that are 
entrusted with protecting civilians; a distrust that is on full display in the very first scene 
in the film, in which a government laboratory is identified as the place where the rage 
virus was synthesized, and where a group of animal rights activists accidentally unleash it 
as they try to free the caged lab animals. From the start, individuals and social systems 
are positioned antagonistically. Nowhere is this more pressing than in the last third of the 
film, in which Jim, Selena and Hannah arrive at the military blockade in search of “the 
answer to infection” (Frank is infected and dies shortly after arriving). The survivors find 
a group of British soldiers camped in a country estate that they have wired with security 
systems. Initially, soldiers and their commander purport to be rebuilding society as they 
wait for the infected to starve out. But the situation devolves quickly, as the soldiers 
become fascistic – attempting to murder Jim, and sexually assault Selena and Hannah. In 
a telling move, the infected are removed from the film’s primary focus during its last 
third, as they present a second, ancillary danger to the threat posed to the survivors by the 
soldiers who claim to be protectors. A similar theme arises throughout the whole of 28 
Weeks Later, which follows a young brother and sister, along with a nurse and a single 
soldier as they must evade both the infected, and American military forces that are trying 
to hunt them down to contain the infection. The two films’ pervasive distrust of social 
systems and authority groups informs its portrayal of government as over-powerful, 
aggressive and dangerous to survivors, while simultaneously feckless in its ability to 
protect its own citizens from disaster.  
 28 Days Later is not a hopeless film, however. Despite the devastating setbacks 
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the survivor group experiences, the film ends on an optimistic note, as Selena, Hannah 
and Jim – now living together in a farm cottage – signal planes that fly overhead. Though 
brief, the scene, and the cottage in particular, have an unmistakable tone of domesticity: 
of an improvised family that the survivors cobble together in the face of all their traumas. 
The survivors in 28 Days Later band together to form a family unit. In a moment of rest, 
Selena and Jim reflect on the father-daughter relationship that sustains Frank and Hannah 
trough the crisis: 
 Jim: Do you know what I was thinking? 
 Selena: You were thinking that you’ll never hear another piece of original music  
 ever again. You’ll never read a book that hasn’t already been written or see a film  
 that hasn’t already been shot. 
 Jim: Um, that’s what you were thinking. 
 Selena: No, I was thinking I was wrong. 
 Jim: About what? 
 Selena: All the death, all the shit, it doesn’t really matter to Frank and Hannah,  
 because …well, she’s got her dad and he’s got his daughter. So I was wrong when  
 I said staying alive is as good as it gets. 
 Jim: See, that’s what I was thinking. 
 
Where do individuals in dystopian societies filled with external threats and collapsing 
social institutions turn? Inward. They either preserve the small families that have 
survived in the face of the disasters, or cobble together new families from the remnants of 
the ruin. The prevailing motif, in Children of Men and 28 Days Later, is that when larger 
social systems are under attack, or are themselves threatening, individuals need to build 
smaller family units to buttress themselves against the anxieties of capital, terrorism and 
bio-chemical attacks endemic to global conflict. 
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Children of Men: Cultural Ruin and the Loss of Belief 
 Released in 2006, Cuarón’s Children of Men adapts the characters and basic 
premise of P.D. James’ 1992 novel of the same name, but alters the plot, ending, and tone 
significantly enough to be considered its own artistic and intellectual statement. The film 
depicts England in 2027 clinging to the last vestiges of Twentieth Century Western 
society. Humanity has been rendered completely infertile for 18-plus years, and the 
prospect of total species extinction has pushed most of the world to chaos. On televisions 
inside trains and buses, a list of world cities—New York, Rio de Jeneiro, Tokyo, 
Moscow—plays over corresponding images of fire, looting, riot police and widespread 
destruction. “The world has collapsed,” the viewer is told, and “Only Britain soldiers on.” 
But the England presented to the viewer is characterized by the work of defamiliarization 
so common to dystopian stories. Cuarón opens on a scene of people huddled in a cafe, 
watching a news report of the death of the world’s youngest man, “Baby Diego,” a man 
of eighteen and some months. While most watch in hushed dismay, Theo Faron pushes 
his way through the crowd, buys a coffee without responding with much emotion to the 
news, and exits. As the camera follows him through the door, it pans across a scene of a 
busy street in “London, 2027,” and at first blush it appears as one might expect a first 
world city to appear twenty years in the future: industrialized buildings line bustling 
streets, modified cars zip around pedestrians, and large video screens play advertisements 
and news reports are directly attached to building facades. But after this momentary 
familiarity, subtle cues of decay become more pronounced: trash bags and filth line the 
streets, and as Theo stops at a mailbox to put sugar in his coffee, his shabby clothes and 
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unshaven face are evident. More than anything, the film is drenched in grays and washed 
out greens, sucking any vibrancy from the frame. Cuarón pauses just long enough for the 
viewer to begin analyzing the industrial scene, before a bomb blast rips through the cafe 
Theo just exited, distorting the sound to a few screams and an increasingly loud ringing 
tone. As a woman emerges through the dust holding her dismembered arm left arm in her 
right hand, the screen cuts to a title card.  
 The entire opening is just over two minutes long, but effectively establishes the 
narrative context of the film: the setting is both familiar and discrepant, the trash and 
sunken colors amid the faded technologies hint at what the explosion makes jarringly 
clear: that chaos and decay are bubbling through the facade of an advanced society. More 
than that, the opening scene serves an important meta-function; the bomb explosion is 
shocking and unexpected, intentionally counterposed to the stereotypical rhythm of 
violence or destruction to which film-goers are accustomed. Cuarón’s opening sets the 
precedent that viewer expectations will be upended, in effect leaving those who are 
watching the film as uneasy as we soon discover the characters to be.  
 Pervasive uneasiness—from within and from the global community outside—is a 
defining characteristic of the English society presented in Children of Men. Cuarón 
creates this effect through a number of techniques. One of the most startling and 
effective, to my mind, is his use of extended tracking shots. In three portions of the film, 
the camera films the action in a continued sequence of more than three minutes with no 
breaks, cuts or edits. The longest, at more than six minutes, is recognized by the 
American Film Institute as one of the longest unbroken sequences in recorded film. These 
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shots are used during scenes of violence, action or heavy military fighting, and are absent 
of any soundtrack. They disallow normal cinematic breaks in continuity, forcing the 
viewer to experience the mis-en-scene at the same level, pacing and intensity as the 
characters.  
The point of these techniques is not just cinematic showmanship, but rather to 
create an atmospheric tension that mirrors the social and political tensions of the English 
society in the story. Humankind has been infertile for eighteen years and immigration to 
England is illegal. A group of anti-government activists has discovered an immigrant, 
Kee, who is miraculously pregnant. The group enlists Theo to help them smuggle her out 
of the country and to the Human Project, a rumored sanctuary community where artists, 
doctors, musicians, philosophers and politicians have fled to rebuild the world. Theo 
comes to distrust the activists, and attempts to smuggle Kee and her unborn baby out of 
the country on his own. As Theo and Kee move to avoid capture by the government or 
the activists, the viewer gets a more complete view of England in 2027. In London, 
captured illegals are caged along the street as they await deportation. Rampant 
unemployment means certain foods are scarce. Bands of thieves live in the unprotected 
countryside, while the outskirts of the British island are used as refugee camps that have 
become de facto ghettos for deported illegals. Activist groups are constantly pushing a 
violent uprising against the British government, funneling weapons into the immigrant 
ghettos. Again and again, the social strife and decay depicted in the films comes as a 
direct response or illustration of many concerns that contemporary globalization theorists 
have vocalized. 
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For example, in a documentary produced in tandem with the DVD release of 
Cuarón’s film, Fabrizo Eva, an Italian lecturer on human geography and sociologist 
Saskia Sassen both preface their response to Children of Men by arguing that the central 
challenge to nations in a globalized world is migration (The Possibility of Hope). Rather 
than a cosmopolitan movement of leisure, travel and cultural exchange, they contend that 
an inequality in the availability of scarce resources and opportunities drives migration in 
the global community, pushing encounters between disparate peoples in the dash for 
resources and prosperity. In the same documentary, Bulgarian philosopher Tzvetan 
Todorov supports the conclusions of Eva and Sassen, and contends that Children of Men 
provides a critical depiction of two major facets of globalization: First, he argues that the 
globalized world pits individuals against major institutional forces, such as governments. 
In the film, the activist group that originally discovers Kee’s pregnancy goes by the 
moniker The Fishes, and though his ex-wife Julian is a member and he is likely 
sympathetic to their politics, Theo is spiteful towards The Fishes because of the bombs 
they have set off while targeting government officials and buildings (indeed, they are 
probably responsible for the very bomb in the coffee shop at the start of the film). 
Throughout the film, the corruption that runs through The Fishes organization is slowly 
revealed, even as the film shows the many ways in which they are merely responding to 
government atrocities.  The film is less interested in identifying one side as more or less 
at fault than the other, than it is in making the argument that pitting individuals against 
large-scale institutions and the vast resources they possess almost necessarily pushes the 
individuals and small groups to extremism.   
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 Todorov’s second thesis is that an “acceleration of contact” in the global 
community not only forces disparate peoples to come into contact with one another more 
frequently, but also to force them into close physical proximity, making the differences 
between the groups—in politics, wealth, access to resources, religious beliefs—that much 
more stark and combustible. Todorov’s thesis is echoed in interview comments from The 
Shock Doctrine author Naomi Klein:  
I think we’ve abandoned a notion of development, which is about steady progress 
that involves building infrastructure, putting in phones lines, electricity, water, 
building schools, more and more [...] what I see is what I call the Global Green 
Zone, where you have a sort of bubble, where the internationals are. Instead of 
infrastructure, you have an absolute kind of apartheid system, where the people 
with the generators, water, cell phones and an expensive, privatized infrastructure 
are surrounded by this chaos.  (The Possibility of Hope) 
 
Klein’s claim that global migration produces a system that resembles apartheid is very 
reminiscent of the ghettoizing seen in Children of Men. London and its surrounding areas 
are locked down, and any perceived threat to this community is pushed to “refugee 
camps” on the outskirts of the British island, where they live in crowded, abject poverty. 
The differences in the lives of those within the bubble of London, and those on the edges 
is the difference between those who are protected by the last remaining system of wealth 
and power, and the overwhelming number of those who are still disaffected by it.  A great 
deal of the social and physical disrepair is positioned as a dystopian imagining of a world 
subject to the extremes of forced migration and compelled to fight for increasingly scarce 
resources. 
Children of Men also presents a picture of a society subjected to the essential 
feature of dystopianism: the loss of belief. Specifically, I argue that the most pressing loss 
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experienced by the society in Cuarón’s story is the loss of hope for a future, to the degree 
that characters frequently question whether it is worth even fighting to stay alive. As 
mentioned, the plot suggests that humanity has suffered from infertility for eighteen 
years, but also makes clear that there is no known cause for the infertility. More 
importantly, barely a few minutes is given in the entire film to speculating about the 
cause of the infertility. Nicole LaRose writes that: “Cuarón's film can be read as an anti-
detective story because its refusal of causation and thus a villain extends the narrative 
beyond the teleology of the detective genre” (6). Put differently, the film refuses to focus 
on the mystery of “what happened?” as its central drama. Rather than cause, the focus 
becomes consequence, as the results of the decades-long infertility recur again and again. 
For the society at large, the loss of a literal future for the species produces a nearly 
absolute loss of hope or belief in the present. In an early scene, Theo visits his friend 
Jasper and the two references the “Quietus”—boxed suicide pills that the government is 
selling—indicating that so many feel hopelessness for future, that the government is 
helping them actively erase the present. 
Moreover, Cuarón fills Children of Men with a myriad of visual cues that speak to 
the pervasive loss of hope by referencing real-life events that produced mass feelings of 
loss or despair. After “Baby Diego” dies, thousands lay flowers outside a hotel gate in a 
makeshift memorial, in what is a clear reference to the national grieving that followed 
Princess Diana’s in England, and the memorial that thousands visited with flowers 
outside the gates at Kensington and Buckingham Palace: 
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Figure 6. Flowers at Buckingham Palace for Princess Diana’s funeral 
 
Figure 7. Flowers for “Baby Diego” in Children of Men 
Other clear visual references to the evacuation of Jewish ghettos in WWII, abuses 
at Abu Ghraib and a myriad other instances of national tragedy or shame are peppered 
throughout the film. An audience literate in these visual cues would immediately 
understand the kind of widespread feelings of loss, shame or hopelessness that these 
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images denote. More than most, Theo, who lost a young son to an influenza outbreak—
seems to embody and typify a kind of hollowness. As LaRose notes: 
We come to understand Theo as the already dead throughout the film as he 
transgresses boundaries. He begins as a sort of living dead, existing in a state of 
apathy; he transitions to an oppositional life as he surveys forms of failed leftist 
rebellion; finally, he becomes the already dead by revealing new theoretical 
understandings realized through a Utopian form of elective kinship. (9) 
 
Theo’s relationships to Kee and Jasper certainly reawaken his sense of community, but I 
think LaRose goes too far in declaring elective kinship to be a kind of utopia. Rather, I 
think Cuarón takes the more subtle step of depicting a small reawakening of hope in 
Theo. Kee’s baby provides a very literal hope for a future to human species, one where, 
theoretically, Theo might be able to find a new partner and have children once again. But 
as he sacrifices his life at the end of the film to deliver Kee and her baby to the 
rendezvous with the Human Project, Theo invests in a different kind of hope. The 
meeting happens on a boat in the ocean just outside the walls of the refugee camp. When 
the Human Project boat arrives, Theo dies as explosions and fighting are heard over the 
city walls. Theo positions himself as a bridge between two worlds. The din of the old 
world destroying itself can be heard in the background, while the baby for the future is 
passed to representatives of a new community. Theo can find hope and purpose in his 
role as an interlocutor, but also sacrifices his life in the transition from a community 
riddled with dystopian fears to a community that represents the hope of a future. 
The Road: Social Decay and the Family as a System 
 Like Children of Men and 28 Days Later, Cormac McCarthy’s novel The Road 
depicts the collapse of society amidst dystopian conflict. And in much the same manner 
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as the two films, The Road repeatedly insists on the importance of small family units – 
sometimes naturally occurring, sometimes improvised – in the face of global disaster. But 
where the society in Cuarón’s film still had some vestiges of its former glory, and where 
28 Days Later depicts a society just weeks into a cataclysmic trauma, the world that 
McCarthy describes is one of nearly complete apocalypse. A father and son travel along a 
road from the mid-south of the United States to the southeastern coast, hoping to stay 
warm during the winter.
4
 The world around them has been completely leveled: There is 
no government or institutions of authority, there are almost no communities or cities, 
most major landmarks have been completely erased from the earth, and the light from the 
sun is perpetually dimmed from the ashen dust that hovers in the sky and covers 
everything. Gangs of cannibals roam the roads during the day. There is no natural 
growth, little clean water, and certainly nothing approaching electricity. McCarthy 
describes: 
Cauterized terrain [...] where all was burnt to ash before them no fires were to be 
had and the nights were long and dark and cold beyond anything they’d yet 
encountered. Cold to crack the stones. To take your life. He [the Man] held the 
boy shivering against him and counted each frail breath in the blackness. (13) 
 
As Children of Men gave few clues as to the cause of its global infertility, so too 
McCarthy offers scant explanation as to the cause of the destruction. The Man has only a 
snippet memory of “A long shear of light and a series of low concussions” (45), a 
description detailed enough to raise suspicions of some kind of cataclysmic explosion, 
                                                 
4
There are a number of clues to suggest that the Man and Boy start out somewhere near Knoxville, 
TN and travel south and east, finally ending on a beach in the Carolinas. Wesley Morgan from the 
University of Tennessee has a detailed retracing of the book’s many locales, and argues that the Man and 
Boy begin in Middleboro, KY, before descending into Knoxville. Morgan suggests their journey may end 
on a southern beach in North Carolina. There is some debate among readers as to whether the pair ends up 
north or south of Charleston, SC, but the book does not offer enough clues for a definitive answer. They do, 
undoubtedly, end the journey somewhere along the Carolina-Georgia coast, against the Atlantic. 
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but too general to draw any specific conclusions. A global weapon, a nuclear meltdown 
or an asteroid are all plausible hypotheses, but impossible to prove, and the question of 
whether the “series of low concussions” are the cause of the destruction or an effect of its 
source remain. In short, McCarthy and Cuarón both move their audience away from an 
investigation of what caused widespread social collapse, and onto a rumination of what 
the consequences of the apocalyptic event reflect on humanity.  
 Even if The Road is far less direct in identifying a cause for the ruin it depicts, 
McCarthy still sets his vision of apocalyptic destruction against the same backdrop as 
Cuarón and Boyle: a contemporary culture awestruck by real scenes of destruction and 
paranoid of its own annihilation.  Aitor Ibarrola-Armendariz writes that: 
No historical period has witnessed such an eruption of end-of-the-world images 
and narratives as the beginning of the new millennium. [Contemporary] books 
and movies […] are all seen to tap into our collective unconscious and that 
suppressed fear of what may hide beneath the extremely fragile veneer of 
civilization that has so far kept us from global annihilation. […] As explained 
earlier on, The Road does not reveal a precise explanation of the origin of the 
worldwide cataclysm; yet, there are some tangential references and religious 
undertones that can easily be linked to our present-day realities. (88) 
 
Widespread cultural paranoia has informed the context of McCarthy’s contemporary 
work, both in The Road, and in his 2005 novel No Country for Old Men, in which an 
unrelenting psychopath leaves a trail of death and destruction across the Texas-Mexico 
border as he tracks a man who has stolen a satchel of money from a botched drug deal. 
Francisco Collado-Rodriguez points out:  
In a period significantly characterized by the posttraumatic collective sense that 
followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks and by ecological fears concerning global 
warming, McCarthy has written two novels framed in different narrative genres 
using very distinct styles […} both novels warn readers about the necessity of 
questioning the power of storytelling, and above all they offer an understanding of 
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the individual self and our civilization as structurally traumatized, with the 
implication that some moral issues should be reconsidered if the human species is 
to survive. Although violence has always been a reiterative theme in McCarthy's 
fiction, in the two novels under scrutiny the topic is openly connected to 
collective devastating results. (49) 
 
Which is to say that even in No Country for Old Men, set in the 1980s and featuring a 
relatively small cast of characters, the spiraling, expansive nature of the violence and 
destruction takes the post-September 11
th
 cultural trauma as its reference point. And 
while the cause of the apocalyptic destruction in The Road is never fully revealed, readers 
immediately recognize the tone of the book, and the nature of the existential anxiety it 
explores as fundamentally contemporary and emerging from the traumas of the new 
millennium.  
 The Road is also nostalgic, to a degree. Characters look back to a lost society that 
was almost immeasurably better than the landscape they inhabit: 
The boy clung to him. They moved away and he tried to find a clear space in the 
darkness but finally he put down the tarp and they just sat and pulled the blankets 
over them and he held the boy against him. The whump of the falling trees and 
the low boom of the loads of snow exploding on the ground set the woods to 
shuddering. He held the boy and told him it would be all right and that it would 
stop soon and after a while it did. The dull bedlam dying in the distance and 
again, solitary and far away. Then nothing. (82) 
 
The earth is not just cauterized and scarred by what has happened; it is slowly lumbering 
to its death. As the Man and the Boy sleep in the woods at night, tremors run through the 
ground, and the dead trees snap and crash in the darkness all around them. The earth 
literally sounds its death knell to them at night; one that plays in conjunction with the 
Man’s rapidly declining health. I read the above passage as an expression of sublime 
terror. To call back to my discussion of the Sublime in my introductory chapter, Terry 
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Eagleton defines the Sublime as: “any power which is perilous, shattering, ravishing, 
traumatic, excessive, exhilarating, dwarfing, astonishing, uncontainable, overwhelming, 
boundless, obscure, terrifying, enthralling and uplifting” (44). McCarthy’s language itself 
is beautiful—old southern trees breaking off in the darkness and “whump”ing into the 
soft unmarked snow. That it is also a terrifying sign of the earth’s impending death 
speaks to a volatile balance in the landscape around: It is arresting, as the face of the earth 
has been removed and remade, but frightening in its significance. McCarthy’s world 
poses a massive existential crisis: How can a dying species in a dying world find meaning 
in life? 
 A consequence of the cataclysmic disaster is that normal meaning-making 
systems are disrupted. By that, I mean that there is no government to organize citizens; 
indeed, there no longer appear to be nations for citizens to belong to. Religion no longer 
seems organized, and the Man spends the better part of the book wondering whether God 
exists, and if he can be blamed for the situation at hand: “...then he just knelt in the ashes. 
He raised his face to the paling day. Are you there? He whispered. Will I see you at last? 
Have you a neck by which to throttle you? Have you a heart? Damn you eternally have 
you a soul? Oh God, he whispered. Oh god” (10). Denunciations of God are common in 
dystopian stories, but this passage is unique for the way the Man’s emotions swing back 
and forth, from questioning God’s presence, to damning his existence, to sobbing for him 
in a last breath. McCarthy creates characters whose relationships to the concept of a deity 
is nuanced by the destruction that surrounds them wherever they travel.  
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 Perhaps an even more significant meaning-making system for most humans is the 
family unit, which functions in The Road as a refuge for displaced survivors, much as it 
does in Children of Men and 28 Days Later. Like religion, government and community, 
McCarthy shows the breakdown of the family amid the apocalyptic landscape in a 
flashback to a conversation between the Man and the Woman (his wife): 
 [The Man]: Please. 
 [The Woman]: Stop it. 
 [The Man]: I am begging you. I’ll do anything. 
 [The Woman]: Such as what? I should have done it a long time ago. When there  
 were three bullets in the gun instead of two. I was stupid [...] You have two  
 bullets and then what? You can’t protect us. You say you would die for us but  
 what good is that? [...] We used to talk about death. We don’t any more. Why is  
 that? 
 [The Man]: I don’t know. 
 [The Woman]: It’s because it’s here. There’s nothing left to talk about. 
 [The Man]: I wouldn’t leave you. 
 [The Woman]: I don’t care. It’s meaningless.  
 
This passage emphasizes the decay of family in the wake of this apocalyptic disaster. 
Where the Man still adheres to the conventions of the nuclear family—professing that he 
wouldn’t leave the family, that he would die to protect them—the Woman wants to end 
what she sees as a facade: living a life that has no possibility of improving. The family, 
and in a larger sense life, have become meaningless to her. 
 The great majority of the book is given over to showing the extent to which the 
Man will go to protect the Boy from harm, and to shield his mind from as much of the 
terror of the world as possible; it mirrors the lengths that Theo and Kee travel to directly 
extricate Kee’s child from a violent and paranoid English society in Children of Men. The 
Man constructs a simple system of morals to which the Boy clings. The man tells him 
that the two of them are “The Good Guys,” and because of this, they do not engage in 
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certain behaviors: They do not eat people. They do not kill when they are not threatened. 
They do not steal unless it is clear something has been abandoned or the owner is dead. 
This system has evolved with two functions: First, it offers a worldview to the Boy, who 
was born some time in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, and who has no firsthand 
conception of a world other than the one he walks with the Man. For a child who has his 
first sip of a carbonated beverage when the two find a rusted Coke-Cola machine in an 
abandoned building, the differences between a soda or a system of morals are not entirely 
distinct. They are both relics of a time before his own. 
 The ethical code which the Man teaches to his Son is but one facet of a larger 
process in which the Man invests all meaning in the child. In a middle section of the 
novel, the Man and Boy encounter an elderly man walking along the road. After much 
prodding from the Boy, they share some of their food with the blind transient, and the 
Old Man and the Man talk while the Boy sleeps: 
 [The Old Man]: When I saw the boy I thought I had died. 
 [The Man]: You thought he was an angel? 
 [The Old Man]: I didn’t know what he was. I never thought I would see a child. I  
 didn’t know that would happen. 
 [The Man]: What if I said he was a god? (145). 
 
The Man doesn’t view the Boy as a god in the sense that he has supernatural powers or an 
omnipresent aura. The Man’s thinking is loosely existentialist. In a world where he is 
completely responsible for everything in life, the Man chooses the Boy as the entity 
through which he will make sense of things. Establishing a relationship with the Boy and 
protecting the Boy from the dangers of their world gives meaning to his life. 
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 Because the Man invests so much significance in the Boy, the central drama of 
the story is whether he would be able to kill the child if necessary—and in a world in 
which roving groups of cannibals roam the roads, it may well be necessary. With only 
one bullet left in his gun, the man constantly wonders if he would be able to kill his son 
to spare him worse pain. Even though he has told himself many times he would be able to 
do so, the Man refuses to shoot his child even as The Man is dying as the novel ends. He 
tells his son: 
I can’t. I can’t hold my dead son in my arms. I thought I could but I can’t. [...] I 
know. I’m sorry. You have my whole heart. You always did. You’re the best guy. 
You always were. If I’m not here, you can still talk to me. You can talk to me and 
I’ll talk to you. You’ll see. (235) 
 
Fresh from his father’s death, the Boy seems to find a family who have been watching 
from a distance and tell the Boy he can travel safely with them. Some see the McCarthy 
ending on a note of hope in an otherwise bleak novel, where others see him betraying the 
tone of much of the book for easy sentimentality at its conclusion. With respect to those 
positions, I think they miss the real focus on the novel’s ending. In the above passage, the 
Man essentially chooses hope over non-believing, even if the evidence for a hopeful 
future is almost nonexistent. He tells his son, “Goodness will find the little boy. It always 
has. It will again” (135). At that moment, the novel ceases to be truly dystopian, because 
its central character makes the existential choice between hope and meaninglessness. In 
essence, the Man and his wife come to the same conclusion: that in the world they 
inhabit, life is neither good nor meaningful. But where she and a number of other 
characters choose to end life in the face of this conclusion, the Man creates meaning in 
his son, and chooses to hope that good will find the boy. Based on the world they inhabit, 
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that hope for a better future may be irrational, but choosing this belief leads to a more 
rational present, one in which a father cannot be the one to take his only son’s life. The 
hope that The Man finds at the end is threadbare, as is any hope left for the reader. We 
know almost nothing of the family The Boy joins, and for a novel that has been almost 
unrelentingly pessimistic, The Boy’s sudden good fortune is jarring. But the point, here, 
is that while the conclusion underscores the thematic significance of small family units in 
dystopian literature. The relationship between The Man and the Boy is their primary 
mechanism for survival, and the small moments of intimacy and domesticity that they 
savor – the language specific to them, the daily routines, the stories they tell one another 
– are the only way they can make a bleak existence meaningful. McCarthy is signaling 
that the family unit is not only a survival method in a dystopian world, but also a 
grounding point for the existential struggle endemic to it. He closes the novel by re-
affirming the one reliability in a crisis: families. 
 Taken together, Children of Men, 28 Days Later and The Road foreground the 
ever-growing sense of powerlessness and impending extinction that grows throughout 
Western culture during the War on Terror decade.  In each narrative, scenes of mass 
destruction and death are followed by the collapse of social systems and whole societies. 
Survivors are left to protect what remains of their families, or to cobble together family-
like units with other survivors. Three narratives covering connected, but distinct kinds of 
calamity all end with scenes that foreground the value of family: Jim, Selena and Hannah 
together in a remote cottage; Theo dying quietly in a boat with Kee and her baby; The 
Man dying and passing his son into the care of another surviving family. This illustrates 
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that these three stories offer a critical distance from the modern world, within which it 
can be analyzed, but also a simple solution to the disasters. Cuarón, Boyle and McCarthy 
imagine complex, tactile dystopian worlds, and then suggest that the hope lost in the 
destruction of old systems can be rekindled in the preservation or birth of a new, smaller 
community.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE GLOBAL POSTHUMAN: DYSTOPIAN ECOLOGY AND 
 
CORPORATE HEGEMONY 
 
 The dystopian landscapes of the previous chapter were firmly rooted in the War 
on Terror decade. Cormac McCarthy, Danny Boyle and Alfonso Cauron’s texts reflect 
cultures of paranoia versed in the language and imagery of terrorism and xenophobia, of 
biological agents and urban devastation. Because the zeitgeists of terrorism and war are 
predicated on immediacy—imminent destruction and impending threats—the dystopias 
imagined by McCarthy and others reflect the same sense of encroaching doom. But as 
authors, artists, and the culture at large emerge from the early and mid-2000s, the sense 
that the world is on the precipice of annihilation subsides, even as the paranoia and 
anxiety of the decade linger. The dual global crises of the 2008 economic collapse and 
the 2008-2009 world food shortage mark a transition in the cultural imaginary and in the 
dystopian fiction born out of it. Texts move from narratives of imminent physical 
catastrophe to stories of class conflict, environmental collapse and posthuman evolution. 
The most contemporary dystopian texts, produced from 2008 to the present, foreground 
concerns about wealth inequality and power, and the role of corporations in biological 
and environmental development. In this chapter, I look to fiction infused with the 
apprehension and fear of the early and mid-2000s, but which looks forward to concerns 
about humanity’s ability to sustain and inhabit the planet in the shadow of global 
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corporate power. Paolo Bacigalupi’s Nebula and Hugo Award-winning novel The 
Windup Girl focuses on a future version of Thailand excoriated by climate challenges and 
battling massive agricultural companies that have farmed much of the world’s food 
supply to extinction. Meanwhile, the BioShock game series, specifically BioShock and 
BioShock Infinite, imagine alternate American histories in which toxic corporations battle 
with or supersede equally corrupt governments. Backlit by theories of posthumanism, 
both the novel and the games feature characters whose transhuman nature allows them to 
destabilize toxic corporate and government-controlled spaces. 
 In her book Decade of Fear: Reporting from Terrorism’s Grey Zone, Toronto 
Star National Security Correspondent Michelle Sheppard recalls sitting across from 
former CIA Director Porter Goss and former NSA Chief Michael Hayden, as the two 
men were “justifying the water boarding of self-professed 9/11 mastermind Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed […] using salted bar nuts as a prop” (1). The bizarre scene occurred 
in November 2010 aboard a “Spy Cruise” boat trip, a tourism package sponsored by the 
Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies, a conservative-leaning think tank. 
The cruise featured lectures and one-on-one conversation opportunities with retired 
counterintelligence officials, and was created by former CIA Operations Officer Bart 
Bechtel, “a true red-white-and-blue-bleeding patriot who worries that Americans may 
forget the horror of 9/11 and become complacent in their security fears” (2). That a 
former CIA officer would charter a cruise combining exotic Caribbean sights and lectures 
from retired NSA, CIA and FBI higher-ups is profoundly odd, but also underscores the 
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slippage of terrorism and national security concerns from the forefront of popular 
imagination by 2010.  
 Five years earlier in 2005—at the height of the Iraq War and just four years 
removed from the September 11
th 
attacks—it would have seemed inconceivable that 
security officials would worry about Americans becoming “complacent in their security 
fears.” But by 2010, the national and global preoccupation had shifted dramatically. 
Americans had not forgotten the threat of terrorism, but security concerns had been 
removed from the most prominent place on the cultural mantle. In 2004, the Pew 
Research Center reported that 89% of Americans were in favor of the U.S.-led global 
War on Terror. At the end of 2004, even as the initial success of the Iraq War was giving 
way to occupation and insurgency, support for the War on Terror remained high, with 
81% of Americans in support of the war and identifying it as an important national issue. 
Terrorism was seen as important not only to national security, but to the economy as 
well. A 2004 poll by the National Association for Business Economics revealed that 40% 
of its 117 member panel identified terrorism as the biggest threat to the U.S. economy, far 
ahead of the 23% that identified the federal deficit as a larger threat.
1
 However, by 
January of 2008, the number of Americans who identified terrorism as their top voting 
priority had dipped to 74%. And that number continued to decline; by the 2012 election, 
just 60% of voters told Pew that terrorism was “very important” to their vote (and this 
was a poll that skewed along political lines, though not as starkly as one might expect: 
68% of likely Romney voters said terrorism was “very important” to their vote, compared 
                                                 
1
Though it should be noted that by 2005, the numbers had nearly flipped for NABE members, with 
more identifying the deficit as the biggest risk to the U.S. economy. Budgets and terrorism remained the 
top polling issues until the global financial collapse in 2008.  
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to only 55% of likely Obama voters). In a March 2013 Gallup poll, a scant 34% identified 
a possible future terrorist attack as a major national concern.  
 Terrorism and warfare faded from the preeminent spot in our cultural 
consciousness even as a myriad of politicians and statesmen worked diligently to 
convince the public of its impending annihilation. From a March 2012 Foreign Policy 
feature by Micah Zenko and Michael A. Cohen: 
Last August, the Republican presidential contender Mitt Romney performed what 
has become a quadrennial rite of passage in American presidential politics: he 
delivered a speech to the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. His 
message was rooted in another grand American tradition: hyping foreign threats 
to the United States. It is “wishful thinking,” Romney declared, “that the world is 
becoming a safer place. The opposite is true. Consider simply the jihadists, a near-
nuclear Iran, a turbulent Middle East, an unstable Pakistan, a delusional North 
Korea, an assertive Russia, and an emerging global power called China. No, the 
world is not becoming safer.
2
 
 
Romney’s speech—one among a litany of public statements from Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and others—was both a play to a 
sympathetic audience filled with veterans, and an acknowledgement of the muted 
                                                 
2The thrust of Zenko and Cohen’s piece is that contrary to the popular political narrative, the 
global security landscape is far more secure than it seems:  
 
The world that the United States inhabits today is a remarkably safe and secure place. It is a world 
with fewer violent conflicts and greater political freedom than at virtually any other point in 
human history. All over the world, people enjoy longer life expectancy and greater economic 
opportunity than ever before. The United States faces no plausible existential threats, no great-
power rival, and no near-term competition for the role of global hegemon. (2) 
 
In just the three years since this piece’s publication, war has broken out between Ukraine and Russian-
backed separatists in Crimea, the Syrian Civil War birthed the fundamentalist state ISIS, and terror groups 
Al-Shabab and Boko Haram have launched violent public attacks East to West across the African 
continent. These events clearly undermine the picture of broad international stability that Zenko and Cohen 
wish to paint. Whether this swell in state war and subaltern terrorism will define the latter part of the 
decade as much as wealth inequality and corporate power has the first part remains to be seen (though it 
certainly feels like it will at the moment), but the point here is just how forcefully Mitt Romney and other 
prominent politicians felt they needed to sell the concept of foreign danger to a nation that, at the time, was 
entirely preoccupied with its economy. 
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response voters gave to foreign threats during the 2012 election season. In fact, just three 
weeks after Romney’s appearance at the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention, the 
prevailing anxiety and financial frustration coalesced into the first Occupy Wall Street 
protests throughout Manhattan’s Zuccotti Park and Financial District. My sense is that 
the national opinion of the Occupy protests, now more than three years past their peak 
popularity, is one of ambivalence. Media coverage of the movement focused heavily on 
its lack of hierarchy or leadership, and its refusal to articulate a clear set of demands. In 
November 2011, even the progressive-leaning polling organization Public Policy Polling 
reported that only 33% of voters held a favorable view of the Occupy campaigns.  
 Even if the protests never culminated in meaningful political appeal, they are 
nonetheless significant for their international context: a constellation of global protests 
against wealth inequality in the global financial system. In Reykjavík in 2009, thousands 
of citizens protested and rioted after Iceland’s three largest private banks collapsed under 
the weight of massive foreign debt, plunging the entire national economy into near-
bankruptcy (“Cracks in the Crust”). Massive anti-austerity protests swept through Greece 
beginning in 2010, rallying against the coming debt austerity deal with a domineering 
European Union. In the protests, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou was 
“portrayed as a capitalist stooge” (Hewitt). A series of similar protests in Spain earlier in 
2011 precede the Occupy movement (Rainsford). Taken together, the protests and riots 
speak to the anxiety and anger directed at two common targets: the private banking 
system, and corporate wealth and influence. Pulitzer Prize-winner Chris Hedges argues 
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that the protests and Occupy movements underscore a rapidly growing fear of corporate 
hegemony: 
We must develop a revolutionary theory that is not reliant on the industrial or 
agrarian muscle of workers. Most manufacturing jobs have disappeared, and, of 
those that remain, few are unionized. Our family farms have been destroyed by 
agro-businesses. Monsanto and its Faustian counterparts on Wall Street rule. They 
are steadily poisoning our lives and rendering us powerless. The corporate 
leviathan, which is global, is freed from the constraints of a single nation-state or 
government. Corporations are beyond regulation or control. Politicians are too 
anemic, or more often too corrupt, to stand in the way of the accelerating 
corporate destruction. (“The Sparks of Rebellion”) 
 
The absence of accountability is Hedges’ central point. By their very global nature, 
corporations operate outside the laws and oversight of any one nation or state. And 
beyond their unlimited power, National Magazine Award-winner Matt Tiabbi insists that 
corporate culture foments a sense of public alienation: “If you think of it this way, 
Occupy Wall Street takes on another meaning. There's no better symbol of the gloom and 
psychological repression of modern America than the banking system, a huge heartless 
machine that attaches itself to you at an early age, and from which there is no escape” 
(“How I Learned to Stop Worrying…”). 
 In this chapter, I work through the manner in which artists working in the 
dystopian genre fictionalize this anti-corporate zeitgeist that is so suspicious of public and 
private systems of wealth and power, looking specifically to the novel The Windup Girl 
and the videogame series BioShock. Both texts brim with fear and anxiety over corporate 
power, and make overt references to the 2008 financial collapse and the 2008 world food 
shortage. In my introductory chapter, I wrote, “Dystopian fear, on the other hand, 
examines the partial or complete loss of such faiths, and a dystopian community is one 
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suffering under both the consequences of failed utopian policies, and an evaporating 
sense of belief in any ability to progress or improve” (Peters 21). The pervading sense 
that corporate systems of authority and wealth are anti-utopian and all-controlling 
animates these stories. My argument is that the authors of these texts look for spaces and 
forces within their fiction to imagine agency and resistance to the dystopian climate. The 
Windup Girl and the BioShock series find a redemptive figure in the cyborg, whose 
posthuman identity challenges and subvert structures of power and money in subaltern 
ways. 
 Hedges and Tiabbi are squarely focused on the impact that corporations have on 
people disaffected by their omnipotence: our sense of fear or alienation. I think it is 
important to remember that landscape and ecology are significant features of dystopian 
story-telling as well. A key example is the barren, ashen world of The Road (2006) that I 
examined in the previous chapter. Equally vivid is the scene in The Matrix (1999) in 
which the real world—a sunless, fulminating cadaver planet ruled by intelligent 
machines—is shown to Neo, his late Twentieth Century life revealed as nothing more 
than a computer simulation. Or Katsuhiro Otomo’s seminal anime AKIRA (1988), which 
envisions a cyberpunk Tokyo rebuilt after world war on an abandoned landfill. 
Landscape and ecology are particularly important to stories of dystopian corporations 
because the fear at play is the concern that corporate excesses poison the collective well, 
figuratively and literally.  
  Authoritarian  corporations and biological modification are tropes linked through 
the history of dystopian writing: Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003) envisions a 
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future America run entirely by corporations who have experimented with human-animal 
gene splicing; William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984) is a cyber-punk satire on 
technological corporations; Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982)—itself an adaptation of 
Phillip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep (1968)—describes a dystopian 
Los Angeles  in which powerful corporations use genetic human replicants for illegal 
work. Going back as far as Fritz Lang’s Metropolis, which depicts a near-prophetic 
Maschinenmensch (“machine-human”) in a massive city controlled by industrialists, 
posthuman characters and hegemonic corporations are interwoven. The presence of post-
human characters and corporations in very recent dystopian stories is simultaneously 
another iteration of this canonical trope, and a validation of Chris Hedges’ commentary 
about corporations: They frighten us because they have near limitless resources and are 
not accountable to the public in the way individuals or the government is imagined to be.  
 The term posthuman has been used to describe a range of critical theories about 
human evolution, humanist philosophy, and the intersection of biology and technology. 
In this chapter, I use the term to describe characters who have evolved or been engineered 
to biologically interact with industrial or artificial technology, as well fictional cultures 
and societies attempting to govern or interact with posthuman forces.
3
 Unsurprisingly, 
science fiction and speculative fiction have a special relationship with the posthuman, 
going at least as far back as H.G. Wells’ steampunk classic The Time Machine. Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein, the prototype of modern horror and science fiction, is suffused 
                                                 
3“Posthuman” is the accepted critical term for describing these characters and scenarios; 
“Transhumanism,” a term I don’t use in this chapter, refers to a cultural and intellectual movement 
advocating humans to actively pursue the ability to biologically interact with machines. So I may 
occasionally refer to a character or trait as being transhuman, but the larger critical discussion of these 
issues will be referred to as posthuman or posthumanism.    
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with anxiety about perverse evolution and the engineering of biological life. And Alduos 
Huxley’s Brave New World popularized the concept of the benevolent scientific dystopia, 
where humans are engineered and pacified by technology, which inspires later cultural 
touchstones like the aforementioned The Matrix or Radiohead’s OK Computer album. I 
think it is important to balance an understanding of this early view of the posthuman as a 
corrupting force in speculative fiction with contemporary discourses which treat the 
posthuman as at least revolutionary, and occasionally utopic.  
 Katherine Hayles’ view of posthumanism is illuminating. She uses the term “to 
describe a historical phenomenon, something that occurred in ideas about the human 
from roughly the 1930s to the present” that were connected to: 
[C]ommon sites where contestations to determine the future of humanity are 
especially intense. These include issues of globalization as disparate cultures race 
toward informational convergence; performativities that re-define the human 
through mimetic imitation of intelligent machines; and virtual embodiments that 
discipline human users to coordinate their perceptions with algorithmic 
procedures. It is too soon to say where these engagements will end. Perhaps the 
only clear conclusions are that the future of humans will increasingly be entangled 
with intelligent machines, and that embodiments will still matter in some sense, 
however virtual or cyborgian they become. (316)  
 
Hayles outlines three large issues that dominate current posthuman theory: globalization 
and an international network of shared knowledge, performances of humanity in 
machines, and virtual embodiments of humanity, all of which are increasingly prominent 
in a networked world of finance, culture and social media. Nick Bostrom describes the 
proliferation of consumer technology as a transformative moment for the posthuman. For 
many decades, industry and technology were most visible on grand public scales: in large 
transportation systems, world wars and the Space Race. Technological achievement was 
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a public endeavor, and a source of national pride. When cars, televisions, and later 
computers become middle class commodities, Bostrom says, technology adopts a new 
status as a class and fashion symbol. More than that, the broad proliferation of personal 
technology devices in the last thirty years means that nearly everyone has access to an 
interactive digital portal that can feel almost haunted by intelligence: 
In Judaic mysticism, a “golem” refers to an animated being crafted from 
inanimate material […] With the invention of the electronic computer, the idea of 
human‐like automata graduated from the kindergarten of mythology to the school 
of science fiction (Asimov, Lem, Clarke) and eventually to the college of 
technological prediction. (8) 
 
 Mark Poster argues that the demarcation between man and intelligent machine 
long ago evaporated, only we fail to consistently notice the blurring because it is not 
embodied in the way commonly imagined. Rather than the lusus naturae of 
Frankenstein’s monster or a humanoid cyborg, Poster suggests that “networked digital 
information humachines”—an umbrella term describing a vast series of digital networks 
through which information and culture are exchanged, such as the internet or the global 
finance infrastructure—constitute  a site that already blurs the natural with the 
engineered: 
"Networked digital information humachines" are neither subjects nor objects. The 
global economy, by contrast, may be understood as the sum of countless human 
practices in which machines are used as tools, as a myriad of rules, institutions, 
and habits that to some extent change over time. "Networked digital information 
humachines" is a phrase that presumes the intertwining of humans and machines 
to such an extent that properly speaking one cannot locate a position that 
resembles that of a subject nor that of an object. (318) 
 
In many ways, Poster’s theory seems indebted to Appadurai’s “scapes” of Modernity in 
that they both conceptualize globalization as a series of portals through which goods and 
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culture pass. The most defining feature of globalization being the network itself. In this 
case, Poster is concerned exclusively with digital global networks: 
At the heart of Empire rests an analysis that derives not from Marx but from 
Foucault and Deleuze. Hardt/Negri narrate the emergence of empire as a change 
in mechanisms of power from societies of discipline to societies of control. The 
thesis that a new mode of political power is coming into being—empire replacing 
the nation state, requires a new mode of social regulation. (326) 
 
It is interesting that Poster, Bostrom, Hayles (and others like Ray Kurzwiel and Marvin 
Minsky) focus on a more liminal conceptualization of the posthuman that emphasizes 
globalization, information portals, and international data networks. Reflecting our 
transnational culture, these theorists adopt an intentionally broad view; the posthuman, 
viewed as macro, so to speak. Contemporary dystopian stories featuring posthuman 
characters and forces often fall somewhere in between these perspectives, depicting 
communities enslaved or monitored by vast networks alongside more typical cyborgian 
portrayals of the posthuman.
4
 Indeed, there is usefulness in character-driven examinations 
of posthumanism. Donna Haraway’s formulation of the cyborg is still particularly 
appealing for its focus on a single figure who stands in opposition to large networks of 
data and authority. Literature and art are, of course, reflections of and meditations on 
pervasive national moods. The authors and game-creators of very recent dystopian fiction 
merge posthuman theories with the prevailing national and international anxiety 
surrounding corporate power and wealth. The vision of a future Thailand in Bacigalupi’s 
The Windup Girl is predicated on a global crop plague and wars between governments 
                                                 
4
To return to a popular example in this chapter, The Matrix (2000) depicts a worldwide computer 
system – The Matrix itself – meant to mollify and pacify human imagination and resistance to machines. At 
the same time, the film uses the Agent Smith character to embody this digital totalitarianism and give its 
audience a natural antagonist for the protagonists to battle.  
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and corporate agricultural giants, while Levine’s BioShock Infinite responds to the 
financial protests that sparked the Occupy Wall Street movement. These two texts stake a 
global view of culture and power. But like so many dystopian texts before them, 
individual posthuman characters play significant roles in destabilizing the global power 
systems that Hayles and Poster describe. For the remainder of this chapter, I analyze the 
figure of the posthuman, first in The Windup Girl and then the BioShock series. The 
function of the posthuman in these dystopian stories is rooted directly in the cultural shift 
I have detailed earlier from the War on Terror decade to the post-recession climate of 
corporate fear. 
 Haraway’s imagining of the cyborg figure in A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, 
Technology and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s (1985) is seminal in this analysis 
because it predicts the critical function of cyborg and transhuman characters in 
contemporary dystopian work. Cyborg is an umbrella term for Cybernetic Organism, or 
any entity that has both technological and organic parts. Haraway called the cyborg “a 
creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction” (7). In many stories, the cyborg 
character is a humanoid, sometimes publically known to be robotic, and sometimes 
passing as human. Darth Vader and Robocop, for example, present a humanoid 
appearance, but are still distinguishable as robotic or biomechanical. Meanwhile, the T-
800 character in the Terminator series and the replicants of Blade Runner are able to pass 
through human society largely undetected and unnoticed. In fact, it is precisely the 
anxiety that a cyborg is capable of “passing” as human that informs many depictions of 
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the cyborg as a dangerous, subaltern entity unless it is destroyed or until it experiences an 
epiphany about the implicit uniqueness of organic human life. 
 Haraway’s cyborg is certainly subaltern, but positioned as a revolutionary, non-
insidious figure. Written in early-Reagan America, A Manifesto for Cyborgs (1985) is a 
socialist-feminist response to an era of American politics not so dissimilar to the present: 
a period of exploding wealth and corporate expansion, deregulation and recession. The 
culture of capitalism, says Haraway, forces the world into a series of binaries and 
competitors:  “In the traditions of “Western” science and politics—the tradition of racist, 
male-dominated capitalism; the tradition of progress; the tradition of the appropriation of 
nature as resource for the production of culture; the tradition of reproduction of the self 
from the reflections of the other—the relation between organism and machine has been a 
border war” (8). Since capitalism forces people into competition, she reasons, culture 
begins to reflect on this oppositional stance. People living in under this system are 
separated into clear categories of race, gender and class, and those who do not fit clearly 
into a category are marginalized or punished. I think the most useful portion of A 
Manifesto for Cyborgs is Haraway’s contention that it is untenable, politically or 
personally, to either fully engage in a culture that is patriarchal, consumption-oriented 
and antagonistic or to be completely autonomous from it: 
The self is the One who is not dominated, who knows that by the experience of 
domination, which gives lie to the autonomy of the self. To be One is to be 
autonomous, to be powerful, to be God; but to be One is to be an illusion, and so 
to be involved in a dialectic of apocalypse with the other. Yet to be other is to be 
multiple, without clear boundary, frayed, insubstantial. One is too few, but two 
are too many. (35) 
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Haraway is searching for a figure that can disrupt the either/or binaries of the world, one 
that is neither entirely socially constructed nor willfully isolated from the culture it exists 
within. Klaus Benesch argues that:     
The machine, especially in its cybernetic representations in modern art, thus has 
come to function as the cultural Other of technological society. Only by using the 
symbolic complexity of the cyborg figure as a foil onto which we project both the 
desire to improve our biological condition, that is to become more machine-like, 
and, at the same time, the anxiety about machines replacing the human body 
altogether, are we able to negotiate the increasing technologizing of the modern 
world. (381) 
 
Benesch’s cyborg is a transitional figure, a both/and, whose very being reflects 
humanity’s desire to better-engineer the species without simultaneously creating its own 
replacement. Benesch, too, sees the cybernetic creature as being able to inhabit binaries. 
But rather than serve solely as a mirror to contradictory human desires and fears, 
Haraway’s cyborg is an active, often transgressive figure that is either one, which is too 
few, or two, which are too many. 
   Future Ecologies in The Windup Girl 
 Haraway’s theory is predicated on mass culture having been dissected and 
compartmentalized into the false binaries of a capitalist system. Bacigalupi’s The Windup 
Girl, presents a vision of a world excoriated by binary systems: global corporations 
versus national governments; natural biology versus genetic enhancement; and progress 
versus fundamentalism. The Windup Girl, which won both the 2010 Nebula and Hugo 
Awards for Best Novel, is set in a vision of Thailand in the 23
rd
 Century. This Thailand is 
simultaneously the trading post and warring ground for a host of international forces. 
Thai, Japanese, Pakistani and American characters representing corporations, 
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governments and tradesmen intersect across Bangkok at all levels of power. But 
transnational though it may be, the Thai kingdom is not emblematic of the mythology of 
20
th
 and 21
st
 Century globalization: a narrative of growth, travel and expansion. Two 
hundred years later, Bacigalupi envisions the world in a state of contraction. Massive 
agricultural corporations call Agrigen and PurCal war over production of a dwindling 
global food supply. Bio-modified foods have almost entirely replaced organic food 
stocks, and crop blight has destroyed even many of these engineered crops. Global 
warming has tripled the swell of the oceans, and Bangkok now sits below sea level, 
protected by a series of locks and levees built around the city. Thailand has a natural seed 
bank, kept hidden from the giant calorie companies that are desperate to mine its stock 
and open up Thailand’s restrictive trade tariffs to Western corporations. 
 That crop shortages and corporate malfeasance inspire this story is not surprising, 
given the state of the world as Bacigalupi wrote. From 2005-2009, a series of major food 
shortages – caused both by crop blight and poor climate conditions for harvest – spread 
across the world and resulted in riots in Eygpt, Haiti, Mozambique, Bangladesh and 
elsewhere. The riots toppled the government in Haiti, and were “the world’s big story,” 
according to the Director of Columbia University’s Earth Center.  National Geographic 
notes that:  
Between 2005 and the summer of 2008, the price of wheat and corn tripled, and 
the price of rice climbed fivefold, spurring food riots in nearly two dozen 
countries and pushing 75 million more people into poverty. But unlike previous 
shocks driven by short-term food shortages, this price spike came in a year when 
the world's farmers reaped a record grain crop. […] Simply put: For most of the 
past decade, the world has been consuming more food than it has been producing. 
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Global protests against multinational agricultural business like Monsanto spread through 
several continents, as many in the public blamed big agribusinesses and their farming 
practices for the food shortages.  And in the years since the book’s publication, food 
scientists at the United Nations and the World Food Bank have warned that a crop blight 
called Wheat Rust could destroy the global wheat crop and plunge millions deeper into 
food insecurity (Chamy). Bacigalupi was certainly aware of these protests and shortages, 
and has said in interviews that the BP spill in the Gulf of Mexico became an important 
way of thinking about corporate influence over a globalized world as he wrote The 
Windup Girl:  
When you look at something like BP, it's a storyline that shouldn't have existed. 
They couldn't see that the step-by-step actions were gonna cascade into something 
much bigger than themselves. I feel like that really applies to almost all of our 
environmental problems. I get on an airplane and fly out here to Boston — that 
has consequences bigger and more complex than I can understand. The BP thing 
— in the assumed storyline, we're going to drill down, we're going to get some 
oil, and everybody's going to make some money — suddenly becomes something 
else, the storyline veers off completely. And that moment where the story veers 
off and you realize we didn't actually understand our own story, that's what's 
fascinating. 
 
The fear of corporate power is an expression of anxiety over that realization he describes 
of not knowing our own story. In these recent corporate dystopias, production and 
consumption are encouraged at breakneck speed, trampling the natural world and the 
climate as everything expands until whole human populations are forced to contract when 
resources are depleted. As Bacigalupi said in a separate interview: 
It all feels as though there’s something going on in the zeitgeist and because of it, 
the themes in The Windup Girl resonate with people […] global warming and 
[genetically modified] foods apparently resonate strongly, as, I think, does a 
certain unease over where we’re headed in terms of our wealth and prosperity. 
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 The story is told from multiple perspectives, though most frequently in the voice 
of Anderson Lake, ostensibly a manager at a giant kink-spring plant, but actually a 
corporate spy for AgriGen trying to locate the seed bank. Everywhere Anderson looks, he 
sees the contracting of the world:  
The world truly is shrinking again. A few dirigible and clipper rides and Anderson 
clatters through darkened streets on the far side of the planet. It’s astounding. In 
his grandparents’ time, even the commute between an old Expansion suburb and a 
city center was impossible. His grandparents used to tell stories of exploring 
abandoned suburbs, scavenging for scrap and leavings of whole sprawling 
neighborhoods that were destroyed in the petroleum Contraction. (114-115) 
 
There is an important distinction to be made here. Many writers describe the process of 
globalization as shrinking of the world – of knitting disparate places together through 
travel and technology. Maxwell Garnett, Secretary of the League of Nations, famously 
said that in 1924, New York was effectively closer to London than Scotland was to it one 
hundred years earlier. That is, that technologies of travel had made the world a smaller 
place. And there is some of that sentiment in the quote above; but when Bacigalupi writes 
about a “Contraction,” he doesn’t just mean “the compression of the world and the 
intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole,” to use Roland Robertson’s 
famous phrase. Instead, he is describing a world wracked by over-consumption and 
overuse of its resources and people. The world is shrinking in this novel because it cannot 
sustain the lives of its inhabitants anymore.    
 The binaries that Haraway sees in the world are immediately evident in The 
Windup Girl, as a constellation of oppositional powers joust for control over the Thai 
kingdom and its remaining natural resources. Working with Anderson and the 
agribusinesses is Trade Minister Akkarat, who wishes to sell the seedbank and open the 
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kingdom to heavy Western trade. On the other side, General Pracha runs the Environment 
Ministry and enforces the kingdom’s strict environmental laws and tariffs with the help 
of Jaidee Rojjanasukchai, Captain of the Environment Ministry’s armed enforcement 
militia. Finally, as Thailand is still ostensibly a monarchy, the Somdet Chaopraya is the 
Regent to the child Queen and the most powerful person in Bangkok. These men stand in 
for historical forces working fervently to ensure their control over the post-Expansion 
globe. Anderson represents corporate hegemony, and the plundering of the world’ 
resources. It’s no surprise that everyone in the Thai kingdom, even allies like Akkarat, 
views Anderson, PurCal and AgriGen not as titans of industry, but as bioterrorists and 
capitalist overlords: they are the future robber barons, over-harvesting the world. And 
while they try to present themselves as progressive agents for a globalized world, 
Anderson describes numerous instances in which calorie company farming and food 
engineering led to food shortages and massive riots: Meanwhile, General Pracha and 
Jaidee lean heavily on the mythology of Bangkok as a holy city and the monarchy as holy 
institution. They see themselves as standing up against a tide of corporate hegemony, 
even if it is a losing battle:  
But it hurts. They hunt and beg for scraps of knowledge from abroad, scavenge 
like cheshires for survival. So much knowledge sits inside the Midwestern 
Compact. When a promising genetic thinker arises somewhere in the world, they 
are cowed and bullied and bribed to work with the other best and brightest in 
Des Moines or Changsha. It takes a strong researcher to resist a PurCal or 
AgriGen or RedStar […But] we are alive. We are alive when whole kingdoms 
and countries are gone. When Malaya is a morass of killing. When Kowloon is 
underwater. When China is split and the Vietnamese are broken and Burma is 
nothing but starvation. (214) 
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Anderson, AgriGen and PurCal argue throughout the novel that the Thai Kingdom is 
anachronistic: fervently guarding its identity as a protectionist nation while the rest of the 
world has opened itself to some cosmopolitan ideal of culture and trade. Geeta Kapur 
theorizes that, “From where I speak there is still ground for debate about the nation-state. 
With all the calumny it has earned, it may be the only political structure that can protect 
the people of the third world from the totalitarian system that oligopolies establish – 
ironically, through the massive state power of the advanced nations” (193). Pracha, 
Jaidee and others view Bangkok as the last refuge from corporate oligopoly. As The 
Windup Girl proceeds, these tense binary forces create a rift in the Thai Kingdom. The 
relationship between the advanced and original – between engineered calorie substitutes 
and a natural seed bank; between global capital forces and tribal extremists; between 
monarchy and transnational corporations; between a dying human race and the cyborgs it 
constructs—is the gyre that widens and widens. The gap between the forces of expansion 
and contraction chew up the center.    
 Andrew Hageman intelligently argues that The Windup Girl dramatizes the 
destabilizing of long-standing centers of power. The agriculture conglomerates warring 
for food across the globe are headquartered in Iowa, at the heart of what we commonly 
call Fly-Over Country:  
Bacigalupi’s setting selections displace the usual centers of action and behind-the-
scenes action-driving centers in what amounts to a re-mapping of post-Expansion 
Earth. On the one hand, placing the corporation driving the action in Des Moines, 
Iowa, charts out a possible techno-future in which agribusiness is far more potent 
than the more traditional centers of finance and/or computer and network 
technologies. On the other hand, Bacigalupi transfers our present day Global 
South from periphery to center of this map by setting the novel in Bangkok.  What 
is more, the diegesis unfolds almost exclusively in the factory district and 
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tenement slums of Bangkok, sites of environmental degradation and danger inside 
this novel and in our own world today. Thus, The Windup Girl is a re-mapping of 
global capitalism as a dynamic of ecology, economy, and geopolitics. (287) 
 
In other words, Bacigalupi dramatizes the destabilization of the systems of power he 
describes by focusing on places that might be typically overlooked or sectioned-off from 
historical seats of power: Fly-over America, a smaller nation on the Indochina Peninsula, 
the rusted slums of Bangkok. And yet the most aggressive destablizer in the entire novel 
is, ironically, a cyborg who spends much of the plot being violently abused and 
controlled. Emiko is a Japanese “Windup,” a genetically modified humanoid used as a 
slave and programmed to obey her owner. Windups, who refer to themselves as New 
People, are illegal in Thailand, and Emiko is forced to work for a sex club owner 
(Raleigh) who bribes the police to ignore her presence. Emiko’s pores are modified to 
make her skin particularly smooth and cool to the touch, meaning she overheats easily 
and must stay inside during the day to avoid the sweltering Thailand climate. For most of 
the book, her humiliation and abuse is acute, as she is forced to perform degrading shows 
at the club and to sleep with whomever Raleigh directs her to. At the same time, as the 
main draw at Bangkok’s most famous sex club, she encounters a host of powerful people 
looking for discreet sex, including the Somdet Chaopraya and Anderson, who becomes 
obsessed with Emiko and tells her of a secret refuge in Northern Thailand where 
Windups live free. Raleigh promises Emiko that she can work to buy her freedom and 
travel to the refuge, but it quickly becomes obvious that he never plans to free her. That 
realization, coupled with her continued degradation at the club, culminates in a dramatic 
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scene in which Emiko ignores her programming and kills the Somdet and his men in the 
club:  
Her first is very fast. Raleigh-san’s throat is soft. […] By the time Raleigh hits the 
floor, Emiko is already bolting across the room, toward the VIP door and the man 
who hurt her most [Chaopraya]. The man who sits and laughs with his friends and 
thinks nothing of the pain he inflicts. She slams into the door. Men look up with 
surprise. Heads turn, mouths open to cry out. The bodyguards are reaching for 
their spring guns, but all of them are moving too slow. None of them are New 
People. (279) 
 
 The slaughter at Raleigh’s club sets the final third of the plot into motion. Akkarat 
assumes that Anderson snuck a military-grade Windup into Thailand to initiate a coup. 
General Pracha believes that Akkarat killed the Somdet in a bid to take over the country 
and open it to Western trade. Anderson refuses to believe that Emiko, programmed to be 
deferential and demure, is even capable of killing eight men. But the slaughter awakens 
new powers in Emiko – or rather, allows her to finally see the power she always had – 
and she slips into the city at night with newfound strength, speed and confidence. The 
cyborg comes to represent a new, subaltern power in Thailand. In so many ways, 
Bacigalupi portrays Bangkok as a living entity. Even the characters who mythologize the 
city as a holy city of souls seem to recognize it as a place that can almost actualize its 
teeming personalities: the streets and peoples, ports and temples coalesce to create a force 
that can seemingly swallow up the very men who seek to rule it. Once Emiko lashes out, 
she becomes an extension of the city, moving throughout Bangkok organically even as 
the streets are brimming with men who seek to destroy her:  
She turns back and smiles at him, seems about to say something, but instead she 
plunges over the balcony’s edge and disappears into the blackness […] Below, 
there is nothing. No person, no scream, no thud, no complaints from the streets as 
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she splatters across the ground. Nothing. Only emptiness. As though the night had 
swallowed her completely. (269) 
 
Emiko moves seamlessly throughout the city because, as Haraway argues, the cyborg’s 
power lies in its liminal nature. If one is too few, and two is too many, the cyborg exists 
somewhere in between. She glides through the night streets with ease because portals and 
passageways, spaces of transition between typical locuses of power and authority, are the 
in-between spaces she has always occupied. In the power vacuum after the Somdet’s 
death, Anderson and Akkarat launch a coup and defeat General Pracha’s environmental 
militia. The novel ends on the day Akkarat and Anderson formally take control of the 
country, when Pracha’s Captain, Kanya, blows up the levees, preferring to flood Bangkok 
than give it over to foreign control. Emiko, quite literally, is the force that destabilizes the 
country and initiates a series of coups and revolutions. Haraway says 
[The Cyborg] is oppositional, utopian, and completely without innocence. No 
longer structured by the polarity of public and private, the cyborg defines a 
technological polis based partly on a revolution of social relations in the oikos, the 
household. Nature and culture are reworked; the one can no longer be the resource 
for appropriation or incorporation by the other. (9) 
 
As Haraway envisions it, the cyborg is a non-essential metaphorical figure that disrupts 
hierarchies of power by destabilizing established binaries. Emiko is the embodiment of 
that figure.    
The BioShock Series and the Posthuman Illusion of Choice 
 
 In my introduction, I argued that utopian and dystopian theories and stories are 
not just elements along a spectrum; they are direct antipathies, linked by their constant 
analysis and appraisal of the other. The threadbare symbiosis between these constructions 
of utopia and dystopia is made especially clear in Ken Levine’s BioShock game series, 
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which is both phenomenally popular and critically-lauded. The series incorporates the 
original BioShock (2007), BioShock 2 (2010), Levine’s opus BioShock Infinite (2013), 
and the downloadable extra BioShock Infinite: Burial At Sea (2014), which combined 
have sold over 16 million copies.
5
 In this chapter, I am only focusing on BioShock and 
BioShock Infinite, which are the most popular and dissected games in the larger series 
and received critical plaudits to match their tidal wave of sales: The British Academy of 
Film and Television Arts named the original BioShock its Game of the Year in 2008, an 
award the game also received from Game Informer and X-Play. BioShock Infinite is even 
more applauded; it received Game of the Year awards from The Associated Press, CNN 
and EGM, and was included on a staggering amount of other best-of-2013 lists
6
 honoring 
everything from its gameplay, to its animation, to the voice work of its actors.  
 The beating heart of each game is a city built to represent the singular utopian 
vision of its founder—and, in the broader thematic strokes of the game, implicit 
criticisms of American Exceptionalism and rampant capitalism. The original BioShock is 
set in the underwater city of Rapture in an alternate 1960:  
                                                 
5
And because games are so easily (and illegally) copied and shared, the actual number of game 
units floating around in public is likely much higher than 16 million.   
 
6
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_accolades_received_by_BioShock_Infinite#Awards_and_no
minations  
117 
 
 
Figure 8. Screencapture of Rapture 
Founded in 1940 deep in the Atlantic sea, Rapture was intended to be an oasis for 
the elite businessmen, inventors and thinkers believed to be stifled by government 
overreach and is an imagined embodiment of Objectivist philosophies. Even the name of 
its founder, business overlord Andrew Ryan, is a nod to Ayn Rand and her many 
Objectivist novels. The player navigates the game as the protagonist Jack, the sole 
survivor of an Atlantic plane crash. Jack swims to a Lighthouse that gives him access to 
Rapture. By Jack’s arrival in 1960, Ryan’s objectivist paradise has been leveled by more 
than a decade of rebellion and class war, and its utopian premise has given way to 
deterioration. Propaganda videos depicting the history and construction of Rapture as a 
neoliberal paradise are set against a crumbling infrastructure through which the ocean is 
constantly seeping in. Thijs van den Berg suggests that “[W]ater is persistently reminding 
the player of the fact that Rapture’s structure is failing. More than anything, Rapture’s 
physical breakdown seems to be indicative of the city’s inability to maintain the purity of 
its ideology” (11). Rapture is supposed to be set apart from a world in which state control 
has stifled innovation and progress, so much so that it was built underwater. And yet the 
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outside world is constantly seeping in, gallons at a time.  Jack is contacted by Atlas, a 
man claiming to lead an underclass rebellion against Ryan’s authority, and recruited into 
the fight against the corporate power that controls the city. 
 The game is set in a city built and nearly destroyed between 1940-1960 to evoke 
the style and zeitgeist of the post-WWII years, and the massive expansion of the 
American economy and military across the globe that accompanied it. Levine intends for 
his audience, for at least most of the game, to assume the mental pose of rebellion against 
the status quo (a mindset we are already conditioned to associate with the 1960s). But 
even if it is meant to echo a past that the player is very familiar with, BioShock performs 
the defamiliarization central to dystopian fiction in its introduction of technologies that 
would be considered incredibly advanced today, never mind the years during and after 
WWII. The fact that Rapture exists underwater is the first of many signs that this is a 
technologically advanced alternate history. Lars Schmeink has argued in “Dystopia, 
Alternate History and the Posthuman in BioShock” that alternate histories, particularly 
those that describe a utopian or dystopian world, serve as a way to rhetorically define 
events from the past while–given the technological advances given to so many alternate 
history narratives—offering a picture of a possible future. Given this construction, 
Rapture investigates the origins of American neoliberalism while giving the player a 
dystopian picture of what a future based entirely around laissez-faire capitalism and 
rational self-interest might devolve into. And as I will discuss in more detail later in this 
chapter, the game itself enacts this critical defamiliarization in the very gameplay. The 
player experiences the story and the world of Columbia almost entirely through Booker’s 
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perspective. Critics evaluate games, particularly first person shooters, on many metrics, 
including the player’s sense of control and autonomy, where the overlapping of player 
and character is made as seamless as possible. BioShock Infinite has been praised for its 
expansive, open-world concept, in which Booker can run, climb, manipulate reality, and 
attach to a series of rails that allow him and Elizabeth to move horizontally and vertically 
throughout Columbia (McCaffrey). But even given that, there’s an inherent distance 
between the player and Booker: you are not experiencing the world; you are experiencing 
the world as a designed character and operate entirely within the limitations of that 
avatar. As the game progresses, the game makes those limitations more stark and 
questions of free will, autonomy and agency are foregrounded.  
 To fight Jack and Atlas, Andrew Ryan has compiled a force of genetically 
modified plasmid-collecting girls called the Little Sisters and their biologically enhanced 
protectors, Big Daddies. A Big Daddy is genetically grafted into massive iron sea diving 
suits, and outfitted with a drill, a laser and a rivet gun. The Little Sisters collect ADAM, a 
plasmid they harvest from the dead bodies littered around Rapture that gives its user 
advanced genetic powers. As Jack, the player has the option of attacking the Big Daddies 
and harvesting the plasmid from a Little Sister. At the game’s end, the player-Jack is 
revealed to be Andrew Ryan’s son while Atlas is unmasked as Frank Fontaine (a slippage 
of Fountainhead, yet another Ayn Rand reference), a gangster who wants to take over 
Rapture and engineer even more profit from its plasmid factories. Fontaine has been 
using a genetic code within Jack activated by the phrase Would you kindly?, which 
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Atlas/Fontaine uses throughout the game to induce Jack to kill his father. As the game 
ends, Fontaine is finally swarmed and killed by Little Sisters. 
 Levine views a world ruled by corporate interests as bleakly as Bacigalupi in The 
Windup Girl. The fundamental problem of Rapture is that the same objectivist ideals the 
city was built to embody and protect are eating the population alive from the inside out. 
Carried through the gameplay to their most extreme conclusion, objectivist values of free 
market capitalism, self-interested decision-making and open competition render everyone 
an object to exploit or an obstacle to overcome in the chase for resources and the mad 
scramble to stay alive. One of the primary questions the player is forced to confront is 
whether and how Jack will harvest plasmid from the Little Sisters, who in turn are 
already harvesting the ADAM plasmid from dead bodies. The game very clearly implies 
that the endpoint of Andrew Ryan’s vision is a world where the less useful (by subjective 
metric) and the weak are literally stripped and harvested for parts. Bacigalupi focuses on 
over-harvested landscapes while Levine depicts a Machiavellian factory magnate ala-
John Galt, but in both the spectre of the robber baron industrialist towers over corporate-
controlled societies.         
 Levine’s view of the posthuman in the original BioShock can at first appear 
ambivalent. Or maybe I should say that the game’s vast web of primary and secondary 
characters encompasses Levine’s many views of the posthuman, which shift fluidly 
between positive and negative. Embodied in the Big Daddies or in Fontaine, the 
posthuman figure seems aggressive and dangerous—outfitted with industrial tools and 
the all-consuming will of a corporation. If you cannot defend yourself, you will be killed 
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or consumed. But when Jack uses a plasmid to give himself superhuman powers to fight a 
Big Daddy, or discovers that his DNA allows him special access to hidden locations in 
Rapture, these posthuman enhancements are cast as subversive and used toward heroic 
ends. In Levine’s hands, posthumanity is an elastic trope that augments a character’s 
behavior, positive or negative.  
 Once the Little Sisters swarm and kill Fontaine, the game’s big twist is revealed: 
the ultimate fate of Jack and Rapture depends on whether the player has harvested the 
ADAM plasmid from any of the Little Sisters during the course of the game. As Jack, the 
player has the option of killing the Little Sisters by violently and quickly ripping the 
plasmid from them, or of ‘healing’ them by slowly harvesting the plasmid in a long 
procedure that returns the Little Sister to being a more-or-less normal child. The player 
can also choose to ignore the Little Sisters. If Jack has healed or ignored all of the Little 
Sisters, five of them follow Jack to the surface, where they live together as a family until 
Jack’s death. If the player has violently harvested even one Little Sister, however, Jack 
becomes an even more barbaric titan than his father, unleashing the powers of Rapture on 
the surface world and stealing a nuclear arsenal. Coupled with the earlier revelation that 
Fontaine had conditioned Jack’s memories and behavior almost from birth, and primed 
Jack with the Would you kindly? command, the game’s thematic preoccupation with 
freewill in a corporate dystopia is made obvious.  
 Ostensibly, free will is the fundamental concept around which Rapture is 
conceived; a sanctuary away from society’s exploitation of individual genius animated by 
personal ambition and the invisible hand. As he is being killed, Andrew Ryan repeatedly 
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proclaims, “A man chooses, a slave obeys.” Ryan chooses to enact his own death in a 
final performance of what he desperately wants to perceive as his own free will. 
BioShock itself is deeply cynical of free will, which is portrayed as illusory, and 
suspicious of systems that claim to be free and anti-authoritarian. Tim Welsh has argued 
that video games themselves offer an illusion of agency to players that the programming 
of the medium has yet to transcend:  
Video games often seduce their players with fantasies of agency and power, the 
chance to play as super-human heroes set against evil, injustice, and oppression. 
Yet, the one power gaming can never offer its player fully is self-determination. 
Despite overtures of customization, open-world environments, and all variety of 
choice, the gamer is always caught between gamic action and algorithmic control. 
In this scene, BioShock violates the player’s implicit trust that the game will tell 
him how to inhabit the (virtual) world and then leave him to play. It strips away 
the illusion of choice. (Welsh) 
 
The game undeniably offers choices to the player, and attaches major consequences to 
those choices. Jack is either liberated or damned according to the decision the player 
makes in harvesting the Little Sisters. But do we laud the game for giving the player a 
larger degree of choice, going so far as to map out very distinct futures that hinge on in-
game choices? Or does the fact that only a few possible endings exist, each imagined and 
programmed by a team of writers and developers, only underscore the tension between 
gamic action and algorithmic control? As Welsh says, BioShock’s deception is revealed 
in the final scene between Jack and Ryan: While you have made choices along the way 
that will augment the plot, the larger turns of the story have been mapped out. What first 
appear to be freely made choices is later revealed to be part of Atlas/Fontaine’s carefully 
mapped plot. At its climax the game suddenly wrestles the illusion of control away from 
the player, who cannot even prevent the Would you Kindly? command from inducing 
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Jack to kill Ryan. In a city built to personify free will, the player mostly observes the 
final moments of the game, preordained by decisions made much earlier. 
 BioShock Infinite only expands and deepens the original game’s interest in free 
will and agency within crumbling systems. As in the original, BioShock Infinite is set in 
an other-worldly city built as a monument to its founder’s towering ego. A dark parallel 
to Rapture, Columbia is a floating, airborne metropolis commissioned by the U.S. 
Government to be proudly displayed at the 1893 World’s Fair. The city itself models the 
white, marbled grandeur of the Chicago World’s Fair, with its founder, Zachary 
Comstock, etched at the very center: 
 
Figure 9. Screencapture of Columbia 
Columbia, named for an Archangel Comstock claims to have seen in a vision, is 
meant to embody the concept and era of American Exceptionalism: the floating city 
could travel from country to country, world’s fair to world’s fair, highlighting the 
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superior uniqueness of American life and culture. But in the game’s alternate history, 
Comstock orders Columbia to fire on Beijing during the 1903 Boxer Rebellion, severing 
an already frayed relationship with the U.S. Government. Columbia secedes from the 
United States, disappears into the sky, and Comstock casts himself in the image of a 
prophet who condemns America as “the Sodom below.” Comstock reorganizes the 
culture of Columbia into one that fanatically values purity, righteousness and piety, and 
which exists primarily as a cult of his personality. Comstock declares his daughter, 
Elizabeth, the heir to Columbia and the fulfillment of a bizarre succession prophecy, and 
enflames the city with warnings of a coming “False Shepherd” who will orchestrate the 
destruction of the city.  
 BioShock Infinite begins in 1912 when the player arrives as Booker DeWitt, a 
mercenary former agent of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency. Booker is sent to 
Columbia through a lighthouse, tasked with rescuing Elizabeth in order to wipe away a 
debt.  Like the objectivist philosophies that buttress Rapture, the pious, Romanesque 
façade of Columbia hastily deteriorates. Comstock weaves natavist racism and ideologies 
of white purity and privilege into the fabric of Columbian society, and in the absence of 
federal labor laws, a non-white underclass of slaves and indentured servants wallow in 
poverty and abuse while racial propaganda adorns the city: 
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Figure 10. Screencapture of Columbia 
There are many vestiges of a vibrant civil life: museums, gardens and memorials, 
all styled to match the grandeur of the World’s Fair, and each a hotbed of racist dogma, 
minstrelsy, and embellished history. Columbia’s “Hall of Heroes,” for example, re-
imagines the Battle of Wounded Knee (which Comstock fought in, according to lore) and 
Columbia’s crusade in the Boxer Rebellion as heroic interventions in righteous battles 
against barbaric people. As the player passes into the Boxer Rebellion exhibit, an 
animatronic “Patriot” declares “Twas yellow skin and slanted eyes that did betray us with 
their lies. Until they crossed the righteous path of our Prophets holy wrath.” Everything 
in Columbia is on message; it all works to stoke xenophobia and elitism and unify the 
paranoia they produce into a slavish devotion to Comstock, who amplifies every stake 
with the language of prophecy and pledges to protect Columbians from invaders and false 
shepherds.  
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 The institutional violence and racism celebrated throughout Columbian culture 
manifests everywhere in its citizens. Only moments after entering Columbia through a 
Baptismal tunnel and wandering through idyllic city streets, Booker is roped into a street 
side carnival where the player is encouraged to stone an interracial couple for violating 
Columbia’s strict purity laws.7 The city descends into destructive chaos when Booker 
kills a policeman at the carnival and quickly rescues Elizabeth. Together, playing as 
Booker with Elizabeth as the A.I. companion, the player spends much of the game 
eluding a number of forces: Comstock’s men; a giant mechanical bird called Songbird 
programmed to protect Elizabeth while also keeping her from ever leaving Columbia; and 
the Vox Populi, a militant underground rebellion of oppressed-class workers led by Daisy 
Fitzroy. In Levine’s games, the separation between utopian and dystopia is particularly 
blurry: one man’s utopia is built on the exploitation of many; the dystopian rubble of that 
same utopian city is staging ground for someone’s revolution—their hope for something 
better. The dystopian lurks in the shadows and fault lines of the utopian. 
 Some discussion of BioShock Infinite suggests that the game discards the original 
BioShock’s narrow focus on corporate, capitalistic dystopias for a more expansive look at 
American culture. In total, BioShock Infinite presents a more expansive world in which to 
roam and questions systems of racism, poverty and dogma with more depth than the first 
game could even attempt. Still, I argue that the scope of this game is actually a very 
logical extension of the original game’s critiques that have been fine-tuned in light of the 
worldwide financial collapse and subsequent Wall Street protests happening during the 
game’s development. If there is any figure in Columbia that rivals Comstock for 
                                                 
7
Which the game does not allow, of course.  
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prominence, it is Jeremiah Fink, the city’s most powerful industrialist and its wealthiest 
citizen. Fink owns nearly every patent in Columbia, and almost all of the city’s 
manufacturing is produced at Finktown, a company town built practicing frenetic worker 
exploitation. Fink built his conglomerate on slave and servant laborers he bought in the 
United States and transported to Columbia. As with BioShock’s depiction of Frank 
Fontaine, Fink freely blurs the line between businessman and criminal, capitalist and 
baron. He pays his workers in money that is only redeemable at Fink’s company stores; 
he exploits and abuses the underclass, most of whom live in a shantytown on the lower 
levels of the city; he savagely busts unions. Fink erects gilded statues of himself 
throughout Finktown.  
 And it is here that BioShock Infinite deepens the critique Kevin Levine sketched 
against unregulated capitalism in BioShock. Finktown, like Rapture, is a self-indicting 
horror show of neoliberalism. But more than that, the images of Fink and Comstock—
etched in gold and bronze and marble—dominate the Columbia skyline and set up the 
Capitalist and the Prophet as joint antagonists who loom and leer over the city.
8
 They 
each profit on systems of oppression and exploitation maintained by narratives of fear. In 
a city originally built to showcase the exceptional uniqueness of America, our two largest 
cultural forces—Big Business and the Church—are presented as poisonous, violent 
institutions with monomaniacal leaders. Levine imagines a resistance to this in the form 
of the Vox Populi, who are lead by the increasingly militaristic Daisy Fitzroy. Fitzroy 
was purchased by Fink as a “Negro convict” in Georgia and brought to Columbia to work 
                                                 
8A symbiosis that has played out in a lot of recent (often dystopian) fiction. P.T. Anderson’s  
There Will Be Blood (2007)  comes to my mind with its duel between the towering oil man Daniel 
Plainview and the pre-television evangelist Eli.  
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for Lady Comstock. When Lady Comstock was murdered, Fitzroy was framed for her 
death, fled, and later resurfaced leading the Vox Populi workers rebellion inside 
Finktown. Levine has consistently argued that the Vox Populi shouldn’t be understood as 
solely analogous to the Occupy Wall Street movement. In an interview with the 
Washington Post, he says the BioShock Infinite writing team researched many historical 
examples of student and worker revolutionary groups, including the West German Red 
Army Faction (or Baader-Meinhoff Group). In the same interview, Levine admits that he 
sees Occupy Wall Street as a descendant of many of these populist rebellions, and even 
used the protests to refine conceptualizations of the Vox Populi as the game was delayed 
and re-worked several times before its ultimately successful release: 
I’ve been spending a lot of time watching Occupy Wall Street. The complaint is 
that they don’t have a consistent message. It’s been interesting to reflect upon the 
movement’s message, watching it crystallize. You can watch that, and this is a 
challenge I’ve had writing [the Vox Populi]. Leftist movements are always less 
organized. There’s a messaging machine on the right, where they’ll come up with 
something and the next day you have 10, 20 people out on the news using those 
points. Leftist groups tend not to like authority; nobody in them tends to listen to 
it. So Occupy Wall Street has been helping me because I’ve been struggling to 
figure out how the Vox Populi get to the point in the demo. 
 
The exploited workers are disgruntled but disorganized until Fitzroy–and later, 
inadvertently, Booker—assumes pivotal roles and gives the Vox Populi leadership a 
unifying message. But as it has with Andrew Ryan, Fontaine, Comstock and Fink and 
many other characters in the BioShock universe, power corrupts strong leaders. Fitzroy 
guides the Vox Populi on an increasingly violent mission to kill the Founders and take 
control of all of Columbia. Fitzroy slashes Fink’s throat, smears his blood across her own 
face, and then is killed by Elizabeth before she can also kill Fink’s young son.  
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 Although the game is sympathetic to the politics behind the Occupy Movement, it 
is suspicious of social movements and dynamic leaders from any background. In Playing 
at Resistance, Thijs van den Berg argues that BioShock attempts to imagine a resistance 
to dominate neoliberal ideologies, but invariably fails because a desire to resist the 
neoliberal paradigm isn’t by itself enough to imagine alternative paradigms: 
While BioShock clearly expresses an interest in destroying Rand’s extreme 
version of capitalist economy—by showing the moral bankruptcy of “rational 
self-interest,” the breakdown of its utopian environment, its decline into class 
struggle, etc.—the game simultaneously has trouble seeing its project through. 
Certainly, BioShock is capable of voicing critique on laissez-faire economics by 
rendering a dystopian version of Rand’s vision. However, the narrative seems to 
be constrained in this respect. It is unable to complete its destructive mission and, 
in spite of itself, continues to make use of the notions of private ownership and 
profit. Both the game’s continued reliance on economies of play and its narrative 
denouement express this limit to its imagination. (11) 
 
Van den Berg’s argument is that the game cannot truly imagine an end to capitalist 
systems of wealth and power when neoliberal ideology is so culturally embedded that the 
core concepts are fundamental parts of the game play. When the Vox Populi movement 
starts matching the hysteria and violence of Fink and Comstock, BioShock Infinite 
acknowledges that, historically, it has been almost impossible even for populist 
revolutions to imagine or enact change that displaces neoliberal ideology. Perhaps Levine 
and the writers are arguing that concepts ripe for abuse–laissez faire Capitalism, rational 
self-interest, exceptionalism and moral rectitude—are too fundamentally woven into 
American culture to imagine a functional alternative. More significantly, perhaps 
BioShock Infinite intimates that its audience—you, the player—are a significant part of 
the problem.  
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 Despite being popular across the globe, it is easy to envision the ideal BioShock 
Infinite player as an American, or someone familiar enough with American culture and 
history to recognize the critiques Levine offers. I believe BioShock Infinite uses the 
character of Elizabeth to argue that the audience, embodied in the player, is as informed 
by neoliberal ideologies as the characters, and therefore just as problematic. Elizabeth is 
the best and most interesting character in BioShock Infinite and the BioShock series as a 
whole because she encompasses multitudes and embodies Haraway’s concept of the 
cyborg, a figure missing from the original game despite a bounty of posthuman 
characters. Elizabeth isn’t biomechanical like Emiko in The Windup Girl, but she has 
powers which at first appear almost supernatural. She has the ability to open up what the 
game calls “tears,” or windows into alternate timelines and histories which she and her 
companions can pass into, or which she can pull things out of and into the timeline she 
currently inhabits. For most of the game, Elizabeth uses only a very small portion of her 
powers; the rest have been drained from her using a giant siphon, which powers much of 
the Columbia’s incredible flying technology and keeps Elizabeth from leaving the city. 
As Booker and Elizabeth run and fight their way through most of Columbia, the 
interwoven history of the city and the characters is revealed: Booker and Comstock are 
the same person, only living in alternate realities. In one reality, Booker is so disturbed by 
his own atrocities at Wounded Knee that he accepts a baptism in a river and is reborn as 
Zachary Hale Comstock. In another reality, Booker rejects the baptism, becomes a 
private detective in New York, and has a daughter named Anna, who he sells to pay off 
his gambling debts. Anna is sold to the Luteces, a twin brother and sister team who 
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discovered how to travel between parallel universes and who work on Comstock’s behalf. 
In his past, Booker changed his mind almost immediately after selling Anna, and 
attempts to rescue her as the Luteces pull the girl through a tear in time and deliver her to 
Comstock, who renames her Elizabeth and anoints her his heir and the fulfillment of his 
succession prophecy. Comstock is Booker. Anna is Elizabeth. Booker is Elizabeth’s 
father.  
 In the last quarter of the game, Elizabeth directs and coordinates nearly all the 
action and momentum; she opens tears, visits Booker in multiple time periods, and 
destroys the Songbird that held her and Booker captive by opening a tear and sending the 
three of them to Rapture, where Booker and Elizabeth materialize safely within the city 
walls and the Songbird is crushed by the weight of the ocean when he materializes 
outside them. But more than that, Elizabeth becomes a kind of Virgil leading the way and 
cultivating the player’s perspective on the many successive revelations in the game’s 
climax. In a very effortless way, the game finesses Elizabeth’s evolution from frightened 
protectorate to lead protagonist, displacing both Booker and the player as the game’s 
prime mover. Elizabeth is initially divided along the binary of public and private; she is a 
public figure in Columbia, crucial to the entire prophecy that Comstock has orchestrated, 
but also buried away in a private tower guarded by the Songbird. The more she becomes 
aware of the reality of life in Columbia, the more the public façade of her persona 
crumbles. Elizabeth cannot hide in plain sight like Emiko in that future Thailand, but she 
is still a kind of subaltern force: she opens tear after tear, exchanging bits of this reality 
with the next, literally blending together the binaries of time, space and personal history. 
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More than that, the game explains that Elizabeth obtained her powers when Booker 
initially tried to rescue her from the Luteces: the tear in time closed around Elizabeth’s 
hand, severing the tip of her finger. Elizabeth is very literally a liminal figure: she can 
open tears in time because parts of her already exist in multiple realities.  
 Haraway argues that the cyborg is a both/and entity, who destabilizes patriarchal, 
racist and colonial hierarchies, and no matter what timeline Elizabeth tears into, the 
player consistently sees Columbia’s future as dystopian. Every reality is defined by war 
and violence rooted in the patriarchal, colonialist dogma that Comstock brings to 
Columbia. Elizabeth takes Booker to a realm of infinite lighthouses, telling him that, 
while each lighthouse represents a different timeline, the core components are always the 
same: “There will always be man. There will always be a lighthouse. There will always 
be a city.”         
 
Figure 11. Infinite Lighthouses 
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That is, even if the variables can change infinitely, the defining characteristics of 
this reality will always be the same. Booker will always be Booker Dewitt, who sells his 
daughter into slavery and accelerates the mass destruction of Columbia. Or Booker will 
become Comstock and bring Columbia into existence. As G. Christopher Williams 
writes: 
Indeed, Elizabeth seems to be defining the BioShock universe, why Rapture 
exists, why Columbia exists, as variations on constant themes.  In Levine’s 
iterations of the BioShock universe, it seems there is indeed always a lighthouse, 
always a man, always a city. 
 
Booker can never change his future in a way that would make it fundamentally different 
because he cannot undo his own past.  
 And yet, I argue the end of the game is revolutionary. Having shown Booker all 
the ways in which his life invariably bends to a dystopian future, Elizabeth opens a tear 
and brings Booker back to the river where he was first offered the baptism. Confronted 
by many iterations of Elizabeth, Booker acquiesces and agrees to be drowned in the river 
– an action that occurs as a cut scene, removing all control from the player. 
 
Figure 12. Bioshock Infinite 
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When you look across the many Elizabeth’s confronting you in a shallow river the 
game’s message seems laid bare: In a realm of endless lighthouses—literally, limitless 
choice—the player-protagonist has none. In both games, whether through the figure of 
Andrew Ryan or Zachary Comstock, whole civilizations are ostensibly built around a 
pure market ideology of choice and free will. But the premise of choice is consistently 
invalidated by the end of each game. Williams continues: 
[T]he most naturalistic moment in the game’s closing scenes is when Booker, the 
man standing in for you, the player, declares something that he doesn’t listen to 
where anyone tells him to go, to what anyone tells him to do.  Elizabeth’s simple 
response is as devastating as the “Would you kindly?” moment in BioShock and 
more to the point: ‘You already have.’ 
 
BioShock Infinite carefully shepherds this point: that your sense of control and free will is 
misplaced. There will always be a curtain pulled to reveal a hidden puppet master or 
make obvious our powerlessness.  
 Still, says the game, what you need to counteract this sense of encroaching 
oppression is a force that can move in and out of these systems of control: the cyborg 
figure. Because Elizabeth can create tears and move through alternate timelines, she is 
able to show Booker the realm of infinite lighthouses. Only there can Booker see the 
infinite repetition of the pattern. And only there can Booker see that the only way to 
prevent Comstock and Columbia is to drown before the Prophet can be baptized into 
existence. You could say that Booker chooses to die, but I’d say that is a way to 
rationalize what is really Booker’s only option; he’s just been given the chance to 
embrace it willingly. As if to reinforce the point, the very ending of the game is 
essentially one long cut scene—completely displacing the player from any notion of 
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being in control. Only Elizabeth has a modicum of control, which she owes to the fluidity 
with which she can move through the fabric of time. As Booker dies, she begins to 
disappear too–his death means Anna, and later Elizabeth, never exist. The cyborg here is 
the one who finally does make the active choice to die, not to the aggrandizement of an 
ego, but to end a cycle of violence and destruction by deleting it entirely.  
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CLOSING REMARKS 
 When I first started writing this project, I was convinced that the sudden swell in 
popularity of dystopian texts was very narrowly tied the abundance of images of 
terrorism onscreen. Indeed, that claim still forms the bedrock of my argument: the 
September 11
th  
attacks, the 2004 train bombings in Madrid, the 2005 bus bombings in 
London and other violent in the first half of the new millennium were mass mediated in 
ways that no other acts of terrorism, to that point, had been. Millions of stories and 
images—from witnesses, survivors, news cameras and cellphones—instantly flow into 
the global media, where they form a tapestry of destruction and death that the public 
constantly relives and renegotiates. In Chapter Three, I quote an essay by Francisco 
Collado-Rodriguez about Cormac McCarthy’s most recent novels, in which he describes 
popular culture as “structurally traumatized” (81), a phrasing I find productive. The idea 
is not just that death and destruction are popular topics for fiction; rather, that the imagery 
of this death and destruction is so vivid and viewed with such repetition that it 
fundamentally changes our society.  Mass destruction—and the looming threat (real, 
imagined or somewhere in between) of mass extinction—became the imaginative 
framework of our culture. 
 While writing, there were dozens of texts and stories I wanted to discuss that 
ultimately fell outside the focus of my individual chapters, but still reflect our structurally 
traumatized world. In particular, the impact that our dystopian zeitgeist has had on 
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superhero films, I think a compelling argument can be made in this manner for 
Christopher Nolan’s The Dark Knight, a movie which was nominated for  ten Academy 
Awards and for which Heath Ledger won a posthumous Oscar. Ledger’s Joker, called 
one of the best screen villains of all time by the American Film Institute (“100 Greatest 
Heroes & Villains), is a subaltern force that destabilizes everything in the film’s universe: 
he steals money from mob-owned banks, executes police officers and public attorneys, 
and ignites bombs around Gotham City. At the time of the film’s release, the New York 
Times editorial board wrote:  
The Joker—who is particularly maniacal and nihilistic in this version of the 
Batman story—is an Osama Bin Laden-style terrorist. He not only engages in 
mass carnage, he aims to damage a free society by instilling fear in the public. 
[…] And Batman is something else: a darker response to the terrorist threat. He 
sets up a form of domestic surveillance, using people’s cell phones. He uses 
torture to uncover the details of an ongoing plot. 
 
The Joker engages in all of this violence purely for the pleasure of watching the chaos 
unfold. He proves nearly impossible to apprehend because he disobeys cinematic and 
narrative conventions: he burns all the money he steals so that he cannot be bought. His 
scarred face is smeared in clown makeup, so no one has ever really seen his true face. 
Every time The Joker describes the origins of his scars, he tells a different story of violent 
facial disfigurement, so that either the other characters or the audience know what is true. 
The audience never sees where he sleeps, eats or hides. He is an opaque force that drifts 
in and out of the shadows to sow anarchy and violence. I think the New York Times 
editorial is correct that The Joker of The Dark Knight embodies the figure of the 
contemporary terrorist: disconnected from larger institutions and groups, waging real and 
psychological war on a major urban setting. But we can also take the character and his 
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impact on Gotham City to represent the psychological experience of living under the 
threat of terrorism: to feel haunted by a force whose face is unknown and whose origins 
are difficult to scrutinize. 
 So captivating to audiences was this portrait of a corrupt city beset by an 
inscrutable terrorist that many other superhero films have tried to copy the dour, dystopic 
tone of The Dark Knight. Even Superman—perhaps the prototype of the charming, 
upbeat, indestructible superhero figure—is reimagined as a disaffected millennial. 
Writing about the 2013 film Man of Steel, Darren Franich remarks, “The outcast/age of 
autism overtones are miles removed from the old-fashioned notion of Clark as an All-
American football-playing über-kid; likewise, the film’s portrayal of a young-adult Clark 
as a job-hopping wanderer feels tapped into our recessionary age.” And Daniel Bettridge 
adds: “It's not for nothing that Man of Steel eschews the series' cinematic tradition in 
favor of emulating the tone of The Dark Knight. It's no longer enough for Superman to 
save the world; instead, he needs to spend his screen time contemplating his place in it.” 
In Man of Steel, Clark Kent can’t escape being sucked into the moribund culture of the 
new millennium. So much so, that the movie ends with an extended battle sequence 
between Superman and the film’s villain, General Zod, that literally destroys half of 
lower Manhattan. We don’t frequently conceptualize Superman as dystopian character, 
but when he spends most of the movie as an outcast, and the final battle ends in massive 
death and destruction, it’s difficult to see this version of the character in any other light. 
 I mention The Dark Knight Rises and Man of Steel not only because I enjoy the 
superhero genre, but also because they are among a wave of texts that have given me 
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pause to reconsider whether the popularity of the dystopian genre is still so narrowly 
tethered to the War on Terror. As I argued in Chapter Four, even when the preeminent 
public preoccupation shifted from terrorism to class, wealth and corporate power after the 
2008 global financial collapse, writers and videogame creators still eagerly employed 
dystopian tropes. The Walking Dead is a grisly, existentially traumatic show about 
zombies that also happens to be the most popular cable program of all time, especially 
among women (Valenti, 1). Other current shows, like Black Mirror, Continuum, The 
Leftovers and The Last Man on Earth, all feature dystopian worlds, but range from action 
thrillers, to heavy drama, to comedy. The Hunger Games franchise remains exceedingly 
popular. In short, our cultural preoccupation with the dystopian remains. 
 But why and where does it go? I think we need to acknowledge terrorism and war 
have recaptured a major portion of our attention, even in a culture that is clearly war-
weary. The emergence of groups like Al-Shabab and Boko Haram in northern Africa, and 
the Islamic State’s program of terror, war and rape across Syria and Iraq fit so easily into 
the lexicon we developed during the initial mania of the War on Terror. Perhaps the 
dystopian remains popular because the international community, by and large, remains 
plagued by war, terrorism and instability. And yet, I wonder if it won’t soon become 
obvious that the dystopian has attached itself as a permanent lens through which this 
generation—the one that came of age during the War on Terror—views itself and the 
world at large. By that, I mean that the way that the dystopian genre has sustained its 
critical and general popularity for well more than a decade says to me that the experience 
and imagery of widespread terrorism is so intense that it becomes a structural element of 
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society. That shows like The Last Man on Earth (2015) can find comedy in apocalyptic 
scenarios is a sign that our culture is starting to recognize and reflect on its own 
fascination with the dystopian. 
 It is of course difficult to predict where the genre and the field of criticism 
growing around it will go in the future, but I argue that the posthuman element of the 
texts analyzed in Chapter Four (The Windup Girl, BioShock and BioShock Infinite) will 
play a significant role in dystopian stories to come. Already Emmy-nominated shows like 
Orphan Black are telling stories contemplating human cloning, body modifications, and 
the expansive power of technology corporations. I think dystopian writers rightfully see 
the posthuman as a force that has the power to destabilize current structures of authority 
and domination. Indeed, in a recent Guardian essay, Paul Mason argues that we are in the 
beginning stages of the end of capitalism: and that the force bringing about this end is the 
disruptive digital network of information and culture that we are able to access. More 
specifically, he argues that access to uninterrupted information and social networks is 
actively creating a new kind of human being, one more willing to distrust systems of 
power, abandon past ideas, and experiment with conceptions of the self: “But we can see 
their prefigurative forms in the lives of young people all over the world breaking down 
20th-century barriers around sexuality, work, creativity and the self.” Questions 
technology, evolution and the definition of “human” will drive the genre. Ironically, 
Mason’s essay is subtitled “Without us noticing, we are entering into the postcapitalist 
era. At the heart of further change to come is information technology [...] The old ways 
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will take a long while to disappear, but it’s time to be utopian.”1 Perhaps if old ways 
disappear, and if the systems of power and wealth we so distrust are upended, then a 
culture that has been so transfixed by dystopian fear will evolve to a more utopian hope 
for something better.
                                                 
1
This really is the sub-headline. It’s quite long.  
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